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Firefighter and public safety is 
our first priority. 
Management today  Fire 
Aids and guides from the past, 
some illustrated here, can 
help improve the fire behavior 
forecasting capabilities needed 
today in both fire use and fire 
suppression. See the articles 
in this issue for descriptions. 
The FIRE 21 symbol (shown below and on the 
cover) stands for the safe and effective use of 
wildland fire, now and throughout the 21st 
century. Its shape represents the fire triangle 
(oxygen, heat, and fuel). The three outer red 
triangles represent the basic functions of 
wildland fire organizations (planning, operations, 
and aviation management), and the three critical 
aspects of wildland fire management (prevention, 
suppression, and prescription). The black interior 
represents land affected by fire; the emerging 
green points symbolize the growth, restoration, 
and sustainability associated with fire-adapted 
ecosystems. The flame represents fire itself as an 
ever-present force in nature. For more informa­
tion on FIRE 21 and the science, research, and 
innovative thinking behind it, contact Mike 
Apicello, National Interagency Fire Center, 
208-387-5460. 
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3 FORECASTING WILDLAND 
FIRE BEHAVIOR: AIDS, 
GUIDES, AND KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
PROTOCOLS 
M.E. Alexander and D.A. Thomas 
C
an wildland fire behavior really 
be predicted? That depends on 
how accurate you expect the 
prediction to be. The minute-by­
minute movement of a fire will 
probably never be predictable—cer­
tainly not from weather conditions 
forecasted many hours before the 
fire. Nevertheless, practice and 
experienced judgment in assessing 
the fire environment, coupled with 
a systematic method of calculating 
fire behavior, yield surprisingly 
good results (Rothermel 1983). 
This is the third and final special 
issue of Fire Management Today in 
a series of issues devoted to the 
subject of wildland fire behavior. 
The first two issues contained 36 
articles dealing with wildland fire 
behavior case studies and analyses 
published in Fire Management 
Today and its predecessors between 
1937 and 2000. These two issues 
contained lead articles on various 
aspects of those subjects (Alexander 
and Thomas 2003a, 2003b). Not 
included in these two issues are 
two recent articles on fire behavior 
published in Fire Management 
Today (Brown 2002; Cornwall 
2003). 
Marty Alexander is a senior fire behavior 
research officer with the Canadian Forest 
Service at the Northern Forestry Centre, 
Edmonton, Alberta; and Dave Thomas is 
the regional fuels specialist for the USDA 
Forest Service, Intermountain Region, 
Ogden, UT. 
This issue is devoted to aids, 
guides, and knowledge-based proto­
cols involved in predicting wildland 
fire behavior for safe and effective 
fire suppression (Alexander 2000). 
It includes 21 articles published 
from 1947 to 1998. A recent article 
by Weick (2002) that emphasizes 
the importance of human factors in 
the field of fire behavior forecasting 
could have easily been included. 
By systematically reflecting upon our fire behavior 
forecasts and the tools that helped us prepare 
them, we become the masters of fire behavior 
models and not their servants. 
The Practice of 
Predicting Wildland
Fire Behavior 
More than 50 years ago, Barrows 
(1951) outlined the basic concepts 
of predicting or forecasting wild-
land fire behavior that are still very 
valid today (see the excerpt on 
pages 6–7). As figure 1 shows, the 
process of judging fire behavior can 
be divided into five simple steps: 
Figure 1—Judging fire behavior requires systematic analysis of many factors 
(from Barrows 1951). 
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1. Basic knowledge.  The founda- We recommend that fire behavior analysts adopt 
tion for judging probable fire  the framework of the After Action Review, as 
behavior must rest on basic  described on the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned  knowledge of the principles of 
Center Website.  combustion: What is necessary 
for combustion to occur? What 
causes the rate of combustion to 
increase or decrease? How may 
combustion be reduced or 
stopped? 
2. Forest knowledge.  Three basic 
factors in a forest area—weather, 
topography, and fuels—are 
important indicators of fire 
behavior. 
3. Aids and guides.  Several aids 
and guides are available to assist 
in evaluating weather, topogra­
phy, and fuels. 
4. Estimate of situation.  The prob­
abilities for various patterns of 
fire behavior are systematically 
explored through an estimate of 
the situation based upon the 
combined effects of weather, 
fuels, and topography. 
5. Decision.  The end product of 
the fire behavior analysis is a 
decision outlining when, where, 
and how to control the fire and 
spelling out any special safety 
measures required. 
For this third and final issue in the 
series dealing with wildland fire 
behavior, we chose articles from 
past issues that reflect the various 
elements involved in Barrows’ 
(1951) process of judging or pre­
dicting wildland fire behavior. 
Comparisons of Fire
Behavior Predictions 
and Forecasts Needed
 
ior predictions to actual fire behav­
ior. This is the only way one can 
truly meet Barrows’ (1951) advice 
to “evaluate the combined effects of 
all significant factors influencing 
fire behavior.” 
Conscious reflection, not as an 
afterthought but as a normal rou­
tine in the day-to-day business of 
fire behavior forecasting, involves a 
highly professional method of ques­
tioning whether our fire behavior 
aids, guides, and protocols are 
working. By systematically reflect­
ing upon our fire behavior forecasts 
and the tools that helped us pre­
pare them, we become the masters 
of fire behavior models and not 
their servants. 
To paraphrase Dr. Karl Weick 
(2003)—coauthor of Managing the 
Unexpected: Assuring High 
Performance in an Age of 
Complexity (Weick and Sutcliffe 
2001)*—becoming a mindful FBAN 
is a constant struggle for alertness, 
and to be alert means to “constant­
ly and diligently seek instances 
where your model didn’t work and 
identify indicators you missed that 
signaled expectations weren’t being 
filled….” 
We recommend that FBANs and 
others adopt the framework of the 
After Action Review, as described on 
by putting their fire behavior fore­
casts through a reflective scrutiny 
based on four basic questions: 
1. What did your fire behavior fore­
cast say would happen? 
2. What actually happened? 
3. Why did the fire behavior aid, 
guide, or protocol predict accu­
rately (or inaccurately)? 
4. Finally (and most importantly), 
if you had to make this forecast 
again, what would you do differ­
ently? How would you change 
the way you used the aid, guide, 
protocol, or model/system in this 
different approach? 
Judging the quality of a fire behav­
ior prediction or forecast solely on 
the outcome can be hazardous. By 
chance, good predictions or fore­
casts can sometimes have bad out­
comes and bad predictions or fore­
casts can result in good outcomes 
(fig. 2). From a practical stand­
point, overpredictions can be easily 
readjusted without serious, lasting 
consequences, whereas underpre­
dictions can be disastrous (table 1) 
from the standpoint of human safe­
ty (i.e., for the public and for fire-
Outcome 
Good  Bad 
Good  Objective  Unlucky 
Lucky  Deserving
F
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
After 50 years, the only item we  the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned 
would add to Barrows’ (1951) out- Center Website (<http://www.wild­
line is the need for the fire behavior  firelessons.net/AftrIncdntRpt.htm>), 
analyst (FBAN) and others engaged 
in wildland fire management to 
* See D. Iverson, “Book Review: Managing the 
Bad 
Figure 2—The 2-by-2 fire behavior predic­
tion or forecast matrix (based on Saveland
pause for a moment to compare, in  Unexpected” (Fire Management Today 62(4) [Fall 2002]: 
a rigorous and systematic fashion,  36–37); and J. Williams, “Next Steps in Wildland Fire 
and Wade 1991) shows that even good fore- Management” (Fire Management Today 62(4) [Fall
the FBAN’s or their own fire behav­ 2002]: 31–35).  casts can have unlucky outcomes. 
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Wildland Fire Management* 
Although forestry dates back 
hundreds of years, organized for­
est fire research has been under­
way less than 30 years. During 
much of this time the major 
efforts have been devoted to stud­
ies of fire behavior or closely 
allied fields. As a result, much 
has been learned about how fires 
act, in spite of the relatively short 
period of organized effort. 
Knowledge stemming from any 
research projects, plus the experi­
ence gained from the control of 
thousands of fires, provide a good 
foundation for a general under­
standing of the complex subject. 
The main purpose of this publica­
tion is to summarize the most 
important aspects of fire behavior 
as we now know them. The 
author recognizes that there are 
still many unknowns in the 
behavior of forest and range fires. 
These unknowns will be the tar­
gets of future research. In the 
meantime it is important that the 
best available information on fire 
behavior be placed in the hands 
of the men who must carry on 
the vital task of fire control … 
Knowledge of fire behavior is an 
essential requirement for fire­
fighters. Successful fire control 
operations depend, first of all, 
upon the ability of the protection 
*From Barrows (1951) handbook Fire Behavior in 
Northern Rocky Mountain Forests. 
forces to judge where and when 
fires will start and how they will 
behave once ignition takes place. 
Every member of the firefighting 
team from ranger to smokechaser 
must be able to make reliable esti­
mates of the behavior of fires burn­
ing under a wide variety of condi­
tions. These estimates must be 
good enough to provide the basis 
for decisions which will lead to fast, 
efficient, and safe firefighting. 
Fire Behavior and 
Suppression Methods 
The character and difficulty of the 
suppression job on every fire 
depends largely upon the behavior 
of the fire. The speed, strength, and 
type of attack are governed by the 
location of the fire and its reaction 
to the surrounding environment. 
Each change in environment may 
change fire behavior and in turn 
call for some adjustment in fire­
fighting strategy and techniques. 
The ability of the man handling the 
suppression job to evaluate the 
behavior pattern largely determines 
the efficiency and economy of the 
entire firefighting operation. 
A primary purpose of evaluating the 
behavior of every fire is to reduce 
or prevent unexpected “blowups 
and runs.” A careful check on 
everything that will affect the 
behavior of a fire reduces the 
chances for the “unexpected.” 
When a skilled size-up has been 
made in advance, the unexpected 
may become expected and a poten­
tial blow or run may often be antic­
ipated soon enough to be prevent­
ed. Effective fire control requires 
that suppression plans and action 
be carried out in accordance with 
continuing estimates and forecasts 
of what the fire is going to do. 
Analysis of fire behavior is a basic 
requirement in firefighting applica­
ble equally to the one-man smoke-
chaser or the big fire where hun­
dreds of men are in action. 
Fire Behavior and 
Safety 
An important reason for under­
standing fire behavior is to provide 
safety for the firefighters. Every fire 
behavior situation calls for specific 
safety measures. Experience gained 
from fighting thousands of fires has 
shown that the suppression job 
may be accomplished with a rea­
sonable degree of safety. To achieve 
safety it is highly important that all 
firefighters have a general knowl­
edge and the leaders of the fire­
fighting forces have a high degree 
of knowledge of fire behavior. 
The most dangerous individual in a 
suppression organization is usually 
the man who is afraid of fire. Fear is 
largely a result of ignorance. Many 
risks can be eliminated from fire­
fighting if each man knows what to 
expect the fire to do. The average 
firefighter need not be an expert on 
6 
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should have a working knowledge of 
ignition, combustion, and rate of 
spread of fires burning in forest 
fuels. Equipped with such basic fire 
behavior “know-how” the individual 
firefighter can approach his job 
without fear and with confidence 
that he can perform required duties 
in a safe and efficient manner. 
Fire Behavior and the 
Forest Manager 
In the northern Rocky Mountains 
fires influence many phases of the 
forest management job. The behav­
ior of fires is an important factor in 
the growth, harvesting, and regen­
eration of forest crops. How often 
fires occur and how hot they burn 
affect both the quality and quantity 
of products harvested from the for­
est. The forest manager may influ­
ence fire behavior by the nature of 
his operations, especially in timber 
cutting. When a forest is opened up 
by thinning or harvesting opera­
tions, lower humidities, high tem­
peratures, and higher wind veloci­
ties are created within the stands. 
Fire behavior is thereby affected. 
Sometimes the debris remaining 
after logging constitutes a fuel con­
dition which greatly increases the 
chance for fires to ignite and burn 
intensely. For these reasons it is 
important for forest managers to 
know fire behavior and to be able to 
evaluate the influence of forest 
management operations on it. 
Judging Fire Behavior 
Many complex factors influence the 
ignition, rate of spread, and general 
behavior of fires. Some of these fac­
tors can be measured more or less 
precisely with instruments. Others 
do not lend themselves to exact 
measurements and therefore must 
be evaluated in general terms. The 
combined effects of all factors, 
whether measured precisely or not, 
determine the behavior of a fire. No 
single factor, such as wind, steep­
ness of slope, or kind of fuel, will 
provide the answer to questions of 
when and where fires will start and 
how fast they will spread. Likewise, 
no single instrument or meter will 
answer these fundamental ques­
tions. Therefore it is necessary for 
the fire control man to develop a 
system aided by instruments and 
other guides where available, which 
will help him evaluate the com­
bined effects of all significant fac­
tors influencing fire behavior. 
Keen observation is a fundamental 
requirement for judging fire behav­
ior. Many visible signs are present 
in the forest to assist the fire con­
trol man in arriving at reliable 
decisions. These include such 
things as the color of the grass and 
other annual vegetation, the posi­
tion of a fire on a slope, the time of 
day, and the amount of sunshine 
filtering through the forest canopy. 
One of the purposes of this hand­
book is to analyze the importance 
and the meaning of the most sig­
nificant of the many factors that 
may be observed and to present a 
method of evaluating their com­
bined effects. 
Fire Safety Measures 
A thorough understanding of fire 
behavior is essential to the pro­
motion of safety in firefighting 
operations. Accidents often occur 
when so-called “unexpected fire 
behavior” develops. To avoid 
these “unexpected events,” the 
first and most important safety 
measure on every fire, regardless 
of size, is to make the estimate of 
the fire behavior situation…. 
Fires behave according to certain 
laws. Runaway fires do not just 
happen. When keen observations 
and evaluations are made of 
weather, topography, and fuels, 
there are very slim chances for 
firefighters to be surprised sud­
denly by an unexpected blowup. 
Every fire behavior situation calls 
for special safety measures. In 
most cases the best safety meas­
ure is aggressive and intelligent 
firefighting aimed at abating the 
danger spot. 
Keen observation and interpreta­
tion of weather, topography, and 
fuels lead to a good understand­
ing of fire behavior and to safe, 
efficient firefighting. 
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7 fighters). Underpredictions can also 
render chosen operational strategy 
and tactics useless (Cheney 1981). 
In addition to evaluating the out­
come of a forecast, it is wise to look 
at the fire behavior prediction 
process itself. Russo and 
Schoemaker (1989) examine com­
mon pitfalls for decisionmakers 
that are equally valid for FBANs 
and others making fire behavior 
predictions or forecasts. Decision 
trap 10 (see the sidebar) is a failure 
to audit the decisionmaking 
process—a failure to understand 
that one’s decisionmaking leaves 
one constantly open to the other 
nine decision traps. 
Other Related Articles 
and Information 
It’s worth noting that Fire Man­
agement Today and its predeces­
sors have also published a variety of 
other fire behavior and fire behav­
ior-related articles in the past 67 
years (Bunton 2000a, 2000b). Many 
are shown in the list of additional 
references beginning on page 10. 
Because copies of many of these 
articles are difficult to obtain, even 
through library sources, they are 
being scanned and will be made 
available through the World Wide 
Web. Many are now available for 
downloading from the Fire Man­
agement Today Website 
(<http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/fmt/index 
.html>). The same Website has an 
author index posted for volumes 
1–59 of Fire Management Today 
and its predecessors. 
Acknowledgments 
The authors offer their sincerest 
heartfelt appreciation to Hutch 
Brown, Madelyn Dillon, and Carol 
LoSapio, editors of Fire Manage­
ment Today, for their significant 
contributions to this special issue, 
and to April Baily, the journal’s 
general manager, for supporting 
the concept of these special issues 
on wildland fire behavior. Their 
Judging the quality of a 
fire behavior prediction 
or forecast solely on the 
outcome can be 
hazardous. 
dedication and outstanding editori­
al abilities have brought “life” to 
many of the articles contained in 
this issue that have long been for­
gotten. 
References 
Alexander, M.E. 2000. Fire behavior as a 
factor in forest and rural fire suppression. 
For. Res. Bull. 197, For. Rural Fire Sci. 
Techn. Ser. Rep. 5. Rotorua and 
Wellington, NZ: Forest Research in assoc. 
with New Fire Service Commission and 
National Rural Fire Authority. 
Alexander, M.E.; Thomas, D.A. 2003a. 
Wildland fire behavior case studies and 
analyses: Value, approaches, and practical 
uses. Fire Management Today. 63(3): 4–8. 
Alexander, M.E.; Thomas, D.A. 2003b. 
Wildland fire behavior case studies and 
analyses: Other examples, methods, 
reporting standards, and some practical 
advice. Fire Management Today. 63(4): 
4–12. 
Table 1—The scope of quantitative wildland fire behavior prediction (adapted from Rothermel 1974, 1980). 
Resolution  Relative  Ease of  Impact of 
Fire 
situation  Intended use 
usefulness/ 
value 
prediction 
accuracy 
inaccurate 
prediction Timeframe  Area 
Possible  Training  Long-term  Not 
applicable 
Moderate  Extremely to 
very easy 
Minor or 
minimal 
Long-range planning  Yearly/  State/  Good  Easy to  Significant 
(e.g., preparedness  seasonal  province/  moderately 
system development)  territory  Easy 
Potential  Short-term planning 
(e.g., daily fire 
assessment) 
Daily/ 
weekly 
Forest/ 
district 
Very good  Moderately 
difficult to 
difficult 
Serious 
Actual  Near real-time  Minutes to  Stand- or  Excellent  Very to  Critical 
(e.g., automated 
dispatch, project 
hours  site-specific  extremely 
difficult 
fires, escaped fire 
situation analysis) 
8 
Fire Management Today The Ten Most Dangerous
Decision Traps* 
1.	 Plunging in:  Beginning to  6.  Shooting from the hip: 
gather information and reach  Believing you can keep 
conclusions without first tak- straight in your head all the 
ing a few minutes to think  information you’ve discovered, 
about the crux of the issue  and therefore “winging it” 
you’re facing or to think  rather than following a sys-
through how you believe deci- tematic procedure when mak­
sions like this one should be  ing the final choice. 
made.  7.  Group failure:  Assuming that 
2.	 Frame blindness:  Setting out  with many smart people 
to solve the wrong problem  involved, good choices will 
because, with little thought,  follow automatically, and 
you have created a mental  therefore failing to manage 
framework for your decision  the group decisionmaking 
that causes you to overlook  process. 
the best options or lose sight  8.  Fooling yourself about feed-
of important objectives.  back:  Failing to interpret the 
3.	 Lack of frame control:  evidence from past outcomes 
Failing to consciously define  for what it really says, either 
the problem in more ways  because you are protecting 
than one or being unduly  your ego or because you are 
influenced by the frames of  tricked by hindsight. 
others.  9.  Not keeping track:  Assuming 
4.	 Overconfidence in your judg- that experience will make its 
ment:  Failing to collect key  lessons available automatical­
factual information because  ly, and therefore failing to 
you are too sure of your  keep systematic records to 
assumptions and opinions.  track the results of your deci­
5.	 Shortsighted shortcuts:  sions and failing to analyze 
Relying inappropriately on  these results in ways that 
“rules of thumb,” such as  reveal their key lessons. 
implicitly trusting the most  10. Failure to audit your decision 
readily available information  process:  Failing to create an 
or anchoring too much on  organized approach to under-
convenient facts.  standing your own decision-
making, so that you remain 
constantly exposed to all the 
* Based on Russo and Schoemaker (1989).  above mistakes. 
Russo and Schoemaker (1989) examine common 
pitfalls for decisionmakers that are equally valid for 
FBANs and others making fire behavior 
predictions or forecasts. 
Barrows, J.S. 1951. Fire behavior in north­
ern Rocky Mountain forests. Stn. Pap. No. 
29. Missoula, MT: USDA Forest Service, 
Northern Rocky Mountain Forest and 
Range Experiment Station. 
Brown, H. 2002. Thirtymile Fire: Fire 
behavior and management response. Fire 
Management Today. 62(3): 23–30. 
Bunton, D.R. 2000a. Creating an index that 
mirrors our past. Fire Management 
Today. 60(1): 27–31. 
Bunton, D.R. 2000b. Subject index— 
Volumes 31–59. Fire Management Today. 
60(1): 32–94. 
Cheney, N.P. 1981. Fire behaviour. In Gill, 
A.M.; Groves, R.H.; Noble, I.R., eds. Fire 
and the Australian Biota. Canberra, 
Australia: Australian Academy of 
Sciences: 151–175. 
Cornwall, M. 2003. Dome Peak Fire: 
Witnessing the extreme. Fire 
Management Today. 63(1): 16–18. 
Rothermel, R.C. 1974. Concepts in fire 
modeling. Paper prepared for Advanced 
Fire Management Training Course, 
National Fire Training Center, 1974 
November 11–22, Marana, AZ. 
Rothermel, R.C. 1980. Fire behavior sys­
tems for fire management. In: Martin, 
R.E. and others, eds. Proceedings of the 
Sixth Conference on Fire and Forest 
Meteorology. Washington, DC: 58–64. 
Rothermel, R.C. 1983. How to predict the 
spread and intensity of forest and range 
fires. Gen. Tech. Rep. INT–143. Ogden, 
UT: USDA Forest Service, Intermountain 
Forest and Range Experiment Station. 
Russo, J.E.; Schoemaker, P.J.H. 1989. 
Decision traps: Ten barriers to brilliant 
decision-making and how to overcome 
them. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster 
Incorporated. 
Saveland, J.M.; Wade, D.D. 1991. Fire man­
agement ramifications of Hurricane 
Hugo. In: Andrews, P.L.; Potts, D.F., eds. 
Proceedings of the 11th Conference on 
Fire and Forest Meteorology; 1991 April 
16–19; Missoula, MT. SAF Publ. 91–04. 
Bethesda, MD: Society of American 
Foresters: 124–131. 
Weick, K.E. 2002. Human factors in fire 
behavior analysis: Reconstructing the 
Dude Fire. Fire Management Today. 
62(4): 8–15. 
Weick, K.E. 2003. Managing the unexpect­
ed: A look at the big ideas. Paper present­
ed at the Georgia Tech’s DuPree College 
of Management and Leadership Center, 
Carter Presidential Center; 2003 March 
25; Atlanta, GA. 
Weick, K.E.; Sutcliffe, K.M. 2001. Managing 
the unexpected: Assuring high perform­
ance in an age of complexity. San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.  ■ 
Volume 64 • No. 1 • Winter 2004 
9 Additional References on Wildland Fire Behavior*
 
Fire Behavior Officer/Fire
Behavior Analyst 
Bushey, C.L.; Mutch, R.W. 1990. Fire 
behavior service center for extreme 
wildfire activity. Fire Management 
Notes. 51(4): 34–42. 
Chandler, C.C.; Countryman, C.M. 1959. 
Use of fire behavior specialists can pay 
off. Fire Control Notes. 20(4): 130–132. 
Countryman, C.M.; Chandler, C.C. 1963. 
The fire behavior team approach in fire 
control. Fire Control Notes. 24(3): 
56–60. 
Dell, J.D. 1966. The fire-behavior team in 
action—The Coyote Fire. Fire Control 
Notes. 27(1): 8–10, 15. 
Knutson, K.K. 1962. The place of the fire 
behavior officer in the fire suppression 
organization. Fire Control Notes. 23: 
81–82. 
Weick, K.E. 2002. Human factors in fire 
behavior analysis: Reconstructing the 
Dude Fire. Fire Management Today. 
62(4): 8–15. 
Training  
Alexander, M.E. 2002. The staff ride 
approach to wildland fire behavior and 
firefighter safety awareness training: A 
commentary. Fire Management Today. 
62(4): 25–30. 
Andrews, P.L.; Sackett, S.S. 1989. Fire 
observation exercises—A valuable part 
of fire behavior training. Fire 
Management Notes. 50(1): 49–52. 
Carlton, D.W. 1991. Fire behavior train­
ing—A look at some upcoming 
changes. Fire Management Notes. 
52(2): 15–19. 
Cochran, A.R. 1957. A training course in 
fire safety and fire suppression tech­
niques. Fire Control Notes. 18(1): 
33–38. 
Editor. 1958. Safe practices under 
blowup conditions—A training outline 
for the fire crew boss. Fire Control 
Notes. 19(1): 3–7. 
Euler, D.H. 1946. The sand box as a fire-
control training tool. Fire Control 
Notes. 7(1): 37–39. 
Giffen, C.A. 1956. Fire control practices: 
A training course. Fire Control Notes. 
17(3): 26–29. 
Keller, P. 2002. What’s a staff ride? Fire 
Management Today. 62(4): 6–7. 
Keller, P. 2002. Walk back into tragedy: A 
quantum leap forward. Fire 
Management Today. 62(4): 16–21. 
* Articles on or related to fire behavior from issues of 
Fire Management Today and its predecessors (Fire 
Control Notes, Fire Management, and Fire 
Management Notes) from 1936 to 2003 that were not 
reprinted or referenced elsewhere in this three-part 
series of special issues (Fire Management Today vol­
umes 63[3], 63[4], and 64[1]). 
Moore, W.R. 1959. Training in the ten stan­
dard fire fighting orders. Fire Control 
Notes. 20(2): 58–60. 
Mutch, R.W. 2002. Why don’t we just leave 
the fireline? Fire Management Today. 
62(4): 22–24. 
Thomas, D.; Cook, W. 2002. Dude Fire staff 
ride. Fire Management Today 62(4): 4–5. 
Thorburn, W.R.; MacMillan, A.; Alexander, 
M.E.; Nimchuk, N.; Frederick, K.W.; Van 
Nest, T.A. 2003. “Principles of Fire 
Behavior”: A CD-ROM-based interactive 
multimedia training course. Fire 
Management Today. 63(2): 43–44. 
Research 
Alexander, M.E.; Andrews, P.L. 1989. 
Wildland fire occurrence and behavior 
analysis in the year 2000 and beyond. 
Fire Management Notes. 50(4): 35–37. 
Alexander, M.E.; De Groot, W.J.; Hirsch, 
K.G.; Lanoville, R.A. 1989. Use of posters 
for interpreting fire behavior and danger 
research. Fire Management Notes. 59(2): 
41–44. 
Alexander, M.E.; Maffey, M.E. 1992–93. 
Predicting fire behavior in Canada’s aspen 
forests. Fire Management Notes. 
53–54(1): 10–13. 
Alexander, M.E.; Yancik, R.F. 1977. The 
effect of precommercial thinning on fire 
potential in a lodgepole pine stand. Fire 
Management Notes. 38(3): 7–9, 20. 
Banks, W.G.; Frayer, H.C. 1966. Rate of for­
est fire spread and resistance to control 
in the fuel types of the Eastern Region. 
Fire Control Notes. 27(2): 10–13. 
Barry, E.F. 1942. How about the esprit de 
corps. Fire Control Notes. 6(3): 
124–125.** 
Byram, G.M.; Martin, R.E. 1962. Fire whirls 
in the laboratory. Fire Control Notes. 
23(1): 13–17. 
Countryman, C.M. 1956. Old-growth con­
version also converts fire climate. Fire 
Control Notes. 17(4): 15–19. 
Countryman, C.M. 1973. The fire environ­
ment concept. Fire Management. 34(2): 
17. 
Curry, J.R. 1936. Fire behavior studies on 
the Shasta Experimental Forest. Fire 
Control Notes. 1(1): 12–13. 
Davis, L.S.; Martin, R.E. 1961. Time–tem­
perature relationships of test head fires 
and backfires. Fire Control Notes. 22(1): 
20–21. 
Davis, W.S. 1949. The rate of spread–fuel 
density relationship. Fire Control Notes. 
10(2): 8–9. 
Gisborne, H.T. 1942. Review of problems 
and accomplishments in fire control and 
fire research. Fire Control Notes. 6(2): 
47–63. 
**See C.F. Olsen,  “Analysis of the Honey Fire” (Fire 
Management Today 63(3) [Summer 2003]: 29–41). 
Greenlee, D.; Greenlee, J. 2002. Changes in 
fire hazard as a result of the Cerro 
Grande Fire. Fire Management Today. 
62(1): 15–21. 
Jemison, G.M. 1939. Determination of the 
rate of spread of fire in the Southern 
Appalachians. Fire Control Notes. 3(1): 
4–7. 
Johnson, V.J. 1982. The dilemma of flame 
length and intensity. Fire Management 
Notes. 43(4): 3–7. 
Luke, R.H.; McArthur, A.G. 1963. Fire 
behavior studies in Australia. Fire 
Control Notes. 24(4): 87–92. 
Sackett, S.S.; DeCoste, J.H. 1967. A new 
mobile fire laboratory. Fire Control 
Notes. 28(4): 7–9. 
Stocks, B.J. 1977. Fire behavior research in 
Ontario. Fire Management Notes. 38(2): 
9–11, 19. 
Traylor, R.E. 1961. Correlation of weather 
to fire spread in grass and brush fuels on 
the Snake River plains in southern Idaho. 
Fire Control Notes. 22(4): 118–119. 
Computerized Aids and Decision
Support Systems 
Andrews, P.L. 1986. Methods for predicting 
fire behavior—You do have a choice. Fire 
Management Notes. 47(2): 6–10. 
Andrews, P.L.; Bevins, C.D. 1999. BEHAVE 
fire modeling system: Redesign and 
expansion. Fire Management Notes. 
59(2): 16–19. 
Andrews, P.L.; Chase, C.H. 1990. Update of 
the BEHAVE fire behavior prediction sys­
tem. Fire Management Notes. 51(1): 
22–25. 
Eubanks, R.L.; Bradshaw, R.L; Andrews, P.L. 
1986. Current status of BEHAVE system. 
Fire Management Notes. 47(2): 29–31. 
Finn, M. 2001. British Columbia Forest 
Service adds new software for wildland 
firefighting. Fire Management Today. 
61(2): 43–44. 
Finney, M.A.; Andrews, P.L. 1999. FAR­
SITE—A program for fire growth simula­
tion. Fire Management Notes. 59(2): 
13–15. 
Rothermel, R.C. 1983. BEHAVE and you 
can predict fire behavior. Fire 
Management Notes. 44(4): 11–15. 
Scott, J.H. 1999. NEXUS: a system for 
assessing crown fire hazard. Fire 
Management Notes. 59(2): 20–24. 
Van Gelder, R.J. 1976. A fire potential 
assessment model for brush and grass 
fuels. Fire Management Notes. 37(3): 
14–16. 
Hand-Held Computer Technology 
Bradshaw, R.L.; Dean, W.A. 1980. Adding 
print capability to your TI–59 fire behav­
ior CROM. Fire Management Notes. 
41(4): 7–8. 
10 
Fire Management Today Burgan, R.E.; Susott, R.A. 1986. HP–71 
replaces TI–59 for fire calculations in the 
field. Fire Management Notes. 47(2): 
11–13. 
Burgan, R.E.; Susott, R.A. 1988. Correcting 
an error in the HP–71B fire behavior 
CROM. Fire Management Notes. 49(2): 
31–32. 
Cohen, J.D.; Burgan, R.E. 1979. Hand-held 
calculator for fire danger/fire behavior. 
Fire Management Notes. 40(1):  8–9. 
Research Instrumentation 
Clark, B.; Steuter, A.A.; Britton, C.M. 1981. 
An inexpensive anemometer frame. Fire 
Management Notes. 42(3): 13–14. 
Dibble, D.L. 1960. Fire climate survey trail­
er. Fire Control Notes. 21(4): 116–120. 
Little, E.C. 1973. Costs $10—Foolproof 
timer measures rate of fire spread. Fire 
Management. 34(4): 10–12. 
McMahon, C.K.; Adkins, C.W.; Rodgers, S.L. 
1986. A video image analysis system for 
measuring fire behavior. Fire 
Management Notes. 47(1): 10–15. 
Schaefer, V.J. 1959. Use of the 60-second 
print camera for stereophotography of 
project fires and related activities. Fire 
Control Notes. 20: 89–90. 
Supporting Tools and Equipment 
Anderson, K. 2001. NIFC FIRE RAWS unit 
survives burnover. Fire Management 
Today. 61(2): 39–42. 
Clark, B.; Roberts, F. 1982. A belt weather 
kit accessory for measuring woody fuel 
moisture. Fire Management Notes. 43(3): 
25–26. 
Dell, J.D.; Hull, M.K. 1966. A fire-behavior 
team field unit. Fire Control Notes. 27(3): 
6–7. 
Division of Forest Fire Research, 
Intermountain Forest and Range 
Experiment Station. 1959. Belt weather 
kit. Fire Control Notes. 20(4): 122–123. 
Ellis, G.R. 1965. A combination pocket 
meter for windspeed and duration. Fire 
Control Notes. 26(2): 5. 
Fischer, W.C. 1978. New portable weather 
instrument shelter performs well. Fire 
Management Notes. 39(3): 15–18. 
Maxwell, F.; McCutchan, M.; Roberts, C.F. 
1974. Automation of fire weather obser­
vations. Fire Management. 35(3): 22–25. 
Palmer, T.Y.; Pace, G.D. 1974. Microwave 
oven dries fuels fast. Fire Management. 
35(2): 22–23. 
Sackett, S.S. 1980. An instrument for rapid, 
accurate determination of fuel moisture 
content. Fire Management Notes. 41(2): 
17–18. 
Warren, J.R. 1980. Remote automatic 
weather stations (RAWS). Fire 
Management Notes. 41(2): 15–16. 
Warren, J.R. 1986. Very portable remote 
automatic weather stations. Fire 
Management Notes. 47(4): 5–7. 
Fuels and Fuel Sampling 
Altobellis, A.T.; Cooper, R.W. 1963. Moisture 
content of gallberry and palmetto during 
a dry period. Fire Control Notes. 24(1): 
10. 
Blank, R.W.; Simard, A.J.; Eenigenburg, J.E. 
1985. A tester for measuring the mois­
ture content of dead fine fuels. Fire 
Management Notes. 46(2): 8–12. 
Bruce, D. 1951. Fuel weights on the 
Osceola National Forest. Fire Control 
Notes. 12(3): 20–23. 
Buck, C.C. 1951. Flammability of chaparral 
depends on how it grows. Fire Control 
Notes. 12(4): 27. 
Countryman, C.M. 1974. Moisture in living 
fuels affects fire behavior. Fire 
Management. 35(2): 10–14. 
Dieterich, J.H. 1963. Litter fuels in red pine 
plantations. Fire Control Notes. 24(4): 
103–106. 
Miller, R.K.; Schwandt, D.L. 1979. Slash 
fuel weights in red pine plantations. Fire 
Management Notes. 40(1): 6–7. 
Potts, D.F.; Ryan, K.C.; Loveless Jr., R.S. 
1984. A procedure for estimating duff 
depth. Fire Management Notes. 45(2): 
13–15. 
Scott, J.H.; Reinhardt, E.D. 2002. 
Estimating canopy fuels in conifer 
forests. Fire Management Today. 62(4): 
45–50. 
Weise, D.R.; Saveland, J.M. 1996. 
Monitoring live fuel moisture—A task 
force report. Fire Management Notes. 
56(3): 13–14. 
Guidelines and Decision Aids 
Alexander, M.E.; Stam, J.C. 2003. Safety 
alert for wildland firefighters: Fuel condi­
tions in spruce-beetle-killed forests of 
Alaska. Fire Management Today. 63(2): 
25. 
Anderson, H.E. 1984. Calculating fire size 
and perimeter growth. Fire Management 
Notes. 45(3): 25–30. 
Cargill, G.E. 1970. Table speeds fire spread 
estimates. Fire Control Notes. 31(2): 
15–16. 
Greenlee, J.; Greenlee, D. 2003. Trigger 
points and the rules of disengagement. 
63(1): 10–13. 
Melton, M. 1989. The Keetch/Byram 
Drought Index: A guide to fire conditions 
and suppression problems. Fire 
Management Notes. 50(4): 30–34. 
Melton, M. 1996. Keetch–Byram Drought 
Index revisited: Prescribed fire applica­
tions. Fire Management Notes. 56(4): 
7–11. 
Mitchell, J.A. 1936. Rule of thumb for 
determining rate of spread. Fire Control 
Notes. 1(7): 395–396. 
Pirsko, A.R. 1961. Alinement chart for 
perimeter increase of fires. Fire 
Control Notes. 22(1): 1–4. 
Fire Weather and Fire 
Weather Forecasting 
Countryman, C.M. 1972. This humidity 
business: What it is all about and how 
it is used in fire control. Fire Control 
Notes. 33(2): 10–11. 
Cramer, O.P. 1950. Use your weather 
records to interpret fire-weather fore­
casts. Fire Control Notes. 11(4): 41–43. 
Cuoco, C.J. 1992–93. Prescribed burns? 
Share information with fire weather 
forecasters and involve them in the 
planning. Fire Management Notes. 
53–54(3): 10–13. 
Fite, F.M. 1953. Fire weather forecasts. 
Fire Control Notes. 14(1): 18–20. 
Fujioka, F.M. 1997. High resolution fire 
weather models. Fire Management 
Notes. 57(2): 22–25. 
Graham, H.E. 1964. A portable fire-
weather forecast unit for use on back­
country fires. Fire Control Notes. 
25(3): 11. 
LaMois, L.M. 1961. Weather and forest 
fires. Fire Control Notes. 22(1): 22–24. 
O’Dell, C.A.; Hammer, L.C. 1979. Fire 
weather meteorological support units. 
Fire Management Notes. 40(2): 3–5. 
Potter, B.E. 1997. Making sense of fire 
weather. Fire Management Notes. 
57(2): 26–27. 
Rodney, E.A. 1964. Forest fires and fire 
weather conditions in the Asheville, 
N.C., fire weather district—Spring sea­
son, 1963. Fire Control Notes. 25(3): 
7–9, 15. 
Schroeder, M.J. 1950. The Hudson Bay 
High and the spring fire season in the 
Lake States. Fire Control Notes. 11(1): 
1–8. 
Svorcek, A.J. 1965. 50 years of fire weath­
er service. Fire Control Notes. 26(2): 
8–9. 
Watkins, C.H. 1961. The Oregon state 
mobile fire weather unit. Fire Control 
Notes. 22(3): 89–92. 
Long-Duration Projections 
Lukens, D.; Krebs, J. 1986. Long-term 
fire behavior projections. Fire 
Management Notes. 47(4): 22–23. 
Mohr, F.; Both, B. 1986. Confinement—A 
suppression response for the future? 
Fire Management Notes. 56(2): 17–22. 
Mohr, F.; Lukens, D.; Terry, D. 1987. 
Managing confinement suppression 
response on the Middle Ridge and 
Little Granite Fires, August 1986. Fire 
Management Notes. 48(3): 23–25. 
Volume 64 • No. 1 • Winter 2004 
11 FOREST FIRES AND SEA BREEZES* 
G.L. Hayes 
S
pot fires which started upwind 
from going forest fires have 
been reported by I.S. Stivers, 
Forest Ranger for the New York 
Conservation Department, whose 
district covers eastern Long Island. 
They had been observed on a num­
ber of occasions, and from a num­
ber of different fires. 
Suspecting at first that incendiaries 
were setting fires behind him, 
Stivers sent patrols upwind from 
going fires. The patrols found no 
incendiaries but they did find new 
fires starting. They, and he, also 
observed that the smoke column, 
after rising high in the air, turned 
and moved back in a direction 
opposite to the surface winds. The 
spots were starting from embers 
which fell from this smoke column. 
On other occasions, Stivers wrote, 
surface winds changed abruptly in 
mid-afternoon from a northerly or 
westerly to a southerly or easterly 
direction, carrying going fires in an 
unexpected direction and upsetting 
suppression plans. A typical case 
was a fire on Sunday, April 1, 1945, 
at 2:30 p. m., that started with a 
northwest wind and began to 
spread to the southeast. Fifteen 
minutes later the wind shifted fast 
to the southwest and sent the fire 
over the Radio Corporation 
Communications plant at 
Riverhead. 
When this article was originally published, 
G. L. Hayes was a forester for the USDA 
Forest Service, Southeastern Forest 
Experiment Station, Asheville, NC. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 8(2/3) 
[Spring/Summer 1947]: 30–33. 
The conditions described and the 
location, on Long Island, indicate 
that the type of local winds known 
as sea breezes was responsible for 
both the upwind spot fires and for 
the rapid changes in direction of 
the surface wind. Much has been 
learned about sea breezes in recent 
years that should be of very materi­
al help in planning fire suppression 
in such coastal areas as Long 
Island. Obviously, fire suppression 
is most difficult when rapid and 
unexpected changes in wind condi­
tions occur. If the wind shifts can 
be anticipated, defensive action can 
be planned in advance. 
There is an excellent discussion of 
sea breezes in the June 1946 issue 
of the bulletin of the American 
Meteorological Society under the 
title “Theory and Observation of 
Land and Sea Breezes,” by 
Raymond Wexler. As many fire con­
trol men in coastal areas may not 
have access to the Bulletin, the fol­
lowing digest of Mr. Wexler’s article 
has been prepared. The land breeze 
is not mentioned as it occurs main­
ly at night and is felt primarily over 
the water. 
Definition and 
Characteristics of 
Sea Breezes 
A sea breeze is a local circulation in 
which the wind near the surface 
blows from the water onto the land 
Coastal surface winds can change direction 
abruptly in mid-afternoon, carrying going fires in 
an unexpected direction and upsetting suppression 
plans. 
and returns at a higher elevation 
from land to water. During the day­
light hours the air is heated more 
over the land than over the water. 
This sets up a local pressure system 
that induces the warmer, lighter 
land air to rise and flow seaward 
and the colder, heavier air over the 
water to settle and flow landward. 
The sea breezes occur on warm 
days near the shores of large bodies 
of water. They are strongest and 
best developed along the seacoasts 
but occur also along the shores of 
bays and large lakes. In the temper­
ate zone the landward flowing wind 
current may be from 200 to 2,000 
feet (60–600 m) thick and may 
reach inland for 20 to 25 miles 
(32–40 km). Above this is the 
return current. Under the same 
conditions it may extend offshore 
as far as 60 miles (97 km) over the 
ocean. In hotter climates or in 
combination with topographic 
winds the inland range is extended. 
The winds from lakes extend short­
er distances. 
Two distinct types of sea breezes are 
recognized. The first type develops 
when there is little or no gradient 
wind;** the second type develops 
when there is a light offland gradi­
ent wind. The first type develops as 
** The gradient wind is the air movement caused by the 
prevailing pressure differences in the atmosphere. It is 
the wind that is usually predicted in the Weather 
Bureau forecasts. 
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a small circulation near the shore  The most dangerous part of the sea breeze 
early in the day, soon after the air  circulation is the front or surface separating the 
over the land has become warmer  landward blowing sea air from the seaward flowing than the air over the water. With 
land air.  continued heating of the land, the 
circulation extends progressively 
farther landward and seaward and 
grows stronger and deeper. 
The second type, which is the more 
common in temperate latitudes, 
develops over the water and usually 
comes onto the land suddenly, later 
in the day. The offland gradient 
wind holds the colder and heavier 
sea air back and heats it up until 
the force of the wind can no longer 
hold it. Then the sea air rushes 
ashore where it is heated until it 
rises and joins the gradient wind 
which is blowing out to sea over­
head. The typical sea breeze circu­
lation is then established. 
The most dangerous part of the sea 
breeze circulation, from the fire 
control standpoint, is the front or 
surface separating the landward 
blowing sea air from the seaward 
flowing land air. The reasons are: 
1. The winds blow in opposing 
directions on either side of the 
front and rise at the front. 
2. The front moves. The rate of its 
advance is less than the velocity 
of the sea breeze behind it and it 
decreases as it moves farther 
inland. When a front moves 
across a fire, the rear or a flank 
suddenly becomes the head of 
the fire. 
3. The winds along the front are 
the strongest and gustiest part of 
the sea breeze circulation. Initial 
gusts of the sea breeze as strong 
as 34 miles per hour (55 km/h) 
have been recorded, whereas the 
average behind the front is only 
about 11 miles per hour (18 
km/h). 
After about a half hour from the 
time the front has passed, the 
velocity is usually very constant, 
with little gustiness. As the higher 
winds are then flowing opposite to 
the surface winds, the danger of 
upwind spot fires is present. 
Although the sea breeze blows from 
water to land, it does not always 
blow perpendicular to the coast 
line. It tends to blow perpendicular 
at first then shift to the right as the 
day grows older. Thus, along the 
east coast where the shore is direct­
ly north and south it would tend to 
start as an easterly wind, shifting to 
southerly. Along the west coast it 
would tend to start as a westerly 
wind, shifting to northerly. 
External Factors 
Influencing Sea
Breezes 
Several conditions affect sea breeze 
formation and behavior. 
1. Character of day.  As sea breezes 
occur only when the air over the 
land becomes warmer than over 
the sea, clear, hot days are most 
favorable to their formation. 
They can and do occur on over­
cast days but they form later, are 
milder, and extend inland for 
shorter distances. In general, the 
clearer and hotter the day, the 
earlier the sea breeze will form, 
the stronger it will get, and the 
farther inland it will penetrate. 
With light gradient winds and 
clear skies, it usually starts about 
2 to 3 hours after sunrise and 
ends within 2 hours before sun­
set. 
2. Gradient wind.  Calm conditions, 
or a light offland gradient wind 
are favorable for sea breeze for­
mation. If the gradient wind is 
blowing parallel to the shore or 
off the water, the sea breeze will 
not develop. 
The velocity of the offland gradi­
ent wind affects the time of 
arrival of the sea breeze and the 
distance inland that it will move. 
Under calm conditions, the sea 
breeze may develop near the 
shore soon after sunup and move 
progressively farther inland until 
the maximum temperature for 
the day is reached, after which is 
subsides. The stronger the 
offland gradient wind, the later 
in the day the sea breeze comes 
ashore, and it may never pene­
trate far inland. In fact, if the 
wind is strong enough, the sea 
air cannot leave the water. At 
Danzig a gradient wind of 22 
miles per hour (35 km/h) was 
observed just to balance the 
force of the sea breeze. The front 
moved intermittently back and 
forth across the shore line. 
To have a front stall over a fire 
would create a very bad situa­
tion. The winds could be strong, 
and would certainly be gusty and 
fluctuate wildly in direction, as 
the front moved back and forth. 
3. Topography.  Where there are 
mountains along a shore line, 
the sea breeze may combine with 
an upvalley or upslope wind. 
Such a combination wind is 
stronger than a straight sea 
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13 breeze and may extend much far­
ther inland. If the mountains lie 
several miles back from the 
coast, separate circulations may 
be set up in the morning which 
will merge after noon. Such a 
combination in California is 
reported to establish a continu­
ous flow of wind for as much as 
40 miles (64 km) inland. A simi­
lar but less extensive flow takes 
place between Great Salt Lake 
and the Wasatch Mountains in 
Utah. 
Along the shores of a bay there 
may be two components of the 
sea breeze, one from the bay and 
the second from the sea beyond. 
The bay circulation will usually 
be the first to affect the land but 
may be replaced later by the 
ocean breeze, accompanied by a 
change in wind direction. 
4. Vegetation.  A heavy vegetative 
cover retards heating of the land 
surface. Hence, the sea breeze 
starts earlier and becomes 
stronger along desert or semi-
desert coasts than along heavily 
forested ones. Likewise, with 
other things equal, conditions 
Where the sea breeze is observed to have
 
important effects on fires, fire control men would
 
profit by observing its characteristics.
 
along our coast are more favor­
able to sea breezes when the veg­
etation is dead and the leaves are 
off the deciduous trees than after 
the fields and woods “green up.” 
5. Atmospheric stability.  An unsta­
ble lower atmosphere is more 
favorable for sea breezes than a 
stable one. In an unsaturated 
atmosphere, stability depends on 
the rate of temperature drop 
with increasing elevation. If the 
temperature decreases more 
than 5-1/2 ºF in 1,000 feet of ele­
vation (or 1 ºF in 182 feet), the 
air is unstable and ascending 
convection currents develop eas­
ily. If it decreases less than this, 
it is stable and convectional 
movement cannot take place. Air 
over the land that is very stable 
in the morning may, through 
surface heating, become unstable 
later in the day, hence the 
hottest part of the day is most 
favorable for sea breezes. 
6. Distance from the shore.  The 
sea breeze is felt first and has 
greatest velocity right at the 
shore. As distance from shore is 
increased the sea breeze arrives 
later in the day, has less velocity, 
and the front moves more slowly. 
With so many factors affecting the 
time of arrival and characteristics 
of the sea breeze, it is impossible to 
set up definite rules which will tell 
when it may arrive or how it will 
behave for any particular place or 
day. Where the sea breeze is 
observed to have important effects 
on fires, fire control men would 
profit by observing its characteris­
tics as related to the factors already 
discussed. Or the local weather 
forecaster of the U.S. Weather 
Bureau might be induced to predict 
the time of arrival, its range inland, 
and probable velocity at and behind 
the front.  ■ 
Russo and Schoemaker (1989) Decision Trap 1—Plunging In: 
Beginning to gather information and reach conclusions without first taking a 
few minutes to think about the crux of the issue you’re facing or to think 
through how you believe decisions like this one should be made.* 
* See page 9. 
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O
ur job of fire control can be 
done, in fact has been done, in 
several ways: By brute strength 
and little attention to the condi­
tions we are attempting to control; 
by observation of what is happening 
but with little or no understanding 
of why the fire is behaving as it 
does; or by practical application of 
knowledge of the basic laws of 
chemistry and physics that are 
actually determining the rate at 
which a fire is spreading. Let us 
look into the most significant fac­
tors that affect fire behavior. 
Fire is a Chemical 
Process 
Combustion is a chemical process. 
It is classified that way because 
combustion, with or without flame, 
is a molecular reaction in which 
molecules of oxygen in the air com­
bine with molecules of cellulose 
and lignin (which make wood) and 
thereby change most of the solid 
into gases. These gases are mole­
cules of different substances. They 
are no longer cellulose and lignin. 
Such changes of substance are 
chemical, not physical, processes. 
When these changes occur at such 
a rapid rate that heat and flame are 
produced, the process is called 
combustion or fire. 
When you look into the fundamen­
tals of combustion and find that 
When this article was originally published, 
H.T. Gisborne was in charge of the Division 
of Forest Protection for the USDA Forest 
Service, Northern Rocky Mountain Forest 
and Range Experiment Station. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 9(1) 
[Winter 1948]: 13–24. It was used at the 40-man Fire 
Boss School on May 5, 1947. 
there are only three basic factors or 
three essentials to this chemical 
process, it is obvious that we are 
overlooking a bet if we fail to con­
sider each of these three things in 
our calculating. 
Three Essentials of Combustion. 
Completely controlling the chemi­
cal reaction called fire are only 
three essentials. They are: 
1. Fuel or something that will com­
bine with oxygen rapidly enough 
to generate heat; 
2. Heat enough to raise that fuel to 
the ignition point; and 
3. Plenty of oxygen in contact with 
the fuel or with the gases evolved 
from the wood. 
Remove the fuel as we do when we 
dig a fire trench; keep it from being 
heated to the ignition point, as we 
do when we widen the trench or 
when we use water; or shut off the 
supply of oxygen as we do when we 
throw dirt, use water, or bury a 
burning log, and you can stop the 
spread of any fire. Every one of our 
methods of fighting fire is based on 
one or more of those three simple 
essentials. THERE ARE NO OTHER 
WAYS. 
Fuel.  Chemically, all of the fuels 
that carry our fires are practically 
alike. From grass and brush to tree 
needles, tree trunks, and rotten 
wood on the ground, they are all of 
the type that the chemist desig-
There are only three things you can do to stop a
 
fire—rob it of its fuel, keep it from being heated to
 
the ignition point, or shut off the oxygen supply.
 
nates as (C6H10O5)y. This means that 
there are 6 atoms of carbon, 10 
atoms of hydrogen, and 5 of oxygen 
in each molecule of cellulose. 
Starch, which is found in the roots, 
seeds, and leaves of all plants, is 
very similar, differing only in the 
subscript. The chemists designate 
the various starches as (C6H10O5)x. 
This point is important to remem­
ber because it helps to reduce some 
errors of judgment based on the 
belief that the chemical nature of 
our fuels differs very materially. 
When C6H10O5 burns, every mole­
cule of that substance combines 
with six molecules of oxygen. The 
resultant products are gases, 6 mol­
ecules of carbon dioxide, and 5 
molecules of water vapor. Fire 
makes water out of the hydrogen 
and oxygen atoms that are in every 
molecule of wood. The chemist 
writes it this way: C6H10O5 + 6O2 ➞ 
6CO2 + 5H2O. Unfortunately, that 
water is not of any help to us 
because it exists as a gas, a super­
heated gas, which rises straight up 
and away from our fuels. The water 
that really counts is the moisture 
content of the grass, trees, or brush 
before they burn. 
Because of this similarity of chemi­
cal composition of our fuels, it is 
obvious that we should not calcu­
late probabilities on the belief that 
different kinds of wood or brush or 
grass burn differently. The leaves of 
grass, trees, and brush and the bark 
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tent. 
There are, however, two other 
ingredients in wood in addition to 
cellulose that are of some, perhaps 
academic, significance. One of 
these is lignin, a substance for 
which the chemists do not know 
the formula. The significance of 
lignin lies in the fact that it has a 
slightly higher heat content than 
cellulose and that it leaches and 
decays more slowly. Hence old 
wood is likely to have lost more cel­
lulose than lignin and therefore 
will have a slightly higher heat con­
tent per pound of material remain­
ing than fresh cut or freshly killed 
wood. Differences in the pitch con­
tent are also known to affect the 
heat of a fire. 
There are also some other minor 
differences in the chemical nature 
of plant and tree leaves, but a series 
of tests of the fat and oil content of 
the leaves of six different genera of 
weeds and brush which were made 
for three consecutive summers 
failed to reveal anything significant. 
Instead, this chemical study made 
at our Priest River laboratory con­
firmed the finding that moisture 
content is THE big variable. 
Ignition.  When there is plenty of 
fuel, the next essential of combus­
tion is that it must be heated to the 
ignition point. For dry cellulose, a 
temperature of only 400 ºF to 600 
ºF (204–316 ºC) is required. The 
average usually used is 540 ºF 
(282 ºC). The point that is of practi­
cal importance is that if your fuels 
are even moderately dry they do 
not have to be heated very hot to 
reach this ignition temperature. In 
other words the kindling tempera­
ture of grass, wood, cotton batten, 
or cellulose in any natural form is 
easily produced. It is not an abnor­
mally high temperature. You will 
build more held line and have to 
charge up less line lost if you 
remember that simple fact and 
then do something about it. 
The key to ignition is the ease with 
which a fuel can be heated to 540 
°F (282 ºC). That ease naturally 
depends upon one obvious differ­
ence in fuels, i.e., their size. The 
fine fuel naturally heats clear 
through and reaches 540 °F (282 
ºC) far quicker than a heavy fuel 
like a log. Size of fuel is therefore 
the significant feature to watch, 
other things such as moisture con­
tent being equal. Actually, size and 
moisture content influence the 
process of combustion in much the 
same way. Make a stick wetter and 
you reduce its ease of ignition. 
Similarly, the bigger the stick, the 
harder it is to ignite it. The wet 
stick and the big stick both require 
more time or more heat to raise 
their surface temperature to the 
ignition point. And that is another 
good basic fact to keep in mind 
both in sizing up probable fire 
behavior and in deciding on tactics 
to use along the line. Let your fire 
burn through the heavier fuels 
where it will burn more slowly. 
Fight it at those places where it 
would go into finer fuels and spread 
faster. Also, fire line construction is 
easier in the fine fuels. You gain in 
two ways by using this basic knowl­
edge. 
Size of fuel is also worth noting 
from another angle. Take 10 
pounds (4.5 kg) of dry grass or dead 
pine needles, 10 pounds (4.5 kg) of 
dry branchwood, and 10 pounds 
(4.5 kg) of log in one chunk and 
ignite each of them. What happens? 
The needles will liberate their 
B.t.u.’s (British thermal units) in a 
few seconds, the branches will 
release theirs in a few minutes, 
while the 10-pound (4.5-kg) log 
may take half an hour to release its 
heat. Ease of ignition is, therefore, 
not the only difference in fire 
behavior to expect in accordance 
with different sizes of fuel. The rate 
of release of the energy is also 
tremendously different. 
This feature, combustion rate, is 
what a football player would call 
the triple threat of fire. And this 
rate of release of energy is the one 
feature we fail most often to recog­
nize. The three threats involved 
are: 
1. The more sudden the release of 
all this heat, the farther it will 
radiate a temperature of more 
than 540 °F (282 ºC). And that 
means something to your tactics. 
It means that if the fuels are 
even moderately dry, a wider fire 
line is needed wherever you find 
an appreciable volume of fine 
fuels. This applies to both stop­
ping a fire and in backfiring. 
2. The faster the release of those 
B.t.u.’s, the greater the volume 
of gas suddenly created, hence 
the faster it will rise overhead. 
That also means something to 
tactics employed, because the 
swifter the rise of hot air the 
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this splitting tremendous energy moisture, and when our fuel moisture indicator 
was released and that the process sticks are below 5 percent you can expect your  then split other uranium atoms
fires to blow up and explode.  which in turn released more energy 
greater the chance of sucking up 
blazing embers and carrying 
them up and over the line, if the 
smoke is leaning across the line. 
That means spot fires. 
3. The faster this release of energy 
and the faster the uprush created 
by it, the greater the local wind 
velocity created by the fire. 
Moderate to large areas of fuel 
releasing their energy suddenly 
are creating conditions that 
breed not only higher wind 
velocities, but twisters or even 
big whirlwinds. I once saw one of 
the really big ones whirl like a 
tremendous barrel and move 
across 2 square miles (5.2 km
2) 
while I was running 200 yards 
(180 m) along the top of Desert 
Mountain, on the Flathead 
Forest. 
Oxygen.  This last essential of com­
bustion is one that we can’t do very 
much about. Combustion engineers 
who design and operate boilers do a 
lot by controlling this one of the 
three essentials. But under our 
conditions there is a1most always 
plenty of oxygen to facilitate com­
bustion of our fuels. Under free 
burning conditions such as occur 
on a forest fire, about 10 pounds 
(4.5 kg) or 133 cubic feet (3.75 m
3
) 
of air is needed for the complete 
combustion of only 1 pound (0.45 
kg) of dry fuel. 
The one time when we do some­
thing to reduce the oxygen supply 
is in throwing dirt. While that dirt 
does lower the temperature of the 
fuel it lands on, the principal func­
tion of dirt is to shut off or at least 
reduce the supply of oxygen. Moist 
dirt is superior to dry dirt primarily 
because it lowers the temperature 
more. But when either moist or dry 
soil covers the surface of the fuel 
the major benefit is by cutting 
down the oxygen supply. Water also 
does the same thing if enough is 
applied to form a film over the sur­
face of the fuel. But here too the 
major benefit is in lowering the 
fuel temperature below the ignition 
pint. 
Combustion—A Molecular Chain 
Reaction.  The public has heard 
and read a lot recently about atom­
ic fission, so controlled that it 
becomes a chain reaction and 
thereby makes possible atomic 
bombs. More understanding of the 
fire job and better financial support 
by the public may follow when we 
show that the job of fire control is 
definitely one of stopping a chain 
reaction which differs from the 
bombs primarily in that ours is a 
molecular instead of an atomic 
chain reaction. 
A chain reaction may be compared 
to a chain letter; you receive one 
but you send out two or maybe 
three or four. Each of the recipients 
of one of these letters similarly 
sends out two or three or four. The 
thing spreads like wildfire. The first 
problem in producing an atomic 
bomb was along this line. That 
problem was to obtain certain 
chemicals which, when assembled 
in a sufficient quantity and 
arrangement, known as the “critical 
mass,” would perpetuate the 
process of splitting atoms of urani­
um into atoms of two other ele­
ments, barium and krypton. It was 
and split more atoms, the process 
continuing and accelerating as long 
as there was a supply of a suitable 
fuel in a proper arrangement and 
condition.. The job of the atomic 
physicists was, therefore, to pro­
duce this chain reaction yet control 
it. Our job is simpler. It is merely to 
control the molecular chain reac­
tion that is fire. 
As you can see, fire is a similar 
process in that if you heat one mol­
ecule of a fuel to the ignition point, 
its process of changing from 
C6H10O5 into CO2 and H2O may 
release enough energy to ignite 
several other adjacent molecules of 
C6H10O5. If the fuel is in a critical 
condition (dry enough), as com­
pared to a critical mass (large 
enough), that process then 
becomes a chain reaction and not 
only spreads like wildfire but it 
really is wildfire in our case. 
Whereas the nuclear physicists 
have to make their fuels, and 
arrange them carefully in an atom­
ic pile, our fuels are arranged for us 
and then, periodically, are put into 
proper condition (dryness) such 
that the chain reaction starts when­
ever and wherever the spark is 
applied. 
If this sounds farfetched or academ­
ic, let me call your attention to one 
more fact, which I know you will 
not dispute. It is this: That when 
our fuels are in their most critical 
condition, i.e., their driest, we have 
some molecular chain reactions 
which are so violent that we cannot 
stop them, just as there is no stop­
ping an atomic bomb once its chain 
reaction is started. Furthermore, 
we have occasions when combus­
tion in the form of a forest fire 
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approaches a rate and even a mag­
nitude rivaling an atomic bomb. 
Those of you who were on any of 
our big fires in 1929, 1931, and 
1934 probably saw some of these 
explosions. Many of them covered 
several square miles in only a 
minute or two. 
If you will keep this chain reaction 
idea in mind, and if you will size up 
your fire, either as a whole or on 
your sector, in the light of the three 
basic essentials of combustion, you 
may be able to calculate the proba­
bility of one of these explosions. If 
you can do that, you may be able to 
save your own life and the lives of 
your men, as well as improve your 
fire control tactics. 
There is one basic criterion to 
watch, however, in trying to antici­
pate a molecular chain reaction at 
an explosive rate. This is moisture 
content of the fuel, for it is mois­
ture content, not mass, nor vol­
ume, nor size, nor arrangement of 
fuel which first determines whether 
or not a forest fire can truly 
explode. And you should remember 
that this moisture content not only 
can be, but is being measured. You 
can get these measurements every 
day if you want them. 
Moisture Content— 
The Critical Variable 
We have not had any true forest fire 
explosions in Region 1 since 1936. I 
believe there were a couple of 
minor ones that year on the Little 
Rockies Fire on the Lewis and 
Clark Forest. But we had several 
really big ones in 1934, 1931, 1929, 
and one or two in 1926. You have 
all read about those in 1919 and 
1910. The main reason why we 
have not had any explosions in 
recent years is this matter of mois­
ture content. Our fuels simply have 
not dried out to the critical condi­
tion that developed in those earlier 
critical years. Hence, it is evident 
that the critical variable in fire 
behavior is moisture content of the 
fuels. Consequently, I want to call 
your attention to some of the possi­
bilities available to you for improv­
ing your calculation of probabilities 
by watching fuel moisture above all 
other elements. 
Basis of Fuel Moisture 
Measurements.  You all know about 
the fuel moisture indicator sticks 
used at some 175 fire danger sta­
tions in Region 1. There are some 
things those sticks will tell you far 
A burning index rating is 
essential to calculation 
of the probabilities in 
any fuel type. 
better, far more accurately than you 
can estimate. To make best use of 
those stick measurements you need 
to know: Why we use half-inch (13­
mm) sticks, how they are made, 
and how accurate they are. 
For four consecutive summers, 
1922, 1923, 1924, and 1925, I col­
lected at periodic intervals samples 
of the five major dead fuels that 
burn in a forest fire. I took these 
samples to the laboratory and 
determined their moisture con­
tents. I found out which fluctuated 
the most, and which the least. On 
this basis, I selected the top layer of 
duff, half-inch (13-mm) sticks, and 
2-inch-diameter (5-cm) branch 
wood as the best representations. 
We therefore used duff hygrome­
ters, half-inch (13-mm) sticks, and 
2-inch (5-cm) sticks at several fire 
danger stations for the next 5 years 
to measure fuel moisture. Then, at 
the suggestion of the rangers in a 
regional meeting and despite my 
protest, we discontinued used of 
the 2-inch (5-cm) ones. Finally, in 
1942, with the Model 6 Danger 
Meter, we dropped duff moisture 
and began to rely solely on the half-
inch (13-mm) sticks. 
From a technical viewpoint these 
half-inch (13-mm) sticks alone fail 
to represent our fuels in two ways: 
1. They do not show the true bene­
fits of light rains as well as duff 
moisture measurements did; and 
2. After heavy rains, they dry out 
faster than either duff or 2-inch­
diameter (5-cm) sticks. 
The error is therefore always 
toward showing more danger than 
would be revealed if all of the sig­
nificant forest fuels were measured. 
The half-inch (13-mm) sticks are 
not too fast, of course, for cheat-
grass, but this fuel type does not 
cover a large percentage of our 
area. Furthermore, after it has 
cured, cheatgrass responds so 
closely to changes of relative 
humidity that humidity measure­
ments can very well be used as an 
index of moisture content of that 
one fuel type. Finally, cheatgrass 
changes moisture and flammability 
so rapidly that you might as well 
always be ready for the worst. 
The half-inch (13-mm) sticks which 
we now use are made from new 
lumber each year. Any one of sever­
al species of wood could be used, 
because here again we are dealing 
primarily with cellulose. We use 
ponderosa pine because it is readily 
obtainable in clear stock at a rea­
sonable price. We use only sapwood 
because it is the moisture content 
of sapwood of twigs, branches, logs, 
and snags in which we are most 
interested. We can ignore the mois­
ture content of the heartwood of a 
log because if the outer sapwood is 
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extremely dry the inner heartwood  Within the mid-elevation thermal belt, you can 
has got to be dry too. We also  expect the least benefit from increased fuel
ignore the effect that bark has on  moisture at night. natural wood, because if we used 
natural sticks with bark on them 
some of that bark would soon chip 
off and then we would no longer 
know the true oven-dry weight of 
our sticks. 
To be sure that moisture measure­
ments made at different stations do 
not differ because of differences 
between the sticks or because of 
errors by the danger station opera­
tor, we go to a lot of work and 
incur considerable expense. These 
sticks now cost from $1 to $1.75 
per set to manufacture. In making 
them they are oven-dried and then 
cut off at the ends until they weigh 
exactly 100.0 grams oven dry. This 
is done so that all that is needed to 
determine their moisture content 
in percent is to weigh them and 
subtract 100.0 from the total 
weight. 
As you can see, this difference in 
weight is not only the weight of the 
water in the wood, picked up from 
the air and from rain, but it is also 
the moisture content expressed as a 
percentage of the oven-dry weight. 
Consequently, when you call for a 
fuel moisture content measure­
ment from any of our stations you 
can bank on its accuracy probably 
95 times out of 100. The other 5 
times the scales will be out of bal­
ance, which is an operator error, or 
the operator will have read the 
scales wrong. Eliminating that 
error is a job for training and 
supervision. 
Application of Stick Moisture.  By 
the present practice we measure 
stick moistures at only two to four 
occupied stations per ranger dis­
trict. That is not enough under 
some conditions of spotted weather, 
wet here and dry there, but under 
widespread and long continued 
drought it is fully adequate. The 
sticks are exposed on a flat, in the 
open, but under a shading layer of 
screen cloth. The reason for this, 
preparing to meet “average-bad” 
conditions, is used in all fire con­
trol planning in Region 1. The 
sticks are therefore always exposed 
alike at all stations so that the 
results are truly comparable. 
The intention in such an exposure 
is to sample average-bad but not 
the very worst conditions. By sam­
pling average-bad conditions we are 
using the sound engineering prin­
ciple of preparing for the worst 
probable but not the worst possible. 
Engineers did not build the Golden 
Gate Bridge at San Francisco to 
withstand the worst possible earth­
quake. They built it to withstand 
the worst probable. Few ditches, 
storm sewers, or bridges are built 
to withstand the worst possible 
flood. To meet worst possible condi­
tions usually costs more than the 
resource is worth. It is better eco­
nomics therefore to accept the risk 
of the worst possible flood, earth­
quake, or fire weather conditions, 
and plan to meet only the average-
bad or worst probable. We can get 
adequate fire control at a justifiable 
cost by using this principle. We do 
use it, not only in fire danger meas­
urement, but also in all phases of 
fire control planning in Region 1. 
The double layer of 12-mesh screen 
cloth under which we expose our 
sticks provides an amount of shade 
and a fuel-moisture equivalent to 
what you would get if you operated 
two danger stations, one in full sun 
and one under the half shade left 
after a moderately heavy logging 
operation. The stick moistures 
obtained by this method can there­
fore be accepted as representing 
average-bad conditions. Open south 
slopes will have drier half-inch 
sticks. Densely timbered north 
slopes will have materially higher 
fuel moistures. But when the sticks 
at our stations have high moisture 
contents, adjacent areas, both open 
and timbered, also can be expected 
to be moist to wet. When our sticks 
are each day showing lower and 
lower moistures you can depend on 
it that both the open areas and the 
timbered slopes will also be getting 
drier and drier. 
Our present sticks and exposures 
therefore give you one definite and 
dependable index to watch. They 
give you something that you can 
use in calculating, instead of guess­
ing. 
The most significant single feature 
of stick moistures to watch for is 
just this: Are they below 5 percent 
and how long have they been there? 
Your danger of blow-ups and explo­
sions can be really calculated by 
getting merely that information. If 
the sticks at both the nearest 
ranger station and some nearby 
lookout have been down below 5 
percent for several days you can 
bank on it that every fuel type in 
that area is in a truly critical condi­
tion. Fortunately, this does not 
happen very often, but it has hap­
pened and it will happen again. 
When it does you will be making 
the mistake of your life if you fail to 
know it. You can always find out by 
consulting the local ranger station 
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If you are already out on a fire a 
phone call will bring you the 
desired information. 
If the sticks are reported as at less 
than 5 percent, you should then ask 
for two more things: a check of the 
computations to be sure no errors 
were made, and a remeasurement 
of the sticks right then. The dis­
patcher or his assistant can do both 
of these in 10 or 15 minutes. If 
these checks verify the original 
reports, you can then calculate that 
every fuel type in the area, on both 
north and south slopes, and at all 
altitudes, is in its most explosive 
condition. You can bank on it that 
fire will spread in all of these types 
at the fastest rate, that there will be 
little difference in rate of spread 
between fuel types, and that the 
danger of both spotting and of big 
whirls will be at a maximum. You 
can expect a chain reaction at its 
worst. 
Those of you who have never seen 
fires like the Lost Johnny and Half 
Moon on the Flathead in 1929, the 
Freeman Lake on the Kaniksu and 
the McPherson on the Coeur 
d’Alene in 1931, and the Pete King 
on the Selway in 1934, simply can­
not fully appreciate the significance 
and the danger under these condi­
tions. It may be enough to point 
out that the Freeman Lake Fire, 
starting at 10:30 a.m. on August 3, 
1931, exploded almost from the 
start to cover 20,000 acres (8,100 
ha) in the next 12-1/2 hours. This is 
at the rate of 1,600 acres per hour 
(650 ha/h), from a standing start! 
Both duff and 2-inch-diameter (5­
cm) sticks were down to 4 percent 
moisture content that afternoon. 
Wind was 13 miles per hour (21 
km/h) at 10 a. m., and 18 miles per 
hour (29 km/h) at 7 to 8 p.m. 
Relative humidity was 10 percent 
or lower from 2 till after 7 p.m. 
THAT is explosive fire weather. 
Differences in rate of spread 
between fuel types practically disap­
pear under these explosive condi­
tions. The basic laws of chemistry 
take charge when nature produces 
such conditions, and the molecular 
chain reaction is actually unstop­
pable until the wind goes down, the 
humidity goes up, and the fuels 
absorb a little moisture. If you have 
to fight such fires, and you should 
be mentally ready for it, you will 
probably do it like Kelley and Ryan 
fought the Freeman Lake explosion. 
You will not build much fire line 
that day, but you will calculate 
where that fire front will be at mid­
night and you will then have fire 
camps and men well distributed 
around it and ready to begin work 
at the first crack of dawn. Kelley 
and Ryan had more than 600 men 
strung around the Freeman Lake 
Fire front the next morning after 
that fire started, and those men 
never let that fire make another 
major run. That is a record to shoot 
for; it has seldom if ever been 
equaled in this region. 
The real difficulties and the most 
frequent need of skill and under­
standing by fire bosses come, how­
ever, in judging gradations between 
this explosive condition and that 
easiest of all conditions, when fire 
will spread, but only so slowly that 
control is largely a problem of how 
to do it at the least cost. In between 
this explosive condition and the 
easiest condition, other factors than 
stick moisture become more and 
more important and all the factors 
become much more involved. It 
should be evident, nevertheless, 
that fuel moisture is THE major 
variable and that if you are to cal­
culate accurately, your first and 
best bet is to get the stick mois­
tures and other measurements 
from the nearest danger stations 
before you even start to order men. 
After you get to the fire, you can 
then see to it that you are informed 
each day, preferably twice a day, as 
to how fuel moisture and other fac­
tors are changing. There are then 
three other major variables to 
watch. These are fuel type, the 
thermal belt, and wind. 
Fuel Types 
Some men have a misconception 
about fuel types because they do 
not understand that our four rates 
of spread—Extreme, High, 
Medium, and Low—represent dif­
ferences only on a class 65 to class 
75 day. Obviously, rate of spread 
will not differ at all in different 
types when the woods are soaking 
wet. Also, rate of spread is very 
nearly the same in all types after 
several August days with the tem­
perature at 100 °F (38 ºC), humidi­
ty at 10 or 15 percent, and the 
afternoon wind at 15 to 20 miles 
per hour (24–32 km/h). Hence, we 
have used the principle of prepar­
ing for the average-bad in our fuel 
type classification, and the rates 
given on our fuel type maps are 
those to be expected on an average-
bad day. This is about class 70 on 
our burning index meter. You can­
not use those fuel type maps cor­
rectly, or dependably, on any other 
basis. 
Although fuel moisture is the critical variable for
 
making fuels explosive, wind velocity is often the
 
straw that breaks the camel’s back.
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based on differences in rate of  consideration of every available source of 
spread, not at the explosive point  information concerning each of the basic factors where we can do nothing about it, 
of fire behavior.  but at combinations of moisture 
contents, wind velocity, and vegeta­
tive conditions just short of the 
explosive point. These begin early 
in August whenever fuel moisture 
drops to 5 or 6 percent, the humid­
ity falls to less than 15 or 20 per­
cent, and the wind rises above its 
normal afternoon average of 6 or 8 
miles per hour (10–13 km/h). After 
several days of such weather, espe­
cially if the burning index rises to 
75, as it will with fuels under 5 per­
cent, humidity under 10 percent, 
and winds of more than 10 miles 
per hour (16 km/h), differences in 
rate of spread become less and less 
as all fuel types approach the explo­
sive condition. 
A burning index rating is therefore 
essential to calculation of the prob­
abilities in any fuel type. If it shows 
class 65 to 75, you can count on 
the differences shown by the fuel 
type map, insofar as that map is 
well made. The weaknesses in these 
maps are well recognized and steps 
are being taken to correct them. 
In applying the burning index to a 
correct fuel type map, some guides 
have been worked out, but this is 
unfortunately a field in which our 
fire research has been woefully 
weak. Our best contribution is in 
U.S.D.A. Circular 591, Influences of 
Altitude and Aspect on Daily 
Variations in Factors of Fire 
Danger, by Lloyd Hayes, published 
in 1941. The outstanding new fact 
resulting from this research was 
the discovery and general location 
of what Hayes called the thermal 
belt. 
Thermal Belt 
The major significance of this ther­
mal belt is that inside a certain alti­
tudinal zone burning conditions 
change less from daytime to night­
time than they do in either the val­
ley bottoms or on the mountain 
tops. At Priest River this zone 
begins about 600 feet (180 m) 
above the valley bottom and contin­
ues upward for about 1,000 feet 
(300 m). Below and above this zone 
fuels pick up more moisture at 
night than they do within it. Within 
the zone the fuels lose a little every 
afternoon and pick up a few percent 
between 6 p.m. and 3 a.m., but the 
change is very slight. Up on the 
mountain top, however, the same 
fuels will pick up 4 percent more at 
night and lose 4 percent more in 
the daytime. Down in the valley 
bottom they will pick up and lose 8 
to 12 percent more than within the 
thermal belt. This is true on both 
north and south aspects. The only 
places where it may not hold true 
are in steep-sided, deep, east and 
west canyons like that of the 
Salmon River. In that canyon and 
perhaps in a few other spots like it, 
the depth of the canyon and its ori­
entation in relation to prevailing 
winds combine to interfere with 
normal air drainage. There the 
thermal belt effect becomes less 
pronounced or even disappears. 
Sometimes going fires will also dis­
rupt this belt, if the fires are large 
enough, but in most places and 
under most conditions you should 
calculate your probabilities on the 
basis of the known difference of 
burning conditions within this 
thermal belt. 
The next time you have a fire start­
ing in late afternoon or early 
evening about 1,000 feet (300 m) 
up from the main valley bottom, I 
suggest that you note for your­
selves whether or not that particu­
lar fire does not run faster and for 
more hours during the night than a 
similar fire in the valley bottom. 
Also note whether or not that fire 
picks up and starts to run earlier in 
the morning. I think you will find 
both of these conditions in almost 
all thermal belt fires. They are 
essential elements in the equation 
required to calculate the probabili­
ties. 
These facts also should be highly 
significant to all fire dispatchers. 
Other things being equal, more 
men should be sent, and they 
should be speeded on their way 
faster to every fire in the thermal 
belt. Furthermore, on a going fire, 
if night work can be done on any 
sector, it should be planned first on 
those portions of the front from 
500 feet to 2,000 feet (152 to 610 
m) above the valley bottom, 
because this is the zone of the ther­
mal belt. Within this zone you can 
expect the least benefit from 
increased fuel moisture at night. 
Wind 
Although fuel moisture is the criti­
cal variable that puts all fuel types 
in an explosive condition, or 
reduces them to an easy job of fire 
control, wind velocity is often the 
straw that breaks the camel’s back. 
In fact, at fuel moistures of 6 or 7 
percent up to 20 or 25 percent, 
wind is often the variable which 
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both in planning to control a fire and out on the fire line where you try 

to put your plan into effect.
 
finally determines what a fire will 
do. Some basic research by Fons at 
the California station has shown 
that with fuel moisture at 8 per­
cent, variations of wind velocity are 
more significant in changing the 
rate of spread than are variations in 
fuel temperature, fuel size, com­
pactness, or density. 
Whether or not some fire seasons 
are, as a whole, windier than others 
I do not know. But we do know that 
wind is a result of certain meteoro­
logical conditions which change 
periodically at from 3- to 5- or 6­
day intervals. If you will watch the 
wind record portion of any fire dan­
ger station chart, particularly for a 
lookout station, you will see a grad­
ual increase of wind for several 
days, then a decrease, then another 
increase. Obviously, by watching 
this up and down trend you can 
definitely improve your calculation 
of the probabilities, even though 
you cannot forecast precisely. 
There are a few general rules of 
wind behavior which can be used 
locally in Region 1. First is a dis­
covery, made by Hayes and 
described in Circular 591, that the 
places of greatest wind danger at 
night are, strange as it may seem, 
the north aspects at high altitudes. 
To put it another way: While you 
can usually count on the wind 
dying down during the night in the 
valley bottom, you should not 
count on this if your fire is up on 
the high divides between major 
drainages. Instead, at the higher 
elevations you should expect the 
highest winds at night, not in the 
daytime, and more wind on the 
north aspects than on the south. 
Another general law of wind behav­
ior during the ordinary fair weather 
of June, July, and August, that is 
quite well known, is that during the 
day the wind usually blows up the 
canyon or creek, while during the 
night it blows down canyon. This 
reversal of direction in the evening 
usually takes place just a few min­
utes after sundown. When both the 
daytime and the night winds are 
very light—less than 4 miles per 
hour (6 km/h)—this reversal may 
not be of much significance. 
However, in topography and on 
areas which are materially heated 
by the sun’s rays, the afternoon 
wind created by rising hot air may 
amount to 8 or 10 miles per hour 
(13–16 km/h). When this is the 
case, reversals at sundown may pro­
duce a significant down-canyon 
wind. This condition is most pro­
nounced on south aspects and in 
watersheds draining toward the 
south into a big canyon running 
east and west, like that of the 
Salmon River. But even under these 
conditions, a large fire may create 
such an updraft as to upset the nor­
mal reversal of wind. Hence, while 
this generality is worth considering 
in your calculations there are other 
factors which also must be recog­
nized before you make your final 
estimate of rate of spread. 
From what has been said it should 
be clearly evident that “calculating 
the probabilities” means doing 
much, very much more than just 
fight a fire with brute strength and 
numbers of men. It means careful 
consideration of every available 
source of information concerning 
each of the basic factors of fire 
behavior. But even when that has 
been done you will still have to use 
judgment, and perhaps even do 
some pure guessing. Nevertheless, 
your batting average is absolutely 
certain to increase IF you first do 
the best you can to calculate on the 
basis of facts and known principles. 
Experienced Judgment 
Perhaps I should not close on this 
point; because if by doing that I 
cause you to discount any of the 
things previously called to your 
attention then I weaken my point. 
However, in fire control there are 
still a lot of basic factors not yet 
understood or not yet measured. 
And even when they are measured 
the basic facts must still be put 
together, weighted one against 
another, and a balanced decision 
then reached. Worse yet, sometimes 
that decision must then be modi­
fied or even seriously compromised 
on the basis of what you can do 
about it. 
Experienced judgment is therefore 
the final determinant of what you 
actually do, both in planning to 
control a fire and out on the fire 
line where you try to put your plan 
into effect. But if you will stop to 
examine just what is meant by 
experienced judgment, you will 
come back to the items I have list­
ed above. For what is experienced 
judgment except opinion based on 
knowledge acquired by experience? 
If you have fought forest fires in 
every different fuel type, under all 
possible different kinds of weather, 
and if you have remembered exactly 
what happened in each of these 
combinations of conditions, your 
experienced judgment is probably 
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fought all sizes of fires in all kinds 
of fuel types under all kinds of 
weather then your experience does 
not include knowledge of all the 
conditions. In that case, some of 
the facts and principles described 
above should be helpful to you. 
Summary 
There are only three things you can 
do to stop a fire—rob it of its fuel, 
keep it from being heated to the 
ignition point, or shut off the oxy­
gen supply. 
When it comes to fire behavior, 
there are likewise only a few basic 
variables. The big one is fuel mois­
ture, and when our fuel moisture 
indicator sticks are below 5 percent 
you can expect your fires to blow 
up and explode. As that moisture 
content rises above 5 percent your 
fires become less and less explosive 
and you know that they are then 
more and more influenced by 
another major variable, wind. 
Both fuel moisture and wind are 
measured every day of the fire sea­
son at numerous stations. Those 
measurements will show you clear­
ly and accurately what the present 
moistures and velocities are, and 
how they are changing, whether 
getting better or worse. These are 
facts. They are available to you. 
They were not available to the 
rangers and supervisors who fought 
the fires of 1910 and 1919, nor to 
many men in 1928 and 1929. You 
therefore have this accurate knowl­
edge that those men did not have. 
Furthermore, you have some 
knowledge of how both fuel mois­
ture and wind velocity differ 
according to altitude and aspect. 
The outstanding general differences 
are known. Very few if any of the 
most experienced old-time fire 
fighters knew these things. 
And finally you have not only excel­
lent topographic maps to help you 
visualize your fire area, but you 
have the major differences in fuel 
types shown clearly so that you can 
Fire control still requires 
headwork based on 
knowledge. 
calculate what you should expect 
your fire to do on this particular 
slope in the next few hours. 
It is true that you still have to esti­
mate how much different the fuel 
moisture will be at your fire from 
what it is at the fire danger station. 
You also may still have to guess 
what the exact wind direction and 
velocity will be on your fire even 
after you find out what they are at 
the nearest ranger and lookout sta­
tion. And it is true that there may 
be an acre of High-High fuel right 
near your fire even though the map 
shows Medium-Medium or even 
Low-Low. But if you have been on 
your district very many years and 
have gotten around, or if you have 
someone else there who really 
knows his fuels, you may be able to 
pick up that important fact. 
Conclusion 
Even though there are some holes 
in our information, we have much 
more than our predecessors. Those 
men had to think of EVERYTHING. 
They even had to go to town to buy 
their axes and shovels and grub. 
Then they had to remember out of 
their own personal experiences 
what the topography and timber 
and brush types were like, up there 
at the fire. Finally, they could only 
feel the wind and kick the duff to 
see how dry the fuels were, right 
where they stood. Finally they 
could look at the sky and guess at 
what the weather might be tomor­
row. Maybe some of them prayed. 
But times have changed. Where 
those old timers had to guess at 
most everything, today, we have 
measurements and maps and many 
other facilities. While we might like 
to have more, I doubt that anyone 
ever will be able to sit down to a 
machine, punch a key for every fac­
tor of the situation, and have the 
machine tell him what to do. Fire 
control still requires headwork 
based on knowledge. If we will 
make a purposeful attempt to use 
all of the knowledge and all of the 
facilities that are availa1ble to us 
today we can do one thing the old 
timers could not do: We can come 
mighty close to getting adequate 
fire control, and at an operating 
cost far below what it used to be.  ■ 
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FIRE BEHAVIOR* 
John S. Crosby 
F
orest fires are known to behave 
in a variety of ways, sometimes 
in quite unexpected ways. 
Prompt suppression requires that 
the fire boss, in estimating the 
probabilities of control within the 
allowable period, consider factors 
affecting the behavior of the fire as 
well as those fixed by the site. 
The important variables not deter­
mined by the specific location are 
the weather factors, primarily mois­
ture and wind. Estimates of fuel 
moisture and winds are made on 
the basis of weather forecasts, or 
through a knowledge of normal 
daily variation and past experience 
based on observation of weather 
reactions in the locality. Often the 
weather forecast must be interpret­
ed in terms of local topography, or 
proximity to large water bodies, so 
personal observation may be 
invaluable. 
Although fuel moisture is an 
important factor, the purpose of 
this paper is to point out certain 
wind features, particularly those in 
which vertical currents are con­
cerned, and to present a few gener­
al rules for recognizing the proba­
bility of their existence. On the 
ground, the best information avail­
able about wind is its surface veloc­
ity and direction, both of which 
may be constantly changing, 
whereas little if anything is known 
When this article was originally published, 
John Crosby was a forester for the USDA 
Forest Service, Lake States Forest 
Experiment Station, St. Paul, MN. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 10(2) 
[Spring 1949]: 12–15. 
Turbulent, gusty winds affect fire behavior by
 
fanning the fire in spurts from varying directions,
 
and by carrying heat and embers to fresh fuels.
 
of the action of the wind above the 
immediate surface and which may 
have considerable effect on the fire. 
General Characteristics 
of Wind 
Wind is air in motion. The direc­
tion of motion taken is almost 
unlimited. Near the ground the 
wind customarily blows in gusts 
and lulls, seldom as a steady even 
flow. Because it cannot be seen, it 
can only be noted by its effect on 
various objects, and hence it is dif­
ficult to obtain a complete picture 
of the variations that characterize 
air flow. Watching the drift of 
smoke is one way to observe its 
motion; this is like observing some­
what similar currents in a river. 
Both water and air are fluid, 
though water is more limited in its 
freedom of motion. The water 
swirls around and over rocks, 
makes eddies around land projec­
tions, and tumbles over falls. It 
exhibits motion in many directions 
besides down stream. Likewise, air 
moves in a turbulent fashion near 
the ground while still following a 
general course. 
The general flow of air is deter­
mined by the air pressure gradient 
and is modified by the effect of the 
earth’s rotation and the friction 
caused by the passage of the air 
over the earth’s surface. The direc­
tion becomes clockwise around 
high pressure centers with a slight 
drift outward, and counterclockwise 
around low pressure centers with a 
slight drift towards lowest pressure. 
At any fixed location the wind 
direction changes as the pressure 
systems migrate and take up new 
positions in respect to that point. 
Many reactions are superimposed 
on the flow of air, particularly near 
the ground, to modify the pressure 
flow. Aloft the wind is stronger, and 
more steady, being changed only by 
strong reactions. 
Up and down air currents may exist 
in the lower atmosphere in a great 
variety of intensities and steepness 
of rise or fall. Small eddies in a 
light wind may be on]y a few feet in 
depth, whereas strong convection 
currents may extend several miles 
into the atmosphere, or the gentle 
lift caused by a warm front may 
amount to 10 feet in a mile (2 
m/km), but extend over 1,000 miles 
(1,600 km). 
At ground level the wind tends to 
parallel the surface; that is to say, 
because the wind cannot penetrate 
or go through the solid earth, its 
larger up-and-down currents must 
change to a motion along the sur­
face on reaching the surface, 
though the direction may be vari­
able, arid small eddies still persist. 
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is more prominent at some dis­
tance above the surface, where, of 
course, it is more difficult to 
observe. When a vertical motion, 
such as an eddy or convection cur­
rent, is superimposed on the exist­
ing wind, the result is alternately to 
speed up and slow down the wind, 
making it gusty and stronger. 
The stronger the horizontal wind, 
the more turbulent it becomes in 
its passage over a rough surface, 
thus creating stronger eddies and 
more gustiness with frequent 
changes in direction. Turbulent, 
gusty winds affect fire behavior by 
fanning the fire in spurts from 
varying directions, and by carrying 
heat and embers to fresh fuels. 
Convection Currents 
The motion of the air is also 
strongly affected by the heat it 
gains from the earth on sunny days. 
Air in contact with the ground 
then, because of the additional 
heat, becomes lighter than air 
above and tends to rise. The rising 
warm air sets up convection cur­
rents. A forest fire also sets up such 
currents locally because of the 
intense heating of the air by the 
fire. 
The earth’s surface is not uniformly 
heated. Water surfaces are cooler 
than land, and forested land cooler 
than exposed soil or rocks, so the 
surface air is not of uniform tem­
perature. Warmed air tends to rise 
in streams usually localized over 
the warmer areas, or hills may help 
to start the warm air upward. 
Down-drafts occur as complements 
to up-drafts. Both currents have 
their effect on a forest fire. While 
an up-draft in a favorable atmos­
phere has the effect of pulling on 
the rising smoke column, thus 
increasing the air feeding into the 
fire, the down-draft increases the 
surface wind velocity, making it 
more gusty and turbulent. 
Once started, convection currents 
may be accentuated or depressed by 
the atmosphere, depending on its 
condition of stability. If stable con­
ditions exist (where the tempera­
ture decrease with elevation in the 
atmosphere is slight), the convec­
tion currents will be damped. 
The stability of the air 
layers both near the 
surface and aloft greatly 
influences fire behavior. 
However, in relatively unstable air 
(where decrease of temperature 
with elevation is great), convection 
currents are increased in speed and 
depth. Convection currents some­
times rise to 8 or 10 miles (13–17 
km) in the atmosphere and develop 
great vertical velocities. 
With night-time cooling, the air is 
stabilized at low levels, and the 
convection currents subside. This 
change is a part of the daily varia­
tion in stability. In flat country the 
wind then dies down. In mountain­
ous country the wind stops flowing 
up-slope and begins to flow down­
slope. Along larger water bodies the 
daytime landward breeze changes 
at night to a seaward breeze. These 
changes are normal only when the 
pressure gradient is weak. 
Influence on Fire 
Behavior 
The stability of the air layers both 
near the surface and aloft greatly 
influences fire behavior. Very large 
fires generate intense heat and may 
enable the heated air to penetrate 
moderately stable layers and join or 
set up vertical currents aloft, thus 
giving a new impetus to the fire, 
causing it to flare up unexpectedly. 
A study of large fires in relation to 
air stability conditions aloft might 
throw new light on unexpected fire 
behavior, and provide a new tool for 
better forecasting fire behavior. 
When there is marked air stability 
even during the daytime, the height 
to which convection currents may 
rise is of little consequence, and the 
diurnal variation in wind is not 
important. Thus, a strong daytime 
wind may not die down much at 
night because it is driven by the 
pressure gradient alone, and it will 
decrease only as the pressure gradi­
ent decreases. 
These considerations are useful 
only insofar as one is able to plan 
for them and hence a few very gen­
eral rules may be helpful. 
While the actual stability of the air 
and the pressure gradient are basic, 
they are not subject to convenient 
observation at a fire. Indirectly, 
however, the condition of stability 
shows itself in several ways. 
Cloud Formations.  Cumulus type 
clouds are always an indication of 
rising air currents, and often indi­
rectly of instability. In mountainous 
country, the rising currents may be 
due to lift over a ridge, while in 
level country it is almost always a 
result of convection if not associat­
ed with a front. For these clouds to 
form there must be sufficient water 
vapor present in the rising air so 
that it is cooled to its saturation 
point before the lift ceases. If the 
cloud bases are low it is an indica­
tion of abundant moisture; if high, 
water vapor is scarce. This condi­
tion is indicated at the ground sur­
face by high or low relative humidi-
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penetrate stable air layers. Flat-
topped cumulus clouds, therefore, 
indicate stability aloft. 
Often, however, vertical currents 
exist without formation of cumulus 
clouds as the water vapor content is 
so low that it cannot be carried 
high enough to condense. Under 
such conditions, when the sky is 
mostly clear, evaporation is speed-
ed, resulting in faster drying of 
fuels. 
When relative humidity is low and 
temperature high, strong currents 
may exist to considerable elevations 
without clouds forming. A further 
check can be made by watching the 
rise of temperature during the 
morning. A sharp rise early that 
flattens out and remains high sub­
stantiates the prospect of deep ver­
tical currents, assuming nearly 
clear skies. Small whirlwinds or 
dust devils also indicate unstable 
conditions, though they may exist 
only near the surface. 
Thunderstorms and very large 
cumulus clouds indicate instability 
extending to great heights with 
strong vertical currents. Thun­
derstorms with high bases may be 
dry storms, that is, the rain evapo­
rates into the air before it reaches 
the ground, and hence lightning 
strikes are more dangerous. 
Stratiform clouds (fog-like clouds 
or layer clouds) indicate stable con­
ditions at least at the level of the 
clouds, though stratocumulus may 
often form in turbulent surface air 
even though the turbulence is shal­
low. In general, the lower the stra­
tus clouds, if they persist, the more 
stable the air, and the less possibili­
ty of vertical currents. Low stratus 
clouds in the morning, however, 
often are a better indication of good 
moisture conditions than of contin­
ued stability during the day, for 
they may have formed in a shallow 
layer of stable air that will rapidly 
change to an unstable layer during 
the heat of the day. 
Visibility.  Good visibility is often a 
sign of unstable air in which verti­
cal currents may develop. In unsta­
ble air the impurities are carried 
aloft and away, while stable air 
traps impurities and holds them in 
a shallow layer of air. 
Air Mass.  Cool air masses follow­
ing cold fronts during the fire sea­
son east of the Rockies tend to rap­
idly develop instability in passing 
over warmer areas. This instability 
at first is not deep, but increases 
with time. The cool air is also dry 
air, and visibility is good. It is usu­
ally recognized as coming in with 
fresh northerly winds. 
Winds.  Gusty winds with a notice­
able decrease in velocity at evening 
indicate the possibility of strong 
convection currents during the day. 
Turbulence and gustiness are more 
readily started in unstable air. Such 
gusty winds usually are accompa­
nied by frequent changes in direc­
tion. The direction may vary 
through 45 or more degrees rapid­
ly, back and forth, or more moder­
ately within periods of an hour or 
so.  ■ 
Russo and Schoemaker (1989) Decision Trap 2—Frame Blindness: 
Setting out to solve the wrong problem because, with little thought, 

you have created a mental framework for your decision that causes you to
 
overlook the best options or lose sight of important objectives.*
 
* See page 9. 
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WARNING SIGNS FOR FIRE FIGHTERS* 
A.A. Brown 
n 1949, 32 men died as a direct 
result of forest fires on national-
forest, State, and private lands. 
Most of them lost their lives 
because of extreme fire conditions 
which resulted in blow-ups. These 
comments will be confined to these 
special situations. 
Probably it is expecting too much 
to make fire behavior experts of all 
fire bosses. Nevertheless, we should 
go as far as we can in the interest 
of safety and sound fire strategy. 
Large Fire Behavior 
We need to study the large fire 
from the point of view of a local 
weather phenomenon. As soon as 
sufficient heat and sufficient area, 
from which heat is rising, have 
crossed a particular threshold, the 
fire takes on new potentials in 
behavior beyond those to be expect­
ed by simply extending the dimen­
sions of a small fire. Sometimes we 
say “it begins to write its own tick­
et.” This is because of the air turbu­
lence which is set up. Similarly, 
there is good evidence that local 
atmospheric conditions, beyond the 
already known effects of humidity 
and wind, play a big part. This 
relates to the stability of the air at 
the location of a fire. It seems rea­
sonable, when an existing atmos­
pheric inversion or ceiling gives 
way under pressure of a mass of hot 
air and gases from below, that there 
is a sudden acceleration in both the 
When this article was originally published, 
A.A. Brown was chief of the Division of Fire 
Research, USDA Forest Service, 
Washington Office, Washington, DC. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 11(3) 
[Summer 1950]: 28–29. 
rising and descending air currents 
and a corresponding acceleration in 
the surface air circulation with 
effects similar to those of blowing 
fresh oxygen on a smoldering fire. 
In other situations unburned gases 
seem to accumulate, then explode. 
Full analysis of such factors will 
require the help of competent 
meteorologists and active participa­
tion and close cooperation by both 
research and administrative groups. 
This will be essential if we are to 
make significant new progress in 
foreseeing blow-up behavior. It can 
be done. 
Every fire crew boss 
needs to have a good 
knowledge of fire 
behavior if he is to be 
left on his own 
responsibility. 
Warning Signs 
In the meantime, here are some 
warning signs to consider when 
critical situations arise: 
Manpower placement and safety— 
1. Every fire crew boss needs to 
have a good knowledge of fire 
behavior if he is to be left on his 
own responsibility. The alterna­
tive is close supervision and 
explicit safety instructions by an 
experienced supervising officer. 
We need to study the large fire from the point of
 
view of a local weather phenomenon.
 
2. There is always danger in placing 
men above a large fire and in 
fighting it from the head down 
in steep country. Wherever such 
strategy is necessary, lines of 
retreat and places of refuge 
become a critical part of the 
responsibility of the fire boss. 
3. Closely related to No. 2 is the 
fact that it is always hazardous to 
attempt to outrun a fire uphill 
when there is danger of being 
trapped. Nearly always there are 
safer alternatives. 
4. Special precautions are needed 
in assigning men to special 
duties when they are detached 
from the main crews or will oth­
erwise be isolated for a time 
from direct supervision and 
guidance by an experienced fire­
man. 
5. The danger of being asphyxiated 
is often overlooked in selecting 
places of refuge. The bottom of a 
gulch in the direction of spread 
may become a chimney flue even 
though it has no fuel to burn, 
and most low places directly in 
the path of the head of the fire 
have such hazards. 
Effects of ground cover— 
The fire front moves much more 
rapidly, through grass and open 
cover than through heavy timber. 
All experienced fire fighters realize 
this, but they often underestimate 
the contrast in the rate of spread. 
The fire perimeter can be expected 
to change from 2 to 10 times as 
rapidly on the sectors of a fire in 
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27   that kind of cover. These two—  To  an experienced fire  3. The mouth of a canyon in rough 
cheatgrass and dry bunchgrass—  country is always affected by fighter, dust devils are 
have extremely high rates of speed	  conflicting air currents. Any fire an ominous sign for in steep country, even if the cover	  in its close vicinity is likely to
blow-ups. is sparse. It is well to recheck the	  reflect these air currents in its 
known ratios between contrasting 
but intermingled fuel types and to 
impress them on trainees. 
Influence of weather and 
topography— 
1. Prevailing wind direction, partic­
ularly if the wind is of low veloci­
ty, will be modified a great deal 
by rugged topography. 
2. Extremely rugged country is apt 
to produce erratic behavior in 
any fire that has gained momen­
tum because of the conflicting 
air currents that are set up. 
behavior. The head of the fire in 
such cases may not be the most 
threatening. 
4. To an experienced fire fighter, 
dust devils—those local whirl­
winds of dust—are an ominous 
sign. Such whirls account for 
many blow-ups.  ■ 
WEBSITES ON FIRE
* 
The Pulaski Project	  Corporation, the project has many  Wildland Fire 
planned endeavors, including a Developing a fully accessible,	  Research 
National Wildfire Education Center world-class hiking trail to the	  Established in January 2001, the
and Museum in Wallace or  Nicholson mine (also known as	  Wildland Fire Operations
Silverton, ID. The proposed center  the Pulaski Tunnel) and rehabili-	 Research Group (WFORG) in
will link the Pulaski story to the tating the adit itself are chief	  Hinton, Alberta, provides leader-
challenges facing forest manage- goals of the Pulaski Project.	  ship in fire operational research
ment and wildfire issues in 21st­ Founded in 2002, the project is	  and technology development.
century America. designed to honor the memory  The Website describes many 
of “Big Ed” Pulaski and other  areas of research and develop-
The project’s Website includes news  wildland firefighters and to focus	  ment, including fire equipment
and information on wildland fire attention on issues surrounding	  and protective clothing, fire
history and management, along wildland fire management and	  management systems, and cur-
with a jointly sponsored and mod- forest health. Now an action ele-	 rent operational issues for fire
erated listserv discussion group on ment of the Greater Wallace	  managers. Research outputs are
forest health, conservation, and fire Community Development	  intended to benefit firefighters,
management. The site also provides  fire managers, equipment manu­
links to fire season reports, fire­ facturers, and fire service agen­
related publications, and an abun­
* Occasionally, Fire Management Today briefly  cies. The site also posts upcom­
describes Websites brought to our attention by the  dance of other resource sites of 
wildland fire community. Readers should not con- ing wildland fire conferences and
interest. strue the description of these sites as in any way  symposiums in the United States
exhaustive or as an official endorsement by the 
USDA Forest Service. To have a Website described,  and Canada and links to other 
contact the managing editor, Hutch Brown, at  Found at <http:www.Pulaski­ research efforts. USDA Forest Service, Office of Communication,  project.org> Mail Stop 1111, 1400 Independence Avenue, SW,
 
Washington, DC 20250-1111, 202-205-1028 (tel.),
 
202-205-0885 (fax), hutchbrown@fs.fed.us (e-mail).  Found at <http://fire.feric.ca>
 
28 
Fire Management Today V 
RECOGNIZING WEATHER CONDITIONS
 
THAT AFFECT FOREST FIRE BEHAVIOR*
 
Owen P . Cramer 
iolent or erratic fire behavior 
often develops as a complete 
surprise even to the more 
experienced fire fighters. Such 
behavior usually is not completely 
explained and is frequently dis­
missed with the remark that the 
fire suddenly “blew up.” Unusual 
fire behavior is often closely related 
to certain weather conditions that 
can be recognized by visible charac­
teristics. These weather conditions, 
some of their characteristics, and 
their relation to fire behavior are 
described here. 
The descriptions and terminology 
used in this discussion agree with 
definitions in the U.S. Weather 
Bureau Weather Glossary of 1946, 
with two exceptions. These are fire 
storm, which has been used in pub­
lished accounts of fires started from 
extensive incendiary bombings, and 
fire whirlwind, which is possibly 
used here for the first time. 
Weather conditions described are 
divided into two major groups: phe­
nomena of stable air, of which only 
inversion is discussed; and phe­
nomena of unstable air, including 
turbulent, convective, and whirling. 
Stable Air 
General Features.  Stable air (sta­
bility) is air in which vertical 
motions are suppressed primarily 
because of the vertical distribution 
When this article was originally published, 
Owen Cramer was a meteorologist for the 
USDA Forest Service’s Pacific Northwest 
Forest and Range Experiment Station. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 15(2) 
[Spring 1954]: 1–6. 
of temperature. In stable air, under­
lying air is relatively cooler and 
heavier; overlying air is relatively 
warmer and lighter. If the tempera­
ture decreases no more than 5 °F 
per 1,000 feet increase in elevation 
in dry air, the air is stable. In 
extremely stable air, temperature 
may actually increase with height. 
There are several indicators of sta­
ble air. Surface wind is steady or 
frequently calm and smoke tends to 
lie in layers. Clouds are the stratus 
or stratified type showing no verti­
cal motion (fig. 1). Visibility is often 
poor, particularly in the lower lay­
ers. Ground and valley fogs form in 
stable layers near the ground. Air in 
the lower layers is usually stable 
during calm, clear nights, but 
becomes unstable in midday when 
heated by the warm ground. 
In stable air, both the intensity of the fire and the 
amount of spotting are reduced. Smoke will not 
rise as high, and much drift smoke will remain in 
the lower layers. 
Convective circulation into the base 
of a fire and in the column of rising 
hot gases above a fire is weak. Both 
the intensity of the fire and the 
amount of spotting is reduced. In 
stable air, smoke will not rise as 
high, and much drift smoke will 
remain in the lower layers. The 
most common stability phenome­
non is the inversion layer. 
Inversion.  An inversion is a hori­
zontal layer of air through which 
temperature increases with increas­
ing height. An inversion is the most 
stable air condition. Inversion lay­
ers occur at any height and vary 
greatly in thickness. As the ground 
cools at night, a surface layer of air 
becomes colder than the air above 
and produces a surface inversion. 
Surface inversions are most pro­
nounced in valley bottoms to which 
Figure 1—Stable air. 
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29 cold air flows from surrounding  Spot fires are more likely in unstable air because 
slopes. This type of inversion is  of the more intense drafts in the fire and the 
readily dissipated by ground heat- greater vertical speed in the smoke column.  ing during the day. 
Since an inversion tends to sup­
press any vertical motion, its base 
is frequently marked by: 
• The flat top of a cloud or fog 
layer, 
• The common height at which ris­
ing cumulus clouds cease to rise, 
and 
• The height at which a rising 
smoke column levels off (fig. 2). 
There is often greater wind, or a 
shift in wind direction, above the 
inversion. An inversion near the 
ground affects a fire in the same 
way as stable air but to a greater 
degree. In the lower layers it tends 
to weaken drafts into and above a 
fire, thereby reducing the fire’s 
intensity and spotting potential. It 
has been suggested that flammable 
mixtures of gases liberated by a 
slow-burning fire might accumu­
late under a surface inversion, and 
that these might ignite and burn 
explosively. 
Unstable Air 
General Features.  Unstable air 
(instability) is air that tends to turn 
over owing to relatively warm, light 
air in the lower layers and relatively 
cooler, heavy air in the upper lay­
ers. The decrease in temperature 
with increasing height is greater 
than in stable air—5.4 °F or more 
per 1,000 feet in dry air. Vertical 
motions are accelerated. Upward 
and downward currents develop. 
Indicators are erratic surface winds 
with gusts and lulls, and a variation 
in direction and turbulence above 
the surface layers. Since smoke, 
dust, and haze are widely dispersed 
by mixing of high and low layers, 
visibility is generally good. Clouds 
in unstable air are the cumulus 
type with pronounced vertical 
development and restricted hori­
zontal area (fig. 3). A deep layer of 
moist, unstable air may be marked 
by cumulonimbus clouds or thun­
derstorms. Instability at the cloud 
level does not necessarily mean 
that this condition exists all the 
way to the ground. If it does exist, 
it may be indicated by dust whirls 
and erratic winds. 
Unstable air affects fires in several 
ways. Spread of fires may be accel­
erated by gusty wind. The column 
of smoke over the fire will rise 
faster and to greater heights than 
in stable air, resulting in a stronger 
indraft at the base of the fire and a 
hotter burning fire. Spot fires are 
more likely because of the more 
intense drafts in the fire and the 
greater vertical speed in the smoke 
column. Unstable air is favorable 
for the formation of fire whirl­
winds. These effects are discussed 
in more detail under the several 
instability phenomena described 
below. 
Turbulence.  Turbulence is irregu­
larity in air motion, shown by 
bumpy air for the pilot and gusty 
wind for the ground observer. Any 
obstacle to the wind sets up 
Figure 2—Inversion. 
Figure 3—Unstable air. 
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Fire Management Today mechanical turbulence on the lee­
ward side (fig. 4). Intermingled cur­
rents of rising warm and descend­
ing cool air cause thermal turbu­
lence, which is characteristic of 
unstable air. Turbulence may be 
accentuated by an uneven surface 
heating that varies with color of 
soil, amount of shade, and type of 
ground cover. 
Gustiness.  Gustiness is a charac­
teristic of wind in unstable or tur­
bulent air. Gustiness refers to sur­
face winds that vary rapidly in ver­
tical and horizontal speed and 
direction. Increasing instability and 
increasing turbulence caused by 
surface obstacles result in corre-
The more intense the 
convective circulation, 
the hotter and faster 
the fire will burn and 
the higher embers will 
be carried. 
sponding increases in gustiness. 
Since a fire greatly increases sur­
face instability, the intensity of 
gusts is likely to be greater in the 
immediate vicinity of a fire. Gusts 
usually cause a fire to spread spas­
modically in unpredictable direc­
tions. They also cause rapid fluctua­
tion in fire intensity and rate of 
spread. 
Convection.  A convection is 
motion in the air resulting from 
temperature differences in adjacent 
bodies of air. Convective currents 
are characteristic of unstable air. 
They consist of rising warm air and 
descending cool air currents (fig. 
5). Heating at the ground either by 
the sun or by fire may initiate the 
upward current. Surrounding air 
descends and flows toward the base 
of the column of rising air. The ris­
ing warm air above a continuing 
heat source is known as the con­
vective column. Above a fire this is 
seen as the smoke column. 
Cumulus clouds are convective 
columns that have become visible 
because of moisture condensation. 
The greater the instability of the air 
or the greater the source of heat, 
the more intense becomes the con­
vective circulation caused by a fire, 
including both indraft at the base 
and updraft in the smoke column. 
The more intense the convective 
circulation, the hotter and faster 
the fire will burn and the higher 
embers will be carried. 
Thundersquall.  A thundersquall is 
the sudden wind that blows out­
ward from beneath a thunderstorm. 
Figure 4—Turbulence. 
Figure 5—Convection. 
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31 Such a wind originates in the area 
of heaviest precipitation in a cumu­
lonimbus cloud, a convective cloud 
type that occurs in unstable, moist 
air. Air, cooled by precipitation, 
descends from the cloud and fans 
out at the surface (fig. 6). The 
thundersquall usually occurs with a 
well-developed thunderstorm and 
hits suddenly with speeds averaging 
30 to 50 miles per hour (48–80 
km/h) for a period of several min­
utes. The thundersquall may occur 
beneath a thunderstorm from 
which no precipitation reaches the 
ground, and may extend outward a 
mile (1.6 km) or more ahead of the 
storm edge. 
These sudden, strong winds may 
sweep a fire far beyond its confines 
before the rainy section of the 
thunderstorm arrives. If the rain 
evaporates before reaching the 
ground, the fire may continue to 
burn unchecked. 
Whirlwind.  A whirlwind is any 
revolving mass of air, from the dust 
whirl to the hurricane. The torna­
do, a whirlwind associated with 
thunderstorms, is the most severe, 
though not the largest type. 
Whirlwinds are usually associated 
with extremely unstable air. Fires 
frequently make the nearby atmos­
phere unstable and produce fire 
whirlwinds. Two types of whirlwind 
will be described, the dust whirl 
and the fire whirlwind. 
Dust whirl.  The dust whirl is the 
smallest type of whirlwind, fre­
quently known as a dust devil. Dust 
whirls indicate unstable air. They 
occur on sunny days with light sur­
face wind when the layers of air 
next to the ground become much 
hotter than the air immediately 
above. These whirls are usually 5 to 
25 feet (1.5–8 m) in diameter and 
may extend upward several hun-
Even a small fire whirlwind may produce
 
considerable spotting and local intensification of
 
the fire.
 
dred feet. Though usually not of 
destructive force, dust whirls can 
throw small debris several yards. 
The greatest speed is near the cen­
ter, where a strong upward current 
occurs. Dust whirls occasionally 
form in the vicinity of fires and 
move into the fire area, throwing 
sparks and embers in all directions 
and temporarily intensifying the 
fire as they pass. 
Fire Whirlwind.  A fire whirlwind 
is any whirlwind caused by a fire. 
The fire whirlwind may vary in 
intensity, from a small dust whirl to 
a whirlwind that easily snaps off 
large trees. The diameter of its cir­
culation may vary from 3 to 50 
yards (2–45 m) or more. Fire whirl­
winds encompassing whole fires 
1,000 yards (910 m) or more across 
have been reported. Besides the 
rotating horizontal winds, there is a 
strong vertical current at the cen­
ter, which may raise burning debris 
to great heights. Even a small fire 
whirlwind may produce consider­
able spotting and local intensifica­
tion of the fire. A central spout or 
tube may sometimes be present 
(fig. 7). Because of the wind and 
Figure 6—Thundersquall. 
Figure 7—Fire whirlwind. 
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Fire Management Today In a fire storm, the 
surface draft into the 
base of the fire may be 
of destructive violence 
several hundred yards 
outside the fire. 
the resulting accelerated combus­
tion, fire whirlwinds are sometimes 
accompanied by a roaring noise 
similar to that produced by a rapid­
ly burning fire. Duration and 
behavior are variable. Fire whirls 
may occur and recur where the 
combination of fire-produced insta­
bility, topography, and wind are 
favorable. It is sometimes possible 
to dissipate a small, recurring fire 
whirlwind by cooling the part of 
the fire over which it forms. 
Fire Storm.  A fire storm is a vio­
lent convection caused by a large, 
continuous area of intense fire. 
This phenomenon was frequently 
observed after extensive firebomb 
raids in Europe and Japan. The 
convective system usually encom­
passes the entire fire (fig. 8). The 
surface draft into the base of the 
fire may be of destructive violence 
Figure 8—Fire storm. 
several hundred yards outside the 
fire. The fire storm, like other con­
vective phenomena, increases in 
intensity with greater atmospheric 
instability. Burning material may 
be lifted several miles high. A fire 
storm is not likely in the usual 
wildfire, where only the periphery 
is actively burning.  ■ 
The Blowup Fire and Firefighter Safety
* 
A review of fire fatalities through  Hundreds have died from this  strategy, more foremen trained 
the years focuses our attention  source, if one considers the historic  in handling men on fires, has 
on four major problems.  fires of the past, such as Peshtigo.  had much to do with the reduc-
Losses of life are becoming fewer  tion in the number of fire fatali-
The greatest man-killer, of  because of organized fire-suppres­ ties in recent years. But blow-up 
course, is the blow-up fire which  sion efforts. Fast initial action with  fires still constitute the worst 
almost yearly takes its toll.  machine-age equipment such as  potential killer. Much remains to 
planes, trucks, and tractors, a bet- be done before the problem is 
* From Seth Jackson, “Death on the Fire Line 
(Fire Control Notes 11[3] [July 1950]: 26–27). 
ter understanding of fire behavior, 
more thorough planning of control 
solved. 
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33 METEOROLOGICAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED 
WITH MASS FIRES* 
DeVer Colson 
W
eather plays an important 
role in the behavior of mass 
fires. The knowledge and 
understanding of the meteorologi­
cal conditions existing prior to and 
during these fires are essential for 
efficient fire fighting and control in 
both urban and rural situations. 
Ordinary fires or even large fires 
which are burning and spreading in 
a regular manner do not present 
the major control problems. 
Serious situations often develop 
when what seems to be a routine 
fire suddenly intensifies or begins 
to spread at a greatly increased rate 
or changes its direction of spread 
abruptly. In forestry parlance, the 
term “blow-up” or “explosive” has 
been applied to such forest fires, 
since these fires often seem to 
explode. However, many fires have 
been designated as “blow-ups” sim­
ply because of a lack of understand­
ing of the factors controlling the 
behavior of these fires. 
There is much to be learned both 
in identifying these factors and in 
forecasting the occurrence of these 
factors. Some of the possible mete­
orological factors will be discussed 
briefly in this paper. 
General Burning
Conditions 
Most serious fires occur with 
extremely low fuel moisture caused 
by severe or extended drought con-
When this article was originally published, 
DeVer Colson worked for the U.S. Weather 
Bureau. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 17(1) 
[Winter 1956]: 9–11. 
ditions. These conditions are usual­
ly combined with high surface tem­
peratures and low relative humidi­
ties and often with strong surface 
winds. 
One notable example involved the 
famous Chicago fire on October 8, 
1871; and the associated fires in 
Wisconsin and Michigan on the 
same day, which burned over 1 mil­
lion acres (400,000 ha), including 
the entire town of Peshtigo, where 
over 600 lives were lost. Weather 
data indicate extreme dryness and 
strong winds on that date. On days 
with less hazardous burning condi­
tions, these fires might well have 
been controlled before they had 
reached such disastrous propor­
tions. 
In the preparation and planning for 
the fire bombing raids over the 
Tokyo area, weather conditions 
were studied in connection with 
brush fires in North Carolina, a 
region climatically similar to the 
Tokyo area. The following factors 
were used: precipitation, relative 
humidity, and maximum wind 
speed. The maximum wind speed 
on the day of the fire was used, 
while the precipitation and relative 
humidity were weighted over the 
day of the fire and the three previ­
ous days. These same factors are 
used directly or indirectly in most 
current fire danger rating systems. 
Many fires have been designated as “blow-ups”
 
simply because of a lack of understanding of the
 
factors controlling the behavior of these fires.
 
Surface Wind Patterns  
The details of the surface wind pat­
terns are necessary for efficient fire 
fighting operations. These details 
would include: 
• The actual local surface wind pat­
terns; 
• the diurnal variations in these 
patterns; and 
• the dependence of these local pat­
terns and their diurnal variations 
on the surface pressure patterns, 
as well as frontal and storm pas­
sages, the upper level weather 
patterns, atmospheric stability, 
wind and temperature profiles, 
and topography. 
A knowledge of the local wind pat­
terns and their variations is even 
more essential in areas of rugged 
terrain. In these areas, there are 
the additional effects of general 
drainage patterns (mountain and 
valley winds) and the diurnal up-
and downslope winds due to the 
differential heating of the slopes. 
The relative influences of all these 
factors vary greatly with the 
ruggedness of the terrain. 
Two local wind surveys have been 
conducted, one by the U.S. Weather 
Bureau in 1949–52 at Oak Ridge, 
TN, and the other by Operation 
Firestop in 1954 at Camp 
Pendleton, CA. Unfortunately, 
much of the data from these sur­
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Fire Management Today In the Mann Gulch fire, the unusual currents may have been due to the
 
strong surface winds resulting from descending currents from the 

high-level thunderstorms in that area.
 
veys cannot be applied to other 
areas because of the influences of 
the local terrain and weather condi­
tions. However, as data from addi­
tional surveys are accumulated, 
more and more generalizations can 
be made that can be applied to 
other areas. Such wind studies are 
important in air pollution and 
smog control. 
It is the unusual cases that cause 
the most trouble. Some recent 
cases are the 1949 Mann Gulch fire 
in Montana and the 1953 
Rattlesnake and 1954 Sierra City 
fires in California. At each of these 
fires, fire fighters lost their lives 
when the fire spread rapidly in an 
unusual and unexpected manner. In 
the Mann Gulch fire, the unusual 
currents may have been due to the 
strong surface winds resulting from 
descending currents from the high-
level thunderstorms in that area. In 
the other two cases, the rapid 
spread of the fire may have been 
due to a combination of the normal 
night downslope air drainage acting 
simultaneously with a pressure gra­
dient across and through the pass­
es. As more is learned about these 
wind patterns, more of these 
unusual fires and their behavior 
patterns can be anticipated. 
Topography 
With the proper pressure gradient 
across mountain ridges and 
through passes, strong local winds 
will be set up as the air flows down 
the lee side. Examples of such 
strong local winds are the Santa 
Ana winds in southern California, 
the east winds in western Oregon 
and Washington, and the chinook 
winds on the east slopes of the 
Rocky Mountains. These winds have 
a tremendous effect on fires, since 
they are associated with high tem­
peratures and low relative humidi­
ties. 
Upper Level Winds 
As fires spread into the crowns of 
high trees, a different rate of spread 
can be expected since the wind 
speed and direction at this level 
may be quite different from that 
near the ground. Also, with burn­
ing buildings, the surface winds 
may have little connection with the 
fire spread at higher levels. With 
convection currents carrying burn­
ing embers up into even higher lev­
els, the rate and direction of the 
spread of the fire due to spotting 
may be entirely different from that 
which would be expected from just 
a knowledge of the surface winds 
alone. 
Turbulence 
In addition to the actual local wind 
patterns, the turbulence or the 
fluctuations in both the wind speed 
and the direction must be consid­
ered. The magnitude and frequency 
of these fluctuations have been 
found to be closely associated with 
the degree of atmospheric instabili­
ty. Also, the magnitude and fre­
quency of these fluctuations will be 
greater at well-exposed sites than at 
well-sheltered locations. 
Mechanical eddies and turbulence 
can be generated as air flows across 
and around sharp features of ter­
rain and buildings. 
Convection 
Under certain atmospheric condi­
tions, better convection can be sus­
tained which will promote more 
efficient burning. These conditions 
are usually associated with atmos­
pheric instability, that is, with near 
or superadiabatic temperature lapse 
rates. However, the convection col­
umn will not attain great heights if 
the wind speed increases too rapid­
ly with height. Too strong a wind 
speed may cause the column to be 
broken away from its energy 
source. 
Temperature inversions tend to act 
as a lid on free convection. 
However, under these conditions, 
as the free air temperature reaches 
a certain value or as the energy of 
the fire becomes great enough, the 
convection can break through the 
inversion and can suddenly extend 
to much greater heights, especially 
if the atmosphere is unstable above 
the inversion. When this break­
through occurs, sudden changes 
will take place in the fire behavior 
and the spread. As fires spread into the crowns of high trees, a 
different rate of spread can be expected since the  Much experimental and theoretical
wind speed and direction at this level may be quite  work is now in progress on the
different from that near the ground.  general problems of turbulence, dif-
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lems at many air pollution and  sudden changes will take place in the fire behavior
micrometeorological projects.  and the spread. 
Thunderstorm and 
Lightning 
The high-level and often dry thun­
derstorms present a great hazard in 
the Rocky Mountain area because 
of lightning fires. Project Skyfire 
has been set up in the Northern 
Rocky Mountain area to study the 
origin, development, structure and 
intensity, movement, distribution 
of these storms, and the possibility 
of modification of these storms to 
reduce the lightning hazards. 
Meteorological
Phenomena induced by
a Large Fire 
Once a fire develops, the original 
wind and temperature distribution 
around and over the fire will be 
changed. A complete study of this 
problem requires accurate and 
detailed data on temperature, 
humidity, wind speed and direction, 
and the composition of the gases in 
the convection column. From these 
results, it will be possible to deter­
mine the rate of transfer of heat, 
momentum, and the distribution of 
energy about the fire. In addition to 
experimental studies at actual fires, 
much information has been gained 
from model studies. 
Strong indrafts, usually referred to 
as the firestorm, have been 
observed in the vicinity of some 
large fires and may become quite 
appreciable at times. 
Conclusion 
As more is learned about the mete­
orological factors as well as a better 
knowledge of the fuel distribution 
and efficiency of combustion, fewer 
fires will be designated as “blow­
ups.” These fires can be anticipated 
and their behavior patterns expect­
ed. However, a vast amount of diffi­
cult experimental and theoretical 
work will be necessary to accom­
plish this goal.  ■ 
Russo and Schoemaker (1989) Decision Trap 3—Lack of Frame Control: 
Failing to consciously define the problem in more ways than one or being 
unduly influenced by the frames of others.* 
* See page 9. 
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AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE IN FOREST
 
FIRE BEHAVIOR* 
George M. Byram 
A
lthough a large fire is essen­
tially a physical or meteorolog­
ical phenomenon, combustion 
itself is a chemical chain reaction 
process, which takes place at high 
temperatures. In all forest fires, 
large or small, materials such as 
leaves, grass, and wood combine 
with oxygen in the air to form com­
bustion products plus large quanti­
ties of heat. Heat, as we shall see, is 
the most important combustion 
product in fire behavior. 
Phases of Combustion 
There are three rather definite 
phases of combustion, although 
they overlap somewhat and all exist 
simultaneously in a moving fire. 
First comes the preheating phase, 
in which fuels ahead of the fire are 
heated, dried, partially distilled, and 
ignited. In the second phase, the 
distillation of gaseous substances 
continues but is now accompanied 
by their burning or “oxidation.” 
Ignition might be regarded as the 
link between the first, or preheat­
ing, phase and the second, or 
gaseous, combustion phase. 
Ignition may also be regarded as 
the beginning of that part of the 
combustion process in which heat 
is given off. The flames seen over a 
forest fire or in a fireplace are the 
burning of distilled gases; combus-
When this article was originally published, 
George Byram was a physicist for the 
USDA Forest Service, Southeastern Forest 
Experiment Station. 
Heat makes combustion a chain reaction by letting 
gases distilled from the fuel react with oxygen in 
the atmosphere to give off more heat, raising the 
temperature of adjacent fuel. 
tion products are principally invisi­
ble water vapor and carbon dioxide. 
If combustion is not complete, 
some of the distilled substances will 
condense without being burned and 
remain suspended as very small 
droplets of liquid or solid over the 
fire. These condensed substances 
are the familiar smoke that accom­
panies most fires. Under certain 
conditions, some of the water vapor 
may also condense and give the 
smoke a whitish appearance. 
In the third or final phase the char­
coal left from the second phase is 
burned and leaves a small amount 
of residual ash, which is not a com­
bustion product. If combustion is 
complete and if the charcoal** is 
mostly carbon, the primary com­
bustion product in this phase will 
be carbon dioxide because the ini­
tial water is driven off in the first 
two phases. Some carbon monoxide 
is formed as an intermediate prod­
uct, which in turn burns as a gas to 
form carbon dioxide. The small 
blue flames appearing over the 
coals in a fireplace are carbon 
** The composition of charcoal varies, depending on 
the conditions under which it is formed. If the distilla­
tion temperature is low, 400 to 500 ºF (204 to 260 ºC), 
the charcoal will contain considerable tar coke. 
monoxide burning. However, if 
combustion is not complete, small 
amounts of carbon monoxide 
remain. In this phase the fuel is 
burned as a solid, with oxidation 
taking place on the surface of the 
charcoal. 
Even though the three combustion 
phases tend to overlap, they can be 
plainly seen in a moving fire. First 
is the zone in which leaves and 
grass blades curl and scorch as they 
are preheated by the oncoming 
flames. Next is the flame zone of 
burning gases. 
Following the flames is the third 
but less conspicuous zone of burn­
ing charcoal. Unless fuels dry to a 
considerable depth (that is, unless 
the Build-up Index is high), this 
last zone may be almost absent. If 
this happens the burned-over area 
will appear black instead of gray, 
which means that much of the 
remaining charcoal, as well as some 
of the underlying fuel, has not 
completely burned. With the excep­
tion of such years as 1947, 1952, 
and 1955, a blackened burned-over 
area has been more common than a 
gray ash-covered area in the 
Eastern and Southern States. 
However, in the rapid heating and resultant high tem­
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 18(2)  peratures existing in a forest fire, the deposits of sec­
[Spring 1957]: 47–57.  ondary products in the charcoal are probably low. 
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The heat of combustion is heat that 
makes combustion a chain reac­
tion. Heat supplied to unburned 
fuel raises its temperature to the 
point where the fuel, or the gases 
distilled from the fuel, can react 
with the oxygen in the atmosphere 
and in so doing give off more heat. 
This in turn raises the temperature 
of adjacent fuel, and thus the 
chainlike nature of combustion 
becomes established. 
The heat energy released by burn­
ing forest fuels is high and does not 
vary widely between different types 
of fuels. Table 1 gives the heats of 
combustion for a number of sub­
stances. These materials and heats 
were selected from tables in Kent’s 
Mechanical Engineers Handbook, 
12th edition. Their average is prob­
ably a good approximation for for­
est fuels. Fuels do not ordinarily 
burn with maximum efficiency, so 
the actual amount of heat released 
per pound of fuel in a forest fire 
will be somewhat less than shown 
in the tabulation. For a small fire 
burning in dry fuels with very little 
smoke, the combustion efficiency 
might be as high as 80 percent. 
Large fires burning with dense 
smoke would be less efficient. 
Combustion efficiency probably 
drops somewhat with increasing 
moisture content. 
Heats of combustion are given in 
British thermal units per pound of 
dry fuel. A B.t.u. is the quantity of 
heat needed to raise the tempera­
ture of 1 pound of water 1 ºF. For 
example, the above tabulation 
shows with the help of a little arith­
metic that the burning of 1 pound 
(0.45 kg) of an average woody fuel 
gives off enough heat to raise the 
temperature of 100 pounds (4.5 kg) 
of water about 86 ºF. To raise the 
temperature of 100 pounds (4.5 kg) 
of water (about 12 gallons [45 L]) 
from a temperature of 62 ºF (17 ºC) 
to the boiling temperature of 212 
ºF (100 ºC) would require about 1.7 
pounds (0.76 kg) of an average 
Table 1—Heat produced by various fuel types. 
Substance 
Heat of combustion 
Per pound, dry (B.t.u.)  Per kg, dry (kJ) 
Wood (oak)  8,316  19,330 
Wood (beech)  8,591  19,969 
Wood (pine)  9,153  21,275 
Wood (poplar)  7,834  18,209 
Pine sawdust  9,347  21,726 
Spruce sawdust  8,449  19,639 
Wood shavings  8,248  19,172 
Pecan shells  8,893  20,671 
Hemlock bark  8,753  20,345 
Pitch  15,120  35,145 
Average (excluding pitch)  8,620  20,036 
Convection, with some help from radiation, is the
 
principle means of heat transfer from a ground
 
fire to the crowns of a conifer stand.
 
woody fuel if it burned with maxi­
mum efficiency. About 1 pound 
(0.45 kg) of pitch would accomplish 
the same result. 
The rate of heat release in a forest 
fire can be visualized by comparing 
it with a familiar rate, such as that 
required for house heating. For 
example, consider a hot, rapidly 
spreading fire burning with a 20­
chain (1,320-foot [400-m]) front and 
with a forward rate of spread of 50 
chains (3,300 feet [1,000 m]) per 
hour. If the fire burns 6 tons of fuel 
per acre (13.4 t/ha), in 1 hour’s time 
enough fuel would be consumed to 
heat 30 houses for a year if each 
house yearly required the equivalent 
of 10 cords (25.5 m
3) of wood weigh­
ing approximately 2 tons per cord 
(0.7 t/m
3). 
Occasionally there is a fire in the 
Eastern States with a rate of spread 
exceeding 5,000 acres per hour 
(2,000 ha/h). If it burns in a dense, 
continuous stand of conifers, which 
might have 12 tons (10.9 t) or more 
of available fuel per acre, such a fire 
could consume enough fuel in an 
hour to heat 3,000 houses for a year. 
Heat Transfer 
There are three primary ways in 
which heat travels or is transferred 
from one location to another. These 
are conduction, convection, and 
radiation. Although dependent on 
convection, there is a fourth or sec­
ondary means of heat transfer in 
forest fires, which might be 
described as “mass transport.” This 
is the carrying of embers and fire­
brands ahead of the fire by convec­
tive currents and results in the 
familiar phenomenon of “spotting.” 
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duction is of much greater impor­
tance in solids than in liquids and 
gases. It is the only way heat can be 
transferred within opaque solids. By 
means of conduction, heat passes 
through the bottom of a teakettle 
or up the handle of a spoon in a 
cup of hot coffee. 
Convection is the transfer of heat 
by the movement of a gas or liquid. 
For example, heat is transferred 
from a hot air furnace into the 
interior of a house by convection, 
although the air picks up heat from 
the furnace by conduction. 
Radiation is the type of energy one 
feels when sitting across the room 
from a stove or fireplace. It travels 
in straight lines like light, and it 
travels with the speed of light. 
Most of the preheating of fuels 
ahead of a flame front is done by 
radiation. For a fire that occupies a 
small area and can be thought of as 
a “point” (such as a small bonfire 
or a spot fire), the intensity of radi­
ation drops as the square of the dis­
tance from the fire increases. For 
example, only one-fourth as much 
radiation would be received at 10 
feet (3 m) as at 5 feet (1.5 m) from 
the fire. However, when a fire 
becomes larger, the radiation inten­
sity does not drop off so rapidly. For 
a long line of fire, the radiation 
intensity drops as the distance from 
the fire increases; that is, one-half 
as much radiation would be 
received at 10 feet (3 m) as at 5 feet 
(1.5 m). For an extended wall of 
flame, radiation intensity drops off 
even more slowly. This tendency for 
radiation to maintain its intensity 
in front of a large fire is an impor­
tant factor in the rapid growth of a 
fire’s energy output. 
Convection, with some help from 
radiation, is the principle means of 
heat transfer from a ground fire to 
the crowns of a conifer stand. Hot 
gases rising upwards dry out the 
crown canopy above and raise its 
temperature to the kindling point. 
Although convection initiates 
crowning, both convection and 
radiation preheat the crown canopy 
ahead of the flames after a crown 
fire is well established. Convection 
is also a factor in the preheating of 
the ground fuels in a surface fire 
but to a lesser extent than radia­
tion. The effects of both radiation 
and convection in preheating are 
Conduction is one of the 
main factors limiting the 
combustion rate in 
heavy fuels, such as 
slash and limbs and 
logs in blowdown areas. 
considerably increased when a fire 
spreads upslope, because the flames 
and hot gases are nearer the fuels. 
The opposite is true for downslope 
spread. 
Convection and radiation can trans­
fer heat only to the surface of 
unburned (or burning) fuel. 
Actually, radiant heat may pene­
trate a few thousandths of an inch 
into woody substances and this 
penetration may be of some signifi­
cance in the burning of thin fuels, 
such as grass blades and leaves. 
However, radiation, like convection, 
for the most part transfers heat 
only to the surface of fuel material, 
and conduction may be considered 
the only means of heat transfer 
inside individual pieces of fuel. For 
this reason conduction is one of the 
main factors limiting the combus­
tion rate in heavy fuels, such as 
slash and limbs and logs in blow-
down areas. Materials that are poor 
conductors of heat, such as most 
forest fuels, ignite more readily 
than do good conductors, but they 
burn more slowly. Although the 
effects of conduction are far less 
conspicuous than those of radiation 
and convection, conduction is a 
very important factor in the com­
bustion process. 
Factors Affecting the
Combustion Rate 
Many factors affect combustion in 
such complex ways that they are 
not yet fully understood even for a 
simple gas or liquid fuel. Solid fuels 
are even more complex. Even so, 
there are two rather simple factors 
that have obvious and definite 
effects on the combustion rate of 
woody substances and are of great 
importance in forest fire suppres­
sion. The first of these is the mois­
ture content of the fuel, and the 
second is fuel size and arrange­
ment. 
It is difficult to overestimate the 
effect of water on the combustion 
rate and, hence, on fire behavior. 
Water in a fuel greatly diminishes 
the preheating rate in the first 
phase of combustion. Much of the 
heat is used in raising the tempera­
ture of the water and evaporating it 
from the fuel. The large quantities 
of resulting water vapor dilute the 
oxygen in the air and thus interfere 
with the second or gaseous com­
bustion phase. If the initial fuel 
moisture is high enough, water 
vapor may make the mixture so 
“lean” that the gases will not burn. 
This dilution of the oxygen in the 
air also affects the third or carbon-
burning phase of combustion. 
Although data are lacking, it is 
probable that moisture reduces 
considerably the heat yield or com­
bustion efficiency. This heat loss 
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evaporation requirements. 
The effect of size and arrangement 
of fuel on combustion can be illus­
trated by the following example. 
Consider a large pile of dry logs all 
about 8 inches (20 cm) in diameter. 
Although somewhat difficult to 
start, the log pile will burn with a 
hot fire that may last for 2 or 3 
hours. The three primary heat-
transfer mechanisms are all at 
work. Radiation and convection 
heat the surfaces of the logs, but 
only conduction can transfer heat 
inside the individual logs. Since 
conduction is the slowest of the 
three heat-transfer mechanisms, it 
limits the combustion rate in this 
case. Consider now a similar pile of 
logs that have been split across 
their diameter twice, or quartered. 
Assume that the logs are piled in an 
overall volume somewhat greater 
than the first pile, so there will be 
ample ventilation. This log pile will 
burn considerably faster than the 
first one because the combustion 
rate is less dependent on conduc­
tion. The surface area was more 
than doubled by the splitting, so 
that convection and radiation are 
correspondingly increased in the 
preheating effects. The burning 
surface is also increased by the 
same amount. 
Assume that the splitting action is 
continued indefinitely until the 
logs are in an excelsior state and 
occupy a volume 30 or 40 times as 
great as in their original form. 
Convective and radiative heat trans­
fer will be increased tremendously 
in the spaces throughout the whole 
fuel volume, and the combustion 
rate might be increased to a point 
where the fuel could be consumed 
in a few minutes instead of hours. 
The effect of fuel arrangement can 
be visualized if a volume of excel­
sior like fuel, such as that just 
described, is compressed until it 
occupies a volume only 4 or 5 
times that of the original volume of 
logs. The total burning surface and 
radiative conditions remain the 
same as before compression, but 
both convective heat exchange and 
oxygen supply are greatly reduced. 
There will be a corresponding 
decrease in fire intensity. 
Fuel size and fuel arrangement 
have their greatest effect on the 
lower intensity fires and in the ini­
tial stages of the buildup of a major 
fire. When a fire reaches conflagra­
tion proportions, the effect on fire 
behavior of factors such as ignition 
probability and quantity of fire-
Figure 1—The fire triangle is the basic link in the chain reaction of combustion. 
brand material available for spot­
ting may be greater than the effect 
of fuel size and arrangement. This 
point will be discussed in the sec­
tion on applications to fire behav­
ior. 
The Fire Triangle 
The principles of combustion may 
be summarized in an effective way 
by means of the fire triangle. This 
triangle neatly ties together not 
only the principles of combustion 
but illustrates their application as 
well. The three sides of the triangle 
are FUEL, OXYGEN, and HEAT. In 
the absence of any one of these 
three sides, combustion cannot 
take place. The fire triangle repre­
sents the basic link in the chain 
reaction of combustion (fig. 1). 
Removing any one or more sides of 
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small-scale fires. Such work might effect on the lower intensity fires and in the initial 
give essential fundamental informa­ stages of the buildup of a major fire.  tion on the relation between the 
the triangle breaks or destroys the 
chain. Weakening any one or more 
sides weakens the chain and dimin­
ishes fire intensity correspondingly. 
The purpose of all fire suppression 
efforts is to remove or weaken 
directly or indirectly one or more 
sides of the fire triangle. Con­
versely, all conditions that increase 
fire intensity operate in such a way 
as to greatly increase or strengthen 
the sides of the triangle, and hence, 
the chain reaction of combustion. 
In a blowup fire the chain becomes 
so strong that it cannot be broken 
by the efforts of man. This means 
that when blowup conditions exist, 
the only opportunity to break the 
chain is by early strong initial 
attack. 
Application to Fire
Behavior 
It is more difficult to apply our 
knowledge of ignition and combus­
tion to the behavior of very high-
intensity fires, sometimes referred 
to as conflagrations or “blowups,” 
than to the behavior of the more 
frequent low-intensity fires. The 
ordinary fire behaves for the most 
part as one would expect from the 
principles or combustion. In a con­
flagration or blowup, however, the 
sides of the fire triangle are greatly 
strengthened by factors that are 
absent, or nearly so, in small fires. 
Although these factors work 
through the basic combustion prin­
ciples, they so greatly modify the 
expected effects of the basic 
processes that a high-intensity 
erratic fire cannot be considered as 
a large-scale model of a low-inten­
sity fire. 
This is best illustrated by consider­
ing the spatial structure of the two 
types of fires. The height of the sig­
nificant vertical structure of a low-
intensity fire can usually be ex­
pressed in tens of feet. This dis­
tance is usually small compared to 
the surface dimensions of the burn­
ing area, so that in a physical sense 
the fire is “thin” or two-dimension­
al as far as volume structure is con­
cerned. On the other hand, the sig­
nificant vertical structure of a well-
developed conflagration may extend 
thousands of feet into the air, and 
this dimension may at times exceed 
the surface dimensions of the burn­
ing area. 
The height that smoke rises above, 
or in the neighborhood of, a fire is 
not always a true indicator of the 
height of the active convection col­
umn above a fire. Smoke from a 
small fire may reach a height of 
1,000 feet or (300 m) more, but 
active convection may reach only a 
few percent of this height.* 
It is the three-dimensional struc­
ture of a large fire that causes it to 
take on storm characteristics 
which, in turn, produce behavior 
phenomena that one could not 
expect by scaling upwards the 
behavior of a low-intensity fire. 
However, this does not mean that 
scale-model fires, including small 
fires in the laboratory under con­
trolled conditions, would not be 
useful in preliminary convection 
column studies. Probably experi­
mental work on convection column 
* Although it is too involved to discuss in a paper on 
combustion, the height of the convection zone depends 
on the rate of heat output of the fire, the wind speed, 
the vertical wind shear, and the stability of the atmos­
phere. 
variables controlling the convection 
process. 
Certain properties of the atmos­
phere, such as the vertical wind 
profile and to a lesser extent the 
vertical temperature profile, appear 
to be the controlling factors in 
extreme fire behavior if an exten­
sive area of plentiful dry fuel exists. 
A discussion of the atmospheric 
factors is outside the scope of this 
paper, but it may be well to exam­
ine in some detail those phases of 
the combustion process that permit 
the atmospheric factors to exert 
their maximum effect. 
Fire behavior is an energy phenom­
enon, and its relation to the com­
bustion process can be understood 
by the use of four basic fuel factors 
relating to energy: 
1. Combustion period, 
2. Critical burn-out time, 
3. Available fuel energy, and 
4. Total fuel energy. 
This last factor is constant, or near­
ly so, for any given quantity of fuel 
per acre. The first three are vari­
ables which, even for any homoge­
neous component in a given fuel 
type, depend on factors such as fuel 
moisture content and fire intensity. 
A fifth fuel factor, the quantity of 
firebrand material available for 
spotting, is more or less independ­
ent of the other four and will be 
treated separately. 
The combustion period may be 
defined as the time required for a 
fuel to burn up completely, and 
depends primarily on fuel size, fuel 
arrangement, fire intensity, and 
fuel moisture. It may range from a 
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several hours or longer for logs and 
heavy limbs. Critical burn-out time 
is defined as the maximum length 
of time that a fuel can burn and 
still be able to feed its energy into 
the base of the forward traveling 
convection column; its magnitude 
depends primarily on fire intensity 
or the rate of a fire’s energy output. 
The available fuel energy is that 
part of the total fuel energy which 
is fed into the base of the convec­
tion column. For fuels with a com­
bustion period equal to or less than 
the critical burn-out time, the 
available fuel energy is equal to the 
total fuel energy. If the combustion 
period is longer than the critical 
burn-out time, then the available 
fuel energy is less than the total 
fuel energy. Total fuel energy is 
determined by the quantity of fuel 
per acre and the combustion effi­
ciency. If the combustion efficiency 
is assumed to be constant, the 
terms “available fuel energy” and 
“total fuel energy” can be replaced 
by the terms “available fuel” and 
“total fuel.” 
An example will illustrate how fire 
behavior relates to the four preced­
ing quantities. Consider a fire 
spreading in an area of plentiful 
heterogeneous fuel, a considerable 
part of which is in the form of 
flammable logs and heavy slash and 
the rest a mixture of smaller mate­
rial such as twigs, pine needles, and 
grass. Assume that the critical 
burn-out time is about 20 minutes. 
Those fuel components with a com­
bustion period less than 20 minutes 
will have an available fuel energy 
equal to their total fuel energy. 
However, logs and heavy limbs may 
require several hours to burn out, 
so their available energy may be 
comparatively low; they could still 
be burning after the fire had moved 
several miles, so would not be 
affecting the behavior of the fire 
front.* 
From the standpoint of fire behav­
ior, a crown fire in a dense conifer 
stand could have more available 
fuel energy than a fire in an area of 
heavy logging slash. However, 
unless large portions of a heteroge­
neous fuel have very long combus­
tion periods, fuel size and fuel 
arrangement should not have as 
much influence on the behavior of 
major fires as on smaller fires. In a 
major fire a larger proportion of 
the heavier fuels take on the char­
acteristics of flash fuels. This is a 
combined result of the shorter 
The purpose of all fire 
suppression efforts is to 
remove or weaken 
directly or indirectly one 
or more sides of the 
fire triangle. 
combustion periods and longer 
critical burn-out times for the 
high-intensity fires. Nevertheless, 
fuel size and fuel arrangement con­
tribute heavily to the rate of 
buildup of fire intensity, especially 
in the early stages, and are there­
fore an important part of the fire 
behavior picture. 
Much of the effect of fuel moisture 
can be interpreted in terms of the 
four basic fuel factors. Because 
moisture decreases the combustion 
rate, it increases the length of the 
combustion period. This, in turn, 
means that a smaller fraction of a 
heterogeneous fuel will have a 
combustion period less than the 
* Heat sources a considerable distance behind the main 
flame front could possibly have indirect effects on fire 
behavior by slightly modifying the structure of the wind 
field. 
critical burn-out time. The avail­
able fuel energy and fire intensity 
will therefore drop as fuel moisture 
increases. For most fires there are 
some fuel components which do 
not burn because of their high 
moisture content; in other words, 
these components may be regarded 
as having infinitely long combus­
tion periods. 
An increase in fire intensity can 
greatly reduce the combustion peri­
od for those fuel components with 
the higher moisture contents. For 
some components the combustion 
period might be infinite for a low-
intensity fire, but perhaps only a 
few minutes, or even less, for a 
high-intensity fire. For example, in 
the high-intensity Brasstown fire 
on March 30, 1953, in South 
Carolina, as well as in other large 
fires in the Southeast in the last 
few years, green brush often 
burned, leaving blunt pointed 
stubs. In a similar manner a reduc­
tion of the combustion period from 
infinity to a few seconds for green 
conifer needles takes place when a 
fire crowns. 
The fifth fuel factor, the quantity of 
firebrand material available for 
spotting, becomes increasingly 
important as fire intensity increas­
es. Equally important is the rela­
tion between surface fuel moisture 
and the probability of ignition from 
embers or firebrands dropped from 
the air. This relation has not as yet 
been determined experimentally, 
but ignition probability increases 
rapidly with decreasing fuel mois­
ture—hence with decreasing rela­
tive humidity. We know that the 
ignition probability for most fire­
brands is essentially zero when fuel 
moisture is 25 or 30 percent (on an 
oven-dry weight basis). We also 
know that not only ignition proba­
bility but also combustion rate is 
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greatest for oven-dry material. In 
addition, both of these phenomena 
in the lower moisture content 
range appear to be considerably 
affected by a change of fuel mois­
ture content of only a few percent. 
The importance of the relation 
between fuel moisture and ignition 
probability in the behavior of large 
fires can be illustrated by a hypo­
thetical example. Suppose that 
from the convection column over a 
large fire, 10,000 embers per square 
mile per minute are dropping in 
front of the fire. Suppose that the 
surface fuel moisture content is 
such that only 0.1 percent of these 
firebrands catch and produce spot 
fires, thus giving only 0.1 spot fires 
per square mile. On the other hand, 
if we assume that the surface fuel 
moisture is low enough for 5 per­
cent of the embers to catch, then 
there would be 500 spot fires per 
square mile. As they burn together, 
these spot fires would greatly 
increase the rate of spread and 
intensity of the main fire. 
Thus, relative humidity (working 
through fuel moisture) has a two­
fold effect on rate of spread in cer­
tain types of extreme fire behavior. 
First is the effect on fuel combus­
tion rate and rate of spread of the 
ordinary flame front. This effect 
would be present on small and 
large fires alike. Second is the effect 
in accelerating rate of spread and 
fire intensity by increasing the 
probability of ignition from falling 
embers. This latter effect would be 
present only on fires where spot­
ting was abundant. Ignition proba­
bility will also depend on other fac­
tors, such as the nature of the sur­
face fuel in which firebrands fall 
and the fraction of the ground area 
covered by the fuels. 
Fuel characteristics that make 
plentiful and efficient firebrands are 
not definitely known. The material 
would have to be light enough to 
be carried aloft in updrafts, yet 
capable of burning for several min­
utes while being carried forward by 
the upper winds. Decayed punky 
material, charcoal, bark, clumps of 
dry duff, and dry moss are probably 
efficient firebrands. Leaves and 
grass are more likely to be ineffi­
cient firebrands except over short 
distances. 
The initial phases of the blowup 
phenomenon are directly related to 
the combustion process and the 
basic fuel factors. A decreasing fuel 
moisture means higher combustion 
rates and shorter combustion peri­
ods. There will, therefore, be an 
increase in the available fuel ener­
gy, or available fuel, accompanied 
by an increase in fire intensity. The 
increase in fire intensity lengthens 
the critical burn-out time, which 
means a further increase in avail­
able fuel. A cycle of reinforcement 
is thus established which favors 
growth of fire intensity. As the 
intensity increases, the atmospheric 
factors become increasingly impor­
tant. It is at this stage that spotting 
and ignition probability may 
become dominant fire behavior fac­
tors. 
By using the basic fuel factors it is 
possible that a fuel classification 
method could be developed to clas­
sify fuel in terms of expected fire 
behavior. It would first require a 
series of burning experiments to 
measure some of the factors and 
their response to variables such as 
moisture content and fire intensity. 
However, once this was done, the 
classification system itself might be 
comparatively simple. Probably its 
greatest value would be in estimat­
ing the conflagration potential of 
different fuel and cover types for 
different combinations of weather 
conditions. 
There is an important difference in 
the energy conversion process for a 
low-intensity fire and a high-inten­
sity fire. In the “thin” or two-
dimensional fire, most of the ener­
gy remains in the form of heat. At 
the most, such a fire cannot con­
vert more than a few hundredths of 
one percent of its heat energy into 
the kinetic energy of motion of the 
updraft gases and the kinetic ener­
gy of the convection column 
eddies.* On the other hand, a 
major conflagration may convert 5 
percent or more of its heat energy 
into kinetic energy which appears 
in the form of strong turbulent 
updrafts, indrafts, convection col­
umn eddies, and whirlwinds which 
can carry burning material aloft. 
The efficiency of the energy conver­
sion process, and hence the kinetic 
energy yield, increases rapidly with 
increasing fire intensity. This is 
brought about by the mutual rein­
forcement action in the basic fuel 
* Although a detailed discussion is outside the scope of 
this paper, energy conversion processes in a fire can be 
studied by a thermodynamic procedure in which a large 
fire, like a thunderstorm, can be treated as a heat 
engine. The efficiency of a heat engine is measured by 
the fraction of heat or thermal energy that can be con­
verted into the kinetic energy of motion. A two-dimen­
sional fire has an efficiency as a heat engine that is very 
nearly zero or, at the most, only a few hundredths of 
one percent. A major high-intensity fire has an efficien­
cy as a heat engine that may reach 5 percent or more. 
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conditions.  that causes it to take on storm characteristics. 
In addition to the difference in the 
energy conversion processes in the 
two types of fires, there is an enor­
mous difference in rate of energy 
yield. For example, there were peri­
ods in the Buckhead fire in north 
Florida in March 1956 when the 
rate of spread probably exceeded 
8,000 acres (3,200 ha) per hour. 
The rate of energy release from this 
fire would compare favorably with 
the rate of energy release from a 
summer thunderstorm. 
Summary 
Combustion is basically a chemical 
chain reaction that can be divided 
into three separate phases: 
1. Preheating and distillation, 
2. Distillation and the burning of 
volatile fractions, and 
3. The burning of the residual 
charcoal. 
For a forest fuel, ignition is the link 
between phase 1 and phase 2 of the 
combustion process. For most for­
est fuels the heat of combustion is 
between 8,000 and 9,000 B.t.u.’s 
per pound on a dry weight basis. 
Heat is transferred by conduction, 
convection, and radiation. A fourth 
means of heat transfer might be 
defined as mass transport and is the 
familiar phenomenon of spotting, 
which becomes increasingly impor­
tant on high-intensity fires. 
Fuel moisture has more effect on 
the ignition and combustion 
process than any other factor. 
Low-intensity fires are essentially 
two-dimensional phenomena, and 
major high-intensity fires three-
dimensional. The third dimension 
of a high-intensity fire permits the 
conversion of part of its heat ener­
gy into the kinetic energy of 
motion, which changes the relative 
significance of the various combus­
tion factors and greatly modifies 
their expected effects. For this rea­
son a high-intensity fire cannot be 
regarded as a magnified version of a 
low-intensity fire. 
The relation of fire behavior to the 
combustion process can be under­
stood by the use of a group of basic 
The initial phases of the blowup phenomenon are
 
directly related to the combustion process and the
 
basic fuel factors.
 
fuel factors, which are (1) combus­
tion period, (2) critical burn-out 
time, (3) available fuel energy, (4) 
total fuel energy, and (5) quantity 
of material available for spotting. 
Such a group of factors might be 
used to classify fuels in terms of 
expected fire behavior. 
If atmospheric conditions are such 
that one or more strong convection 
columns can form, the following 
appear to be the main combustion 
factors that determine the intensity 
and rate of spread of a major fire: 
1. The quantity of available fuel 
energy, or available fuel, per 
acre. The magnitude of this 
quantity depends on a reinforc­
ing relationship between the 
basic fuel factors. In turn, this 
relationship is regulated primari­
ly by fuel size and arrangement, 
fuel moisture, and the intensity 
of the fire itself. 
2. Quantity of firebrand material 
per acre available for spotting. 
3. Probability of ignition from fire­
brands dropping ahead of the 
main burning area. This proba­
bility depends on several factors, 
the most important of which is 
the prevailing relative humidity 
determining the surface fuel 
moisture.  ■ 
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ITS EFFECT ON FIRE BEHAVIOR*
 
James B. Davis and Craig C. Chandler 
“T
he fire wasn’t doing much 
until the air tanker went  Vortex turbulence consists of a pair of miniature 
over, and then it spotted all  whirlwinds trailing from the wingtips of any
over the place,” complained the fire  aircraft in flight.
crew foreman. 
Such reports have caused fire con­
trol officers to ask, “Can air tankers 
really cause erratic fire behavior?” 
The answer is yes—under some 
conditions. The gremlin is “vortex 
turbulence,” a pair of whirlwinds 
streaming out behind the wingtips. 
What is Vortex 
Turbulence? 
Vortex turbulence is a sheet of tur­
bulent air that is left in the wake of 
all aircraft. It rolls up into two 
strong vortices, compact fast-spin­
ning funnels of air, and to an 
observer on the ground appears to 
trail behind each wingtip (fig. 1). 
Because it moves out at right 
angles to the flight path, vortex tur­
bulence can be distinguished from 
propeller wash, which is largely 
localized to a narrow stream lying 
approximately along the flight path. 
Unfortunately, however, vortex tur­
bulence is usually invisible. 
Under certain conditions the two 
vortices may stay close together, 
sometimes undulating slightly as 
they stretch rearward. The interac-
When this article was originally published, 
James Davis was a forester for the USDA 
Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Forest 
and Range Experiment Station; and Craig 
Chandler was a fire behavior specialist for 
the Forest Service, Forest Fire Research. 
Washington Office. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 26(1) 
[Winter 1965]: 4–6, 16. 
tion between them tends to make  How Important are
them move first downward, then  Vortex Wakes? 
outward along the surface of the  The Flight Safety Foundation, Inc.,
ground.  reports: “In recent years, there have 
Figure 1—Low-flying spray plane. Note funneling effect of spray trailing behind each 
wingtip. This is vortex turbulence. 
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45 been increasingly frequent reports 
by pilots encountering severe dis­
turbances of another airplane even 
when separated from it by distances 
of several miles. There also are an 
increasing number of fatal acci­
dents to lighter airplanes, resulting 
from upsets near the ground or 
structural failures which are being 
ascribed to encounters with wakes 
of large airplanes. It is now general­
ly accepted that the only distur­
bance which an airplane can pro­
duce that is powerful and persistent 
enough to account for these inci­
dents arises from the vortices 
which trail from the wingtips of 
any airplane in flight.” 
Ordinarily, vortex turbulence does 
not pose any difficulties to fire con­
trol forces. But under special cir­
cumstances vortex wakes may 
cause a fire to act most unexpected­
ly. Line personnel should become 
familiar with the vortex problem 
and the situations where it is likely 
to affect fire behavior. 
What Causes Vortex 
Turbulence? 
Vortex turbulence is a byproduct of 
the phenomenon that gives lift to 
an airplane. Air flowing the longer 
route over the top of the wing has 
to travel faster than the air flowing 
across the bottom in order to reach 
the trailing edge simultaneously. 
The difference in speed causes a dif­
ference in pressure between the top 
and bottom of the wing with a 
resultant upward force, or lift. If 
you want to demonstrate this effect, 
hold the back of a spoon in a 
stream of water from a faucet. The 
spoon will be pulled into the 
stream as soon as the water touch­
es it. 
However, here is where the trouble 
starts. Since the air pressure is 
greater on the under surface of the 
The vortex in the form of a horizontal whirlwind
 
can cause sudden and violent changes in fire
 
behavior on calm days in patchy fuels.
 
wing than on top, some air tries to 
flow around the end of the wing to 
the lower pressure area. Because of 
the flow around the tip, the main 
stream—instead of flowing straight 
back across the top and bottom of 
the wing—tends to fly inward 
toward the fuselage on the top of 
the wing and outward on the bot­
tom. As a result, the air doesn’t “fit 
together” at the trailing edge but 
forms a vortex sheet that rolls up 
into two large whirlwinds that trail 
from each wingtip (fig. 2). 
Is Turbulence the Same 
for All Air Tankers? 
Vortex severity and persistency vary 
with several factors. Most impor­
tant are the type and size of the air­
craft and the condition of the air. 
Vortex turbulence is greatest when 
produced by a large aircraft with a 
heavy wingspan loading. 
Thus, the heavier the aircraft or 
payload per unit of wing surface, 
the more severe the turbulence will 
be. The B-17 is a heavier airplane 
than the PBY. Thus, when the vor­
tex wake immediately behind a B­
17 is 29 m.p.h. (46 km/h), the 
lighter PBY’s vortex will be only 16 
m.p.h. (26 km/h) under the same 
flying conditions, since both planes 
have the same wingspan. 
How Does Air Tanker 
Speed Affect
Turbulence? 
It may seem surprising, but turbu­
lence is inversely related to air­
speed (fig. 3). 
Other factors being equal, an air­
craft with a high wingspan loading 
at slow airspeed is the source of the 
strongest vortices. In terms of air 
safety, one of the greatest hazards is 
a heavily loaded aircraft flying at 
slow speeds before landing or after 
takeoff. Essentially, this is the con­
dition when an air tanker slows 
down for an accurate airdrop. 
Figure 2—Airflow over wing with distortion of flow and vortex formation. 
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Fire Management Today The air tanker pilot should be aware of the  1. Wind can blow the vortices away 
from the drop area. For example, problem his aircraft can cause through the effect 
a 10-m.p.h. (16-km) wind can of vortex wakes on a fire.  blow the vortices more than 800 
How Does Aircraft 
Height Affect
Turbulence? 
At high altitude, the two vortices 
remain separated by a distance 
slightly less than the aircraft’s 
wingspan. However, the interaction 
of the two causes them to drop. As 
they approach within approximately 
a wingspan of the ground, they 
begin to move laterally outboard 
from each wingtip. The lateral 
motion may be better termed “skid­
ding” than “rolling,” for at the 
ground contact point the direction 
of rotation is opposite the core’s 
lateral movement (see fig. 2). The 
downward movement may require 
only 10 seconds from a TBM flying 
at 50 feet (15 m), but a minute or 
more from the same aircraft flying 
at 150 feet (45 m). The time 
required for downward movement 
is important for two reasons: 
Figure 3—Relation of vortex velocity to air tanker speed. The tanker’s altitude was 75 feet 
(23 m); vortices took about 15 seconds to reach the ground, where their velocities were 
obtained. 
feet (240 m) in the short time 
required to drop from 150 feet 
(45 m). 
2. Vortices weaken rapidly with 
time. Under average air condi­
tions, the turbulence may lose 
its danger potential in less than a 
minute. In rough air, the funnels 
break up and weaken even more 
rapidly. Calm air is the worst sit­
uation because it permits the 
turbulence to persist for a longer 
period. 
How Does Vegetation
Affect the Vortex? 
Natural surfaces are more or less 
rough and, therefore, cause fric­
tional resistance to air movement 
above them. The rougher the sur­
face, the greater the friction. 
Timber, for example, has a much 
greater slowing effect on wind than 
does open grassland. Whereas a 
vortex turbulence is more like a 
horizontal whirlwind than what we 
normally think of as a wind, the 
same frictional considerations 
apply. A heavy stand of timber 
would dissipate most of the force of 
a vortex; the same vortex would be 
only slightly weakened in grass or 
scattered timber. 
How Do Vortex Wakes 
Affect Fire Behavior? 
Although there are many observa­
tions on the effect of vortex wakes 
on other aircraft, we have only two 
or three on forest fires. However, 
what is known about the vortex and 
about fire behavior can lead to 
some pretty good guesses. 
Because wind tends to break up the 
vortex and is normally accompa­
nied by much natural turbulence, 
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lence will probably be noticeable 
only on a calm day. Not only will 
the vortex wake be stronger on 
quiet days, but because the fire will 
usually be spreading slowly, the 
sudden air turbulence will be even 
more unexpected and potentially 
serious. 
On the ground, the effect of vortex 
turbulence will be felt as a sudden 
gust which may last only a few sec­
onds or for up to half a minute. In 
litter, grass, or light brush the 
result will be a sudden but brief 
flareup or increase in local fire 
intensity and rate of spread. In 
heavy timber or brush fuels with a 
continuous overstory, vortex turbu­
lence will usually not reach the 
ground and so will have no notice­
able effect on fire behavior. 
In patchy fuels, where timber or 
brush is interspersed with open 
grassy areas, the effects of vortex 
turbulence may be extremely seri­
ous. Although the vortex wake will 
not reach the ground beneath a 
timber canopy, it may in the open­
ings. Because the core usually 
remains above ground, the true 
wind direction at the surface is not 
parallel to the ground but slightly 
upward (fig. 4). Thus, both flames 
and burning embers tend to be 
swept upward as well as outward. 
Thus, vortex turbulence, compared 
with a natural gust of the same 
velocity, has a greater potential for 
triggering crowning and spot fires 
because flames and embers are 
driven up into the crowns. 
The most serious situation is calm 
air on the ground but a light, 
steady wind aloft. Under these con­
ditions the vortex may be carried 
far from the aircraft to strike the 
ground in an unexpected location, 
with ember showers being moved 
over long distances by the upper 
winds. Only rarely would one 
encounter a fire in patchy timber 
and brush under precisely these 
weather conditions; yet this was 
apparently the case on one well-
documented fire in California in 
1962. 
Summary 
Vortex turbulence consists of a pair 
of miniature whirlwinds trailing 
from the wingtips of any aircraft in 
flight. The more heavily loaded the 
aircraft, and the lower and slower it 
flies, the stronger the vortex turbu­
lence will be and the more likely to 
reach the ground. The vortex will 
be in the form of a horizontal 
whirlwind with velocities up to 25 
m.p.h. (40 km/h)—sufficient to 
cause sudden and violent changes 
in fire behavior on calm days in 
patchy fuels. 
Wind, gustiness, and surrounding 
high vegetation will tend to break 
up or diminish vortex intensity. 
The fire crew should be alert for 
trouble when: 
1. The air is still and calm. 
2. The fire is burning in open 
Figure 4—Wake from a DC-3 and pronounced vertical motion of the vortex. 
brush or scattered timber. 
3. The air tanker is large or heavily 
loaded. 
4. The air tanker is flying low and 
slow. 
The air tanker pilot should be 
aware of the problem his aircraft 
can cause. He may know the effect 
of vortex wakes on his or other air­
craft, but may not know the effect 
on a fire. He can abide by the fol­
lowing rules during situations of 
possible danger from vortex wakes: 
1. Don’t fly parallel to the fireline 
more than necessary. 
2. Keep high except when making 
the actual drop. 
3. Ensure that ground crews are 
alert to the presence of the air 
tanker and the pilot’s intentions. 
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Fire Management Today THE CONCEPT OF FIRE ENVIRONMENT*
 
C.M. Countryman 
W
ebster** defines “environ­
ment” as “the surrounding 
conditions, influences or 
forces that influence or modify.” 
This definition applies to “fire envi­
ronment” very well. For fire envi­
ronment is the complex of fuel, 
topographic, and airmass factors 
that influences or modifies the 
inception, growth, and behavior of 
fire. 
Fire environment may be repre­
sented by a triangle (fig. 1). The 
two lower sides of the triangle rep­
resent the fuel and topographic 
components of fire environment. 
The top side represents the airmass 
component; this is the “weather” 
part of the fire environment. 
Interrelationships of
Components 
Fire environment is not static, but 
varies widely in horizontal and ver­
tical space, and in time. The fire 
environment components and 
many of their factors are closely 
interrelated. Thus, the current state 
of one factor depends on the state 
of the other factors. Also, a change 
in one factor can start a chain of 
reactions that can affect the other 
factors. 
For example, consider the simple 
topographic factor of slope aspect. 
When this article was originally published, 
C.M. Countryman was a research forester 
for the USDA Forest Service, Pacific 
Southwest Forest and Range Experiment 
Station. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 27(4)
 
[Fall 1966]: 8–10.
 
** Webster’s Third International Unabridged Dictionary
 
(1961: G. & C. Merriam Co.), p. 760. 

Fire environment is the complex of fuel, 
topographic, and airmass factors that 
influences or modifies the inception, growth, 
and behavior of fire. 
The amount of heating of fuel by 
the sun on a slope depends partly 
on aspect. A slope facing east 
begins to warm first, and its maxi­
mum temperature occurs early in 
the day (fig. 2A). A slope facing 
south reaches its maximum tem­
perature about 2 hours later, and it 
is higher than the maximum of the 
east-facing slope (fig. 2B). A slope 
facing west reaches its maximum 
temperature still later, and this 
maximum is higher than those of 
the east and south slopes (fig. 2C). 
The north slope also has its distinc­
tive diurnal trend (fig. 2D). The 
data illustrated in figure 2 were 
obtained from observations taken 
on a clear day on 45-degree slopes 
early in July at 42° N. For a differ­
ent combination of cloud cover, 
slope, time of year, and latitude, a 
different pattern would be observed. 
This differential heating of different 
aspects affects the probability of fire 
starts, and also fire growth and 
behavior. 
Figure 1—Fire environment may be represented by a triangle. Each side represents a 
component of fire environment. 
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ed, it transmits this heat to the air 
above it by conduction, convection, 
and radiation. The resulting 
increase in air temperature changes 
the relative humidity. In addition, 
local winds also are often strongly 
affected by the differences in air 
temperature resulting from the dif­
ferential heating of slopes of differ­
ent aspects. These winds are further 
modified by the configuration of 
the topography and by the surface 
fuels. Since the moisture content of 
fine dead woody fuels depends pri­
marily on the relative humidity of 
the air, the differences in heating of 
slopes can affect both fuel moisture 
content and fuel temperature. The 
amount of heating of fuels, vegeta­
tive or urban, on the surface is 
affected by airmass conditions such 
as clouds, moisture content, and 
windspeed. 
Because fire behavior 
and fire environment 
are interdependent, 
changes in one will 
cause changes in the 
other. 
Fire and Fire 
Environment 
Where does fire fit into this pic­
ture? In an environment without 
fire, radiant energy from the sun is 
almost the only source of heat. This 
energy heats the earth’s surface and 
to a minor extent the air above it. 
Most of the energy that directly and 
indirectly modifies the airmass and 
fuel components of fire environ­
ment comes from the heated earth 
surface. Because of differences in 
slope, aspect, and ground cover, 
heating by the sun is not uni­
form—some areas become much 
warmer than others. This variation 
in the local heat sources creates the 
variability in local weather and fuel 
conditions. 
Perhaps we can most simply con­
sider fire as just another local heat 
source. As a heat source it reacts 
with its surroundings in the same 
Figure 2—Relationship of temperature to time of day on 45-degree slopes facing in four directions: A, east; B, south; C, west; and 
D, north. Data were taken on a clear day in early July at 42° N. 
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interacting with the airmass to cre­ burning in a closed environment that may be
ate changes in local weather, and  much different than the more open environment  with the fuel to a modify fuel mois­
above or outside the stand. ture and temperature. Because of 
the high temperatures in a fire, 
however, the reaction can be much 
more violent. By adding fire to the 
center of the fire environment tri­
angle (fig. 1), this symbol becomes 
the fire behavior triangle. It is the 
current state of each of the envi­
ronmental components—topogra­
phy, fuel, and airmass—and their 
interactions with each other and 
with fire that determines the char­
acteristics and behavior of a fire at 
any given moment. 
Fire Environment 
Patterns 
Because fire behavior and fire envi­
ronment are interdependent, 
changes in one will cause changes 
in the other. To understand or pre­
dict fire behavior, we must look at 
the fire behavior and the fire envi­
ronment at all points of the fire. 
Thus, both fire behavior and fire 
environment are pattern phenome­
na. 
The scope of the fire environment 
depends primarily on the size and 
characteristics of the fire. For a 
very small fire, the environment is 
a few feet horizontally and vertical­
ly. For a large fire, it may cover 
many miles horizontally and extend 
thousands of feet vertically. An 
intensely burning fire will involve a 
larger environmental envelope than 
one burning at a lower combustion 
rate. 
Open and Closed Fire
Environments 
From a fire behavior standpoint, 
fire environment can be separated 
into two general classes: 
1. Closed environment, and 
2. Open environment. 
Inside a building, for example, the 
fire environment is nearly inde­
pendent of outside conditions. Fuel 
characteristics are determined by 
the construction of the building 
and by its contents. The climate 
and, hence, the moisture content of 
the hygroscopic fuels are controlled 
by the heating and cooling systems. 
Air movement and topographic 
effects are nearly nonexistent. This 
is confined or “closed” environ­
ment. However, the environment 
outside buildings is not confined. 
Current airmass characteristics 
vary with the synoptic weather pat­
terns and local conditions. Wind 
movement and topographic effects 
prevail. This is “open” environ­
ment. 
Fire burning inside a building is 
controlled by the fire environment 
within the building. The outside 
environment has little effect. As 
long as the fire remains within the 
building (fig. 3A), there can be no 
spread to adjacent fuel elements. 
The fire is confined. 
If the fire breaks out of the build­
ing, it is no longer burning in a 
closed environment. Outside condi­
tions can influence its behavior, 
and the fire can spread to other fuel 
and grow in size and intensity (fig. 
3B). 
Closed and open environments also 
exist in wildland fuels; however, the 
boundaries between the two envi­
ronments are not as clear as they 
are in urban areas. 
For example, a fire burning under a 
dense timber stand (fig. 3C) is 
burning in an environment that 
may be much different than that 
above or outside the stand. Fuel 
moisture is often higher, daytime 
temperature is lower, and wind-
speed is much slower. In this situa­
tion the fire is burning in a closed 
environment. 
If the fire builds in intensity and 
breaks out through the crowns of 
the trees (fig. 3D), it is burning in 
an open environment and can come 
under an entirely different set of 
controls. Fire behavior and charac­
teristics can change radically. 
Open and closed environments 
exist in other fuels as well as tim­
ber, such as grass and brush. 
Because of the short vertical extent 
of these fuels, the probability of fire 
burning entirely in a closed envi­
ronment is much less. But the 
closed fire environment in a fuel 
bed influences fire behavior, even if 
only part of the fire is burning in a 
closed environment. 
The most obvious use of the con­
cept of fire environment and fire 
behavior patterns is probably in 
understanding and predicting wild­
fire behavior, but the concept can 
also be used in prescribed burning. 
In fires of low or moderate intensi­
ty, which are usually desired in pre­
scribed burning, the fire environ­
ment pattern largely controls the 
behavior pattern. Thus, by knowing 
the fire environment pattern for 
the area, the fire behavior pattern 
can be predicted. And by selecting 
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51 Figure 3—These fires are burning in the following fire environments: A, closed urban; B, open urban; C, closed wildland; D, 
open wildland. 
the proper environment pattern,
 
the desired type of behavior can he  For a prescribed fire, by knowing the fire
 
obtained and dangerous points can  environment pattern for the area, the fire behavior

be alleviated.
  pattern can be predicted. 
Summary 
Fire environment is the complex of 
fuel, topographic, and airmass fac­
tors that influences or modifies the 
inception, growth, and behavior of 
fire. It is the current state of these 
factors and their inter-relationship 
with one another and with fire that 
determines the behavior and char­
acteristics of a fire at any given 
moment. 
Fire environment is not static, but 
varies widely in space and time. 
Both fire environment and fire 
behavior are pattern phenomena, 
and both patterns for the area of 
the fire must be considered in 
order to understand and predict a 
fire’s behavior. 
Because of the difference in the fire 
environment patterns, the behavior 
of fire burning in a closed environ­
ment may be vastly different from 
one burning in an open environ­
ment. The concept of fire environ­
ment and fire behavior patterns is 
useful for the understanding and 
prediction of fire behavior for both 
wildfires and prescribed fires.  ■ 
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WINDSPEED OBSERVATION*
 
John S. Crosby and Craig C. Chandler 
S
urface windspeed is often the 
most critical weather element 
affecting fire behavior and fire 
danger. It is also the most variable 
and, consequently, the hardest to 
evaluate. 
What Is Gustiness? 
Air moving across the surface of 
land is constantly changing speed 
and direction. Standing still, one 
observes a series of gusts and lulls. 
Because of gusts, trying to measure 
windspeed is much like trying to 
measure the speed of a car on a 
winding mountain road. It slows on 
the turns, speeds up on the 
straightaways, and slows to a crawl 
on bumpy stretches. To obtain a 
reliable average speed, one must 
determine the time required to 
travel at least 2 miles (3.2 km). And 
the rougher and more crooked the 
road, the longer is the distance 
required to obtain a reliable aver­
age. This same principle applies to 
wind measurements. The greater 
the gustiness (the ratio between the 
range in momentary windspeeds 
and the average speed), the longer 
it takes to determine a reliable 
windspeed. 
Peak windspeeds that persist for 1 
minute can affect gross fire behav-
When this article was originally published, 
John Crosby was a research forester for the 
USDA Forest Service, North Central Forest 
Experiment Station, Columbia, MO; and 
Craig Chandler was Forest Service 
Assistant Chief, Forest Fire Research 
Branch, Division of Forest Protection 
Research, Washington, DC. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 27(4) 
[Fall 1966]: 12–13. 
ior, including rate of spread and fire 
intensity. For example, a surface 
fire in pine litter spreading at 10 
chains (660 feet [201 m]) per hour 
with the wind averaging 5 miles per 
hour (8 km/h) would spread 11 feet 
(3.3 m) farther than expected dur­
ing a minute when the wind was 
blowing at 9 miles per hour (14 
km/h). During that minute it would 
burn with twice its average intensi­
ty and would be nearly three times 
as likely to jump a prepared fireline. 
Momentary gusts have little effect 
on the overall rate of fire spread 
and intensity, but they do produce 
large fluctuations in flame height 
and can easily trigger crowning or 
throw showers of sparks across the 
fireline when other weather factors 
are in critical balance. Gusts will 
usually be close to the average 
value and will rarely exceed the 
maximum value. 
Gustiness is caused by mechanical 
and thermal turbulence. 
Mechanical turbulence is produced 
by friction as the air flows over the 
ground surface. Its magnitude 
depends on the height above the 
ground where measurements are 
made, the roughness of the ground 
surface, and the windspeed. The 
maximum mechanical turbulence 
is found close to the surface in 
rough topography on windy days. 
Peak windspeeds that persist for 1 minute can
 
affect gross fire behavior, including rate of spread
 
and fire intensity.
 
Thermal turbulence occurs when 
horizontal wind meets convective 
currents produced by unequal heat­
ing or cooling at the ground. Its 
magnitude depends mostly on 
topography, ground cover, solar 
radiation, and atmospheric stability. 
The maximum thermal turbulence 
occurs above rough topography 
with patchy ground cover during 
sunny afternoons in unstable air. 
Gustiness Problem 
Gustiness is a serious problem for 
both fire researchers and fire-con­
trol planners. Because of gustiness, 
wind measurements at two loca­
tions cannot be compared unless 
they are taken at the same height 
above the ground and for the same 
length of time. For maximum com­
parability, measurements should be 
taken as high above the ground as 
possible and for as long as possible. 
But high towers and long observa­
tions are expensive. Therefore, for 
fire-danger rating we have estab­
lished a standard anemometer 
height of 20 feet (6.1 m) and a stan­
dard observation time of 10 min­
utes. 
While these standards are fine for 
fire-danger rating, they often con­
fuse the firefighter on the ground. 
Rapid changes in fire behavior are 
determined by rapid changes in the 
wind blowing on the burning fuel, 
and not by changes in the long-
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term average windspeed 20 feet (6.1 
m) above ground. Often the fire­
fighter loses confidence in his 
meteorologist or his weather sta­
tion, or both, because he is told to 
expect a 16-mile-per-hour (26­
km/h) wind and found the fire 
fanned by 35-mile-per-hour (56­
km) gusts. He often must estimate 
the variations in windspeed that 
may be expected for the average 
speed that is reported. 
Tool for Estimating
Gustiness 
To help firefighters estimate gusti­
ness, we determined the 10-minute 
average speed, the probable fastest 
1-minute average speeds, and the 
probable average and highest 
momentary speed or gust during 
the fastest 1-minute speed (table 1). 
The table values were determined 
from several hundred noon and 
afternoon observations made at 
Salem, Missouri, during fire sea­
sons. They were taken when gusti­
ness was likely to be greatest, as it 
often is on difficult fires. Thus, the 
estimates are most accurate when 
they are needed the most. 
It is difficult to convert windspeeds 
taken by firefighters to the standard 
windspeed. In preparing spot fore­
casts for project fires, wind meas­
urements are often made with a 
hand-held anemometer. This 
instrument indicates gust speed 
accurately, but it is almost impossi­
ble to accurately determine average 
speed with it. Consequently, the 
windspeed reported from the fire-
line almost invariably is the average 
gust speed rather than the accepted 
20-foot (6.1-m), 10- minute stan­
dard. Therefore, another table was 
Often the firefighter must estimate the variations 
in windspeed that may be expected for the 
average speed that is reported. 
Table 1—Wind gust estimating table. 
Standard 
10-minute 
average 
Probable 
maximum 
1-minute speed 
Probable momentary gust speed 
Average  Maximum 
mph  km/h  mph  km/h  mph  km/h  mph  km/h 
1  1.6  3  4.8  6  9.7  9  14.5 
2  3.2  5  8.0  8  12.9  12  19.3 
3  4.8  6  9.7  11  17.7  15  24.1 
4  6.4  8  12.9  13  20.9  17  27.4 
5  8.0  9  14.5  15  24.1  18  29.0 
6  9.7  10  16.1  16  25.7  20  32.2 
7  11.3  11  17.7  17  25.7  21  33.8 
8  12.9  12  19.3  19  30.6  23  37.0 
9  14.5  13  20.9  20  32.2  24  38.6 
10  16.1  14  22.5  22  35.4  26  41.8 
11  17.7  15  24.1  23  37.0  27  43.5 
12  19.3  17  27.4  25  40.2  29  46.7 
13  20.9  18  29.0  26  41.8  30  48.3 
14  22.5  19  30.6  28  45.1  32  51.5 
15  24.1  20  32.2  29  46.7  33  53.1 
16  25.7  21  33.8  30  48.3  35  56.3 
17  27.4  22  35.4  32  51.5  36  57.9 
18  29.0  23  37.0  33  53.1  38  61.2 
19  30.6  24  38.6  34  54.7  39  62.8 
20  32.2  25  40.2  35  56.3  40  64.4 
21  33.8  26  41.8  37  59.5  42  67.6 
22  35.4  27  43.5  38  61.2  43  69.2 
23  37.0  28  45.1  39  62.8  44  70.8 
24  38.6  29  46.7  40  64.4  46  74.0 
25  40.2  30  48.3  41  66.0  47  75.6 
26  41.8  31  49.9  43  69.2  49  78.9 
27  43.5  32  51.5  44  70.8  50  80.5 
28  45.1  33  53.1  45  72.4  51  82.1 
29  46.7  34  54.7  46  74.0  53  85.3 
30  48.3  35  56.3  47  75.6  54  86.9 
Note: All readings were taken in the afternoon 20 feet (6.1 m) above the ground. 
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Table 2—Standard windspeed estimates based on maximum gusts 
a 
Fastest gust 
observed on 
hand-held 
anemometer 
b 
Standard windspeed when 
atmospheric condition is: 
Stable 
c  Neutral 
d  Unstable 
e 
mph  km/h  mph  km/h  mph  km/h  mph  km/h 
0–3  0–4.8  0  0  0  0  0  0 
4–6  6.4–9.7  1  1.6  1  1.6  1  1.6 
7  11.3  2  3.2  1  1.6  1  1.6 
8  12.9  2  3.2  2  3.2  1  1.6 
9  14.5  3  4.8  2  3.2  2  3.2 
10  16.1  4  6.4  3  4.8  3  4.8 
12  19.3  6  9.7  4  6.4  4  6.4 
14  22.5  8  12.9  6  9.7  5  8.0 
16  25.7  10  16.1  8  12.9  7  11.3 
18  29.0  12  19.3  9  14.5  8  12.9 
20  32.2  15  24.1  11  17.7  10  16.1 
22  35.4  17  27.4  13  20.9  12  19.3 
24  38.6  19  30.6  15  24.1  14  22.5 
26  41.8  22  35.4  17  27.4  16  25.7 
28  45.1  24  38.6  19  30.6  18  29.0 
30  48.3  27  43.5  21  33.8  20  32.2 
32  51.5  29  46.7  23  37.0  22  35.4 
34  54.7  32  51.5  25  40.2  23  37.0 
36  57.9  34  54.7  27  43.5  25  40.2 
38  61.2  37  59.5  29  46.7  27  43.5 
40  64.4  39  62.8  31  49.9  29  46.7 
Gustiness is a serious 
problem for both fire 
researchers and fire-
control planners. 
developed to convert gust speed 5 
feet (1.5 m) above the ground to 
the standard 20-foot (6.1-m), 10­
minute speed for stable, neutral, 
and unstable conditions (table 2). 
This conversion should be used 
when fire-danger indexes are deter­
mined from fireline observations or 
when wind information consists of 
a mixture of hand-held and tower 
observations.  ■ 
a. Standard windspeed is 10-minute average speed 20 feet (6.1 m) above the ground 
b. Readings were taken 5 feet (1.5 m) above ground. For best results observations should 
be made for several minutes. 
c. This column usually should be used for observations between 8 p.m. and 8 a.m. 
d. This column usually should be used for observations between 8 a.m. and noon, and 
between noon and 8 p.m. on overcast days. 
e. This column usually should be used between noon and 8 p.m. on clear or partly cloudy 
days. 
Russo and Schoemaker (1989) Decision Trap 4— 
Overconfidence in Your Judgment: 
Failing to collect key factual information because you are too sure 
of your assumptions and opinions.* 
* See page 9. 
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55 ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY FORECAST 
AND FIRE CONTROL* 
Rollo T. Davis 
Unstable air masses increase 
chances of big fires. Relative 
humidity seems to play a smaller 
role than thought before. 
Atmospheric stability forecasts, 
projecting stability for 36 to 48 
hours, can warn fire control per­
sonnel when to expect erratic fire 
behavior and an increase in blow­
up potential.** 
H
ave you ever wondered why 
some forest fires are extremely 
difficult to control while oth­
ers, under seemingly like weather 
and fuel conditions, are relatively 
easy to curb? Even during dry peri­
ods when winds are high and 
humidities low, some fires show no 
erratic behavior or blow-up poten­
tial and are easily checked. But at 
other times, under apparently the 
same conditions, the wildest blow­
up develops. Still more puzzling is 
the fact that some fires are almost 
impossible to control and become 
conflagrations even though the soil 
is wet, humidities are relatively 
high, and surface winds outside the 
fire zone are light. Why the differ­
ence? 
Blow-up characteristics of forest 
fires have been attributed to low 
relative humidities and strong sur-
When this article was originally published, 
Rollo Davis was a Forestry Meteorologist 
for the ESSA Weather Bureau, Jackson, 
MS. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 30(3)
 
[Summer 1969]: 3–4, 15.
 
** Editor’s note:  Beginning with the Summer 1969
 
issue of Fire Control Notes, most articles in each issue
 
started with a short summary paragraph. In 1972, the
 
practice was largely discontinued.
 
face winds. Papers have been pre­
sented about the relationship 
between relative humidities below 
30 percent and large fires. Daniel J. 
Kreuger, former Georgia Fire 
Weather Supervisor, made a study 
of forest fires in Georgia for the 
years 1950–59. He reported in the 
Georgia Forest Research Paper #3 
that 77 percent of the fires burning 
300 acres (121 ha) or more 
occurred when the relative humidi­
ty was 25 percent or less. Ninety-
two percent of the large fires 
occurred when the relative humidi­
ty was 30 percent or less. Mr. 
Kreuger concluded: 
1. Fires, when promptly and ade­
quately attacked (barring equip­
ment failure), rarely, if ever, 
become large unless the relative 
humidity is 30 percent or less at 
the fire. 
2. Potential for large fires increases 
rapidly as humidities fall below 
25 percent. Fire fighters should 
increase their vigil whenever 
these low relative humidities 
exist or are forecast. 
Atmospheric
Turbulence 
The relationship of atmospheric 
turbulence to erratic fire behavior 
has also been studied and dis­
cussed. As early as 1951, George M. 
Byram and Ralph M. Nelson pre­
sented a paper titled “The Possible 
Most large fires occur when the temperature
 
profiles through the lower levels of the
 
atmosphere exhibit some degree of instability.
 
Relation of Air Turbulence to 
Erratic Fire Behavior in the 
Southeast.”
† In this paper, they 
pointed out the possibility of a 
direct relationship existing between 
unstable low-level air and extreme 
fire behavior in the Southeast. 
A review of the weather conditions 
at the time of the larger fires 
occurring in Mississippi during 
1967 revealed that large, hard-to­
control fires did not necessarily 
occur on the days with the lowest 
relative humidities. In fact, the 
largest fires occurred 24 to 48 
hours after a day with desert-like 
humidities. This pattern seemed to 
be begun by the passage of a cold 
front. With cold, dry, continental 
arctic air overspreading the State 
behind the front, the relative 
humidities often dropped below 20 
percent. One to 3 days later, relative 
humidities started climbing, but 
fire severity and size also increased. 
Hoping that this unexpected fire 
pattern might be explained, the 
daily surface weather maps and the 
temperatures from the surface to 
the 5,000-foot (1,524-m) level were 
critically examined for all days on 
which fires of more than 300 acres 
(121 ha), classed as “E” fires, 
burned. The examination of the 
temperature profiles aloft strongly 
† Fire Control Notes 12(3) 1–8. 
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suggested that the atmospheric 
instability in the lower atmosphere 
played a significant role in erratic 
behavior of fires. 
To investigate further, information 
on all 1967 fires of the class “E” 
and larger was requested from the 
Fire Control Directors of the States 
surrounding Mississippi. The 
requested information was supplied 
by Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, 
and Alabama, and a total of 70 fires 
were investigated. No attempt was 
made to investigate weather condi­
tions for fires when fire control 
personnel were unable to attack the 
fire shortly after it started. 
Atmospheric stability in the layer 
between the surface and the 5,000­
foot (1,524-m) level was categorized 
for the investigations as follows: 
1. Stable—Temperatures aloft 
decreasing with increase in alti­
tude at a rate about 3.5 degrees 
F or less per 1,000 feet. 
2. Conditionally unstable— 
Temperature decrease with 
increase in altitude at a rate of 
3.5 to 5.4 degrees F per 1,000 
feet. (Conditionally unstable air 
tends to become unstable if 
forced to rise. Additional heat 
supplied at the surface is suffi­
cient to produce the needed 
rise.) 
3. Unstable—Temperature decrease 
with increase in altitude of 5.5 
degrees F per 1,000 feet. 
4. Absolutely unstable— 
Temperature decrease with 
increase in altitude greater than 
5.5 degrees F per 1,000 feet. 
Only six of the 70 fires studied 
occurred when the conditions in 
the low levels of the atmosphere 
were classified as stable. Fifteen, or 
21 percent, occurred when the air 
mass was classified as conditionally 
unstable, and fifteen others burned 
during unstable conditions. The 
greatest number, by a significant 
percentage, occurred when the air 
mass was classified as absolutely 
unstable. Thirty four of the big 
fires, nearly one-half of the 70 cases 
studied, burned when the air mass 
at the fire site was absolutely unsta­
ble. 
Relative Humidities 
Relative humidities in the area of 
the fires ranged from 18 percent to 
80 percent. A large percent of the 
fires during periods when the 
atmosphere was absolutely unstable 
burned when relative humidities at 
the surface were above the level 
normally associated with big or 
erratic fires. Nearly 60 percent of 
the large fires studied took place 
when the relative humidity in the 
area was above 30 percent. Air mass 
stability, therefore, appears to be as 
significant, if not more significant, 
than low-level moisture in the 
behavior of forest fires once they 
got started. 
It seems reasonable that air mass 
stability should play a very impor­
tant role in the behavior of forest 
fires. Unstable air, from the meteor­
ological viewpoint, is also convec­
tively unstable. Once the air starts 
to rise, it will be warmer than its 
surroundings. The air continues to 
rise until it reaches a level where 
the temperature of the surrounding 
air is the same. When unstable air 
is displaced upward, it is replaced 
by air moving laterally, creating an 
indraft of air, which is also unsta­
ble. This air rises. With the heat of 
the fire being the initiating force to 
start and maintaining convection, a 
chain reaction is begun. The con­
vective column increases in size, 
and the indrafts increase in velocity 
to fan the flames which then 
increase the heat to intensify con­
vection, and so on (fig. 1). Fire con­
trol personnel are well aware of 
Figure l—Convection currents visibly at work on a forest fire. 
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many of the direct and indirect 
effects of air mass instability on for­
est fires. Some of the more spectac­
ular effects are rapid crowning, 
long-distance spotting, erratic 
movement, and blow-up potential. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
Most large fires occur when the 
temperature profiles through the 
lower levels of the atmosphere 
exhibit some degree of instability. 
Fire control foresters who are fur­
nished daily with an atmospheric 
stability forecast can plan ahead 
and use their manpower and equip­
ment better. 
The atmospheric stability forecast should be a 
routine product of all weather offices, and fire 
control personnel should be trained to use it. 
Upper air temperature data are 
readily available at all ESSA 
Weather Bureau Offices where 
forestry meteorologists are sta­
tioned. These data enable the 
forestry meteorologist to determine 
the degree of atmospheric instabili­
ty. Using other meteorological 
information available, such as the 
computerized lifted index prognos­
tic charts, the forestry meterologist 
can project the stability into the 
future and come up with a forecast 
of the atmospheric stability for the 
following 36 to 48 hours. 
Considering the value of such fore­
casts to the forestry industry, the 
atmospheric stability forecast 
should be a routine product of all 
weather offices, and fire control 
personnel should be trained to use 
it.  ■ 
Russo and Schoemaker (1989) Decision Trap 5— 
Shortsighted Shortcuts: 
Relying inappropriately on “rules of thumb,” such as implicitly trusting 
the most readily available information or anchoring too much on 
convenient facts.* 
* See page 9. 
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A DANGEROUS COMBINATION* 
Donald A. Haines 
On June 8, 1981, a wildland fire on 
Merritt Island, FL, suddenly 
changed directions, killing two fire­
fighters. On August 2, 1985, Delta 
Flight 191 crashed and burned 
while attempting to land at Dallas-
Fort Worth Airport. These two 
events had one common theme, 
strong thunderstorm down-
bursts.** 
I

t happens to most firefighters
 
sooner or later if they have been
 
on the job long enough. Every­
thing along the fireline seems fairly 
well controlled. But then, unex­
pectedly, the wind shifts and 
becomes erratic. Wind speed picks 
up dramatically for 5 to 15 minutes 
and then decreases. 
Another factor is added to the high 
winds: Precipitation ranging from 
very light to very heavy. It may fall 
so hard during a thunderstorm that 
it puts out the fire, or it may evapo­
rate before it hits the ground. 
With a change in weather comes a 
change in fire behavior—this time 
for the worse. The fire changes 
direction, previously controlled 
lines are lost, and a routine opera­
tion becomes life threatening. What 
happened? 
When this article was originally published, 
Donald A. Haines was a principal research 
meteorologist, USDA Forest Service, North 
Central Forest Experiment Station, East 
Lansing, MI. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 
49(3) [Summer 1988]: 8–10. 
** Editor’s note:  This article, unlike any others in the 
Summer 1988 issue of Fire Management Notes, con­
tains a short summary paragraph. Except for a brief 
period from 1969 to 1972, this practice was highly 
unusual in the journal. 
Definition 
The odds are high that the weather 
event described in the introduction 
was a downburst. A downburst is a 
downdraft associated with a thun­
derstorm or other well-developed 
cumulus clouds that induces an 
outburst of damaging winds on or 
near the ground. When the burst is 
small (0.4 to 4 km or 0.25 to 2.5 
miles in diameter), it is a micro-
burst; larger ones (more than 6.5 
km or 2.5 miles in diameter) are 
macrobursts. Not all downdrafts are 
downbursts. Fujita (1978) stated 
that horizontal wind speeds gener­
ally exceed 40 miles per hour (64 
km/h) on the ground in a true 
downburst. Although Schroeder 
and Buck (1970) discussed down-
drafts in their handbook Fire 
Weather, recent research has great­
ly increased our knowledge of 
downburst occurrence and struc­
ture. Because a downburst can 
cause dramatic and dangerous fire 
behavior, firefighters should under­
stand this phenomenon. 
Downbursts are classed as either 
dry or wet. Most investigators 
believe that both types require rain­
drops as an initial condition 
because evaporation of these drops 
cools the air, which then falls as it 
gets heavier. Humid areas, like the 
Southeastern United States (where 
A downburst is a downdraft associated with a 
thunderstorm or other well-developed cumulus 
clouds that induces an outburst of damaging 
winds on or near the ground. 
the downdraft is almost always 
associated with moderate to heavy 
rain), usually experience wet down-
bursts. The wet downburst pro­
duces a core of rain that is visible, 
although it may be obscured by 
associated weather. 
Dry downbursts occur in more arid 
places, like Colorado, when cloud 
bases are higher and precipitation 
evaporates before the downdraft 
reaches the ground (Monastersky 
1987). The dry downburst might 
not be seen easily by either radar or 
observers in such cases. Both 
cumulonimbus clouds as well as 
less fully developed rain clouds can 
produce them. 
During a study of microbursts in 
the Denver area, Fujita and 
Wakimoto (1983) found that 81 
percent were the dry type. Little or 
no rain fell to the surface with 
them. In contrast, during an 
Oklahoma study, Eilts and Doviak 
(1987) found that the macrobursts 
detected on their radar were imbed­
ded in intense convective storms 
and had large, heavy rain cores. 
But, these differences in detection 
may be the result of scanning 
strategies used with the different 
radar units Eilts and Doviak (1987). 
In particular, the Oklahoma radar 
may have missed lighter rain cores. 
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59 Sherman (1987) concluded that  Although wet downbursts are difficult to forecast, 
with the falling dense air in a  downbursts in a dry environment can be predicted 
downburst, the flow behaves like a  from morning upper-air soundings.  toroidal vortex. In other words, as 
the vortex at the head of a down-
burst approaches the ground, each 
element of the falling vortex moves 
downward and outward along a 
roughly hyperbolic path. Near the 
cloud base, winds and rain con­
verge around the descending air, 
feeding into it. A sharp observer 
might be able to spot the develop­
ing downburst if it is outlined by 
rain because the precipitation falls 
rapidly, reaching a downward veloc­
ity of 65 miles per hour (105 km/h). 
When flying directly beneath a 
microburst, a pilot in a spotter 
plane will find that the difference 
between the headwind and the tail­
wind is typically 60 miles per hour 
(97 km/h) as the winds spill out 
horizontally to either side of the 
parent cloud. Fujita (1978) showed 
that in one case this difference 
exceeded 172 miles per hour (279 
km/h). 
Several researchers have found a 
relationship between an observed 
temperature drop at surface and 
the increased wind speed. The larg­
er the temperature change, the 
more severe the wind gusts. The 
leading edge of the horizontal 
movement of the wind gusts is 
called a gust front. As it spreads 
horizontally, the gust front may 
develop as an expanding fluid struc­
ture many miles long, depending 
on the strength of the downburst 
(fig. 1). 
A Tragic Example 
The weather that occurred with the 
1981 Florida wildland fire seems to 
have been a classical downburst 
(USDA FWS 1981). Two men oper­
ating a dozer and plow attempted 
containment along the eastern 
flank of the Ransom Road Fire. A  and the flames overtook the two 
thunderstorm developed and winds  men. A tower with a recording 
abruptly changed from south to  anemometer to the northeast of the 
west. In response, the head of the  fire area showed wind speeds 
fire changed from north to east,  increasing from an average of 7 to 
Figure 1—The four stages of a thunderstorm downburst and gust front. The precipitation 
roll is a horizontal roll vortex formed by airflow that is deflected upward by the ground. 
Note the changes in wind direction as the gust front passes a point and moves on 
(Wakimoto 1982). 
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with gusts to 52 miles per hour (84 
km/h). Within 10 minutes, the tem­
perature fell from 82 °F (28 °C) to 
60º F (16 °C). The tower readings 
ended at that point as lightning hit 
it. 
This then was a true wet-core 
downburst as “a heavy rainstorm, 
accompanied by thunder and light­
ning, descended on the fire area, 
lasting for 15 to 20 minutes and 
just about completely extinguished 
the wildfire” (USDA FWS 1981). 
Forecast Possibilities 
Conclusions 
Even though research is taking the 
surprise out of the dry downburst, 
forecasting the wet downburst will 
be a difficult problem for some 
time to come. Predicting the 
The Board suggested 
that crews pull back 
during impending 
thunderstorms in areas 
with fuels that burn with 
high intensity and rate 
of spread. 
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Although wet downbursts are diffi­
cult to forecast, downbursts in a 
dry environment can be predicted 
from morning upper-air soundings. 
According to Caracena and Maier 
(1987), “inroads have already been 
made into the microburst forecast 
problem in understanding the dry 
end of the convective spectrum 
where the concept of severe weath­
er is extended to conditions that 
favor strong downdrafts from high 
base cumulonimbi.” They believe 
that to be able to forecast down-
bursts in all parts of the United 
States, meteorologists must first 
understand how nature generates 
them over the entire range from 
wet to dry extremes. Forecasters 
then could diagnose typical down-
burst conditions from the daily 
upper-air data. 
impressive winds that accompany 
these downbursts remains an elu­
sive goal. Accordingly, the Board of 
Inquiry for the Ransom Road Fire 
aimed recommendations at the 
field level. The Board felt that an 
observer in a spotter plane in direct 
contact with the line crews could 
have anticipated the weather condi­
tions and, hence, fire behavior 
changes. This could have allowed 
directions for an escape route. The 
Board also suggested that crews 
pull back from the fire during 
impending thunderstorms in areas 
with fuels that burn with high 
intensity and rate of spread, as in 
the Ransom Road Fire. 
Russo and Schoemaker (1989) Decision Trap 6—Shooting From the Hip: 
Believing you can keep straight in your head all the information you’ve 
discovered, and therefore “winging it” rather than following a systematic 
procedure when making the final choice.* 
* See page 9. 
Volume 64 • No. 1 • Winter 2004 
61  
 
 
 
ESTIMATING SLOPE FOR PREDICTING
 
FIRE BEHAVIOR* 
Patricia L. Andrews 
W 
hen predicting fire behavior 
in the field, it is desirable to 
be able to obtain the 
required input information with a 
minimum of special equipment. 
This article tells how to estimate 
slope (percent) using materials in a 
belt weather kit. This method can 
be used on wildfires by fire behav­
ior analysts, field observers, and 
strike team leaders. Those who are 
monitoring fires that are not 
receiving full suppression action, 
such as prescribed fires in wilder­
ness, will find it especially useful. 
Importance of Slope 
To predict fire behavior, a fire spe­
cialist must supply values for fuel 
model, fuel moisture, windspeed, 
and slope. Calculations can be done 
using tables, nomograms, calcula­
tors, or computer programs 
(Andrews 1986). As described by 
Rothermel (1983), fuels are classi­
fied as a particular fuel model by 
observation (Anderson 1982); wind-
speed is measured; live fuel mois­
ture is estimated by the state of 
curing; dead fuel moisture is deter­
mined by an estimate of shade and 
measurements of temperature and 
relative humidity; and slope is 
determined from a topographic 
map, estimated, or measured with 
an instrument such as a clinome­
ter. Slope can also be estimated 
When this article was originally published, 
Patricia Andrews was a mathematician for 
the USDA Forest Service, Intermountain 
Research Station, Fire Sciences 
Laboratory, Missoula, MT. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 
49(3) [Summer 1988]: 16–18. 
Those monitoring fires, such as prescribed fires in
 
wilderness, will find this method especially useful.
 
with adequate precision using the 
method described here. 
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of 
slope on predicted flame length for 
four fuel models: 
•4  (chaparral); 
• 13 (heavy logging slash); 
•2  (timber litter and understory); 
and 
•9  (hardwood litter). 
In this example, there is no wind, 
dead fuel moisture is 6 percent, and 
live fuel moisture is 100 percent. 
Calculations were done using 
BEHAVE (Andrews 1986). A resolu­
tion of less than 5 percent is clearly 
not necessary, especially when all of 
the other uncertainties involved in 
fire behavior prediction are taken 
into account. On the other hand, 
the value for percent slope has 
enough influence that a poor esti­
mate might lead to a significant 
over- or underprediction. 
Estimating Slope 
The lines in figure 2 represent 
slope percentages from 0 to 100. 
Using a sheet of adhesive acetate, 
Figure 1—The 
influence of slope on 
calculated flame 
length is shown for 
four fuel models under 
constant wind and fuel 
moisture conditions. 
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is unimportant. 
attach a copy of figure 2 to the 
board in a belt weather kit. Notch 
the board where the lines converge. 
Hang the compass by its neckstring 
at the notch to serve as a plumb. 
Sight along the board parallel to 
the slope, as shown in figure 3. 
Noting where the string lies, read 
the slope to the nearest 5 percent. 
This method of estimating slope is 
a simple, no-cost alternative to eye­
ball estimates, which are notorious­
ly poor, and to instruments such as 
clinometers, which are expensive 
and give a level of resolution not 
required for fire behavior predic­
tion. 
Figure 3—The influence of slope on 
calculated flame length is shown for 
four fuel models under constant wind 
and fuel moisture conditions. 
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63 AIR TANKER VORTEX TURBULENCE— 
REVISITED* 
Donald A. Haines 
E
xtreme drought had a devastat­
ing impact on wildland fire 
activity over much of the 
Central and Western United States 
during the summer and autumn of 
1988. State and Federal suppression 
forces in Michigan’s Upper Penin­
sula confronted fire behavior rarely 
experienced in early summer, typi­
cally a period of low fire occur­
rence. 
The Stockyard Fire 
The Stockyard Fire, near Escanaba, 
MI, proved especially troublesome 
because of unexpected fire behavior. 
Among other features, 100-foot­
long (30-m) sheets of flame moved 
horizontally, undulating like waves 
on a water surface. Fire, brands 
moving with the sheets caused spot 
fires that quickly turned into 15- to 
30-foot-high (4.5- to 9-m) fire 
whirlwinds. Even though the 
Burning Index (National Fire 
Danger Rating System) was 27 with 
fuel model E, burning was so 
intense along some sectors of the 
fire that escaping gases did not 
ignite until well above the fire. In 
those cases, the gases exploded as 
large bubbles high in the air. 
But the most interesting behavior 
occurred along a 300-foot (90-m) 
length of the right flank. Here 
three tractor-plow operators built 
line within a jack pine plantation. 
When this article was originally published, 
Don Haines was a research meteorologist 
for the USDA Forest Service, North Central 
Forest Experiment Station, East Lansing, 
MI. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 
50(2) [Spring 1989]: 14–15. 
The trees were 3 to 6 inches (8–15 
cm) in diameter and 25 to 30 feet 
(7.5–9 m) high. Compared with 
other sectors, this was a quiet area. 
The operators plowed 50 feet (15 
m) from a backing fire with 2-foot 
(0.6-m) flame lengths. Aided by a 
firing-out crew well behind the 
tractor operators, the fire burned to 
the line, leaving a wide black area. 
Winds were light and then became 
calm. The low flames suddenly 
began to “climb” up a few trees into 
the crowns. Within a minute or two 
the flames became a high wall. The 
wall changed into a crown fire, 
moving directly toward the tractor 
crew. Flame tilt had shifted from 
slightly eastward to vertical and 
then to westward. 
The resultant crown fire was 
described as a “waterfall,” a “break­
ing wave,” a “curl,” and a “wave 
curl.” In other words, it was a hori­
zontal roll vortex of some type. 
Witnesses also stated that this wave 
(vortex) moved along the fire line at 
about 15 miles per hour (24 km/h). 
The vortex rotation threw foot-long 
(0.3-m) fire brands westward, 100 
feet (30 m) away from the flank, 
into unburned fuels. Flame heights 
increased to 150 to 250 feet (45–76 
m). Luckily no one was killed, 
although one of the tractor opera­
tors was badly injured and spent 
weeks in a medical bum center. 
The crown fire was described as a “waterfall,” a
 
“breaking wave,” a “curl,” and a “wave curl”—in
 
other words, a horizontal roll vortex of some type.
 
What happened? Of equal interest, 
why did it happen only along this 
section of the line? 
Possibilities Rejected 
None of the more typical causes 
can explain the unexpected changes 
in fire behavior. There were no 
heavy fuel concentrations. Fuels 
were relatively uniform in a typical 
jack pine plantation. Also, the area 
was relatively flat with no unusual 
topographic features. 
There were no apparent immediate 
weather concerns. The weather 
charts showed that the region was 
covered by a large, flat, high-pres­
sure cell. Although the fire 
occurred near one of the Great 
Lakes, the land/sea breeze circula­
tion did not change at that time. 
Also there was no apparent change 
in the vertical structure of the 
atmosphere over the fire. 
Burnout operations upstream of 
the site had no effect on down­
stream activity, nor did anyone see 
the formation of a large vertical fire 
whirl or other suspicious fire-initi­
ated features. 
Lessons Relearned 
However, one interesting incident 
did occur in this sector only min­
utes before the sudden, violent 
increase in fire activity. A DC-4 air 
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tanker carrying 2,000 gallons 
(7,571 L) of retardant flew along 
the fire line, circled, then came 
back and dropped the retardant just 
south of this sector as the fire 
intensified. The tanker was flying at 
less than 400 feet (120 m) and at 
perhaps 140 miles per hour (225 
km/h). 
Almost a quarter of a century ago, 
Davis and Chandler (1965) pub­
lished an article in Fire Control 
Notes, “Vortex turbulence—its 
effect on fire behavior.” In it they 
warned about aircraft vortex turbu­
lence, a sheet of turbulent air left 
in the wake of all aircraft. It rolls 
up into a strong vortex pair—two 
compact, fast-spinning funnels of 
air (fig. 1). Unfortunately, this vor­
tex pair is usually invisible. Under 
certain conditions, the two vortices 
may stay close together, sometimes 
undulating slightly as they stretch 
rearward. The interaction between 
them tends to make them stay 
together as they move downward 
Davis and Chandler warned that under special
 
circumstances, vortex wakes may cause fire
 
behavior to change dramatically.
 
through the air. They usually roll 
apart as they hit the surface of the 
ground. This vortex phenomenon 
was discovered when it caused the 
crash of several light aircraft 
caught in the wakes of large air­
planes. 
Ordinarily, aircraft vortex turbu­
lence does not endanger fire con­
trol forces. But Davis and Chandler 
warned that under special circum­
stances, vortex wakes may cause 
fire behavior to change dramatically. 
Vortex severity and persistence vary 
with several factors. Most impor­
tant are the type, size, speed, and 
altitude of the aircraft and the pre­
vailing atmospheric conditions. 
Other factors being equal, the 
strongest vortex pair is produced by 
a large, slow-flying aircraft with a 
high wingspan loading. The speed 
is most important before landing or 
after takeoff. It is also a factor when 
an air tanker slows down for an 
accurate airdrop. 
Aircraft altitude is important 
because vortices weaken rapidly 
with time. Under typical wind 
speeds, the vortex pair may lose its 
potential impact in less than a 
minute. But the pair tends to per­
sist in calm air. At high altitude, 
the two vortices remain separated 
by a distance slightly less than the 
aircraft’s wingspan. However, the 
interaction of the vortices causes 
them to drop at a rate of 300 to 500 
feet per minute (90–150 m/min) 
depending on various factors. 
For a more complete description of 
the action of these vortices, please 
read Davis and Chandler (1965)* 
and also Chandler and others 
(1983). 
Be Aware 
Today’s fire crews and air tanker 
pilots would be wise to heed the 
warnings offered by Davis and 
Chandler. Fire crews should be 
alert for trouble in these circum­
stances: 
• The air is still and calm. 
• The fire is burning in open land 
or in scattered or low timber. 
• The air tanker is large or heavily 
loaded. 
• The air tanker is flying low and 
slowly. 
Air tanker pilots should be aware of 
the problem the aircraft can cause 
and take these precautions: 
• Do not fly parallel to the fire line 
more than necessary. 
• Keep high except when making 
the actual drop. 
• Ensure that ground crews are 
alert to the presence of an air 
tanker and the intended flight 
path. 
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Figure 1—Low-flying spray plane. Note 
funneling effect on spray trailing each  * Editor’s note: Reprinted in this issue of Fire 
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65 A TREND ANALYSIS OF FIRELINE 
“WATCH OUT” SITUATIONS IN SEVEN 
FIRE-SUPPRESSION FATALITY ACCIDENTS* 
Gene A. Morse 
U
nder the auspices of the 
National Wildfire Coordinating 
Group’s (NWCG’s) Fireline 
Safety Committee, seven events 
resulting in nine firefighter fatali­
ties were analyzed. Common to all 
the fatalities was the use of tractor-
plow units. The tractor plow is the 
primary equipment used for forest 
and wildland fire suppression activ­
ities in the South and the East. 
The events were well documented 
with extensive details, photographs, 
and maps. They provided an ade­
quate background of the events and 
factors leading to the deaths of the 
nine firefighters. A careful analysis, 
it was believed, might reveal a pat­
tern of unsafe actions that could be 
changed in the future to avoid a 
recurrence of these tragic events. 
A first reading of the fatality reports 
indicated no common factors in 
fuels or topography. Some similari­
ties were noted in weather patterns, 
but it was difficult to draw defini­
tive conclusions based on the 
weather factor alone. 
Approach 
The decision was made to apply the 
process developed in the NWCG 
Standards for Survival training pro­
gram as the criteria for analyzing 
When this article was originally published, 
Gene Morse was a division training and 
safety officer for the Florida Division of 
Forestry, Tallahassee, FL. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 
51(2) [Spring 1990]: 8–12. 
these events. The Standards for 
Survival focus on the 18 “Watch 
Out” Situations and the Standard 
Fire Orders. The “Watch Out” 
Situations and Fire Orders have 
gained widespread use as aids to 
safety among forest and wildland 
fire suppression agencies. 
Practical application of the 
Standards for Survival training on 
an incident centers around identify­
ing a potentially dangerous fireline 
event, linking it to a “Watch Out” 
Situation on the Survival Checklist, 
and then taking a positive action 
(observing the appropriate Fire 
Order) to eliminate or minimize 
the possibility of firefighter injury 
or death. One response from one of 
the fatality reports of the seven 
events illustrates how a “Watch 
Out” Situation was identified but 
the Fire Order was not observed: 
• Potentially hazardous event:  “It 
had been jumping our lines … 
the thing [fire] had already 
jumped a 60-foot canal….” 
• “Watch Out” Situation (#16): 
Getting frequent spot fires across 
line. 
• Fire Order not observed (#1): 
Initiate all action based on cur­
rent and expected fire behavior. 
In each of seven fatality events, a single
 
overlooked “Watch Out” Situation appeared to be
 
the major contributing factor.
 
In analyzing these events, it was 
apparent that, in each instance, a 
single overlooked “Watch Out” 
Situation appeared to be the major 
contributing factor. Simply follow­
ing that reasoning process a step 
further leads to the conclusion that 
if the dominant positive action— 
Fire Order—to counteract that 
negative situation had been imme­
diately observed, then a tragic situ­
ation may have been avoided. 
Perhaps some readers might say 
that the method used in this analy­
sis is too simplistic—that overlook­
ing common threats to safety is too 
basic to be neglected. In this 
response lies a pitfall: The “Watch 
Out” Situations—commonly occur­
ring during a fire event—are haz­
ardous situations. It is hard, when a 
fire seems routine, to believe that it 
could become threatening. But a 
fire event has the potential to 
develop a “Watch Out” Situation 
quickly. Danger is inherent in a fire 
event. To develop “scotoma” in 
regard to these dangers is a major 
contributing factor to many fireline 
fatalities. 
What is scotoma and how does it 
apply to fireline fatalities? Scotoma, 
a medical term, has direct rele­
vance to this analysis. Scotoma is, 
literally, a blind spot. In a psycho­
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which occurs when a person tends 
to block out from his or her con­
sciousness anything considered not 
important—or critical—to survival. 
The significance of scotoma in fire-
line suppression operations is dra­
matically emphasized by this state­
ment found in the fatality reports: 
“Personnel on the fire considered it 
to be routine … until the fire blew 
up” (figs. 1 and 2). Although it was 
phrased differently in several 
reports, this same type of comment 
surfaced repeatedly. The meaning is 
clear: It was “just another fire” to 
the firefighters. 
Scotoma had taken hold and 
blocked out sensitivity to hazardous 
events or conditions present in the 
fire environment. 
The prevalence of this attitude or 
mindset was best expressed by a 
veteran firefighter recently during a 
fireline safety training session when 
he commented, “I know those 
things [“Watch Out” Situations] are 
out there on the fire, but I’ve seen 
them so many times I’m not really 
aware of them now.” 
Trends and Conclusions 
This analysis—to identify haz­
ardous conditions or events in the 
fatality reports and then link them 
to the NWCG Survival Checklist— 
aimed at determining significant 
trends. The findings established 
that there were 84 separate haz­
ardous conditions or events in the 
fatality reports. Some specific 
examples drawn directly from the 
reports, linked to the Survival 
Checklist, and the appropriate dom­
inant Standard Fire Order are out­
lined in table 1. 
An analysis of the 84 hazardous 
conditions or events, when linked 
Figure 1—A number 
of “Watch out” 
Situations were pres­
ent when a fire 
tragedy occurred in 
this mountainous 
region, resulting in 
two firefighter deaths. 
The familiar state­
ment, “personnel on 
the fire considered 
the situation to be 
routine until fire blew 
up,” was contained in 
the fire report. Note 
victims’ location on 
the windward side of 
the ridge, adjacent to 
a draw. Mild drought 
conditions existed, 
with 30-mile-per­
hour (48-km/h) 
winds. 
Figure 2—This 
sketch of a fatality 
scene, prepared by a 
fire behavior analyst, 
illustrates a danger­
ous fireline condi­
tion. It shows the fire 
with three separate 
heads, burning in 
three subdivision 
blocks, part of a 
huge, largely unpop­
ulated subdivision 
with heavy fuel load­
ing. Mild drought 
conditions existed. 
Note that the fire­
fighter’s tractor is 
located in a “pocket,” 
with the fire heads 
on either side 
advancing more rap­
idly than the fire in 
Block No. 2. Person­
nel on this fire con­
sidered it to be “rou­
tine”—until it blew 
up. 
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67 Table 1—Nine examples of hazardous conditions listed on the Survival Checklist for which there is a Standard 
Fire Order. 
Hazardous condition or event  Survival Checklist  Fire Order 
Initial instructions to the firefighter: “Grab the first 
piece of fire you come to—and do the best you can.” 
No. 6: Instructions and 
assignments not clear. 
E: Ensure instructions 
are given and understood. 
“[The fire] looked like one of those waves in Hawaii, 
like when you shoot the waves on a surfboard. The 
smoke was going up; it looked like an explosion.” 
No. 4: Unfamiliar with 
weather and local factors 
influencing fire behavior. 
I: Initiate all action based 
on current and expected 
fire behavior. 
Q: “What radio traffic did you get after XXX offloaded 
and started plowing?” 
A: “None … I never heard any.” 
No. 7: No communication 
link with crew members 
or supervisor. 
R: Remain in communi­
cation with crew mem­
bers, your supervisor, and 
adjoining forces. 
Q: “Had there been any briefings? Weather briefings? 
Fire behavior briefings? Safety briefings? 
A: “Not to my knowledge “ 
No. 5: Uninformed on 
strategy, tactics, and haz­
ards. 
R: Retain control at all 
times. 
“There was no apparent briefing with the crew on a 
plan of attack and escape, if necessary.” 
No. 3: Safety zones and 
escape routes not identi­
fied. 
D: Determine safety zones 
and escape routes. 
“Heavy palmetto growth prohibited penetration to 
safety only 60 feet [18 m] away.” 
No. 17: Terrain and fuels 
make escape to safety 
zones difficult. 
D: Determine safety zones 
and escape routes. 
“[He] began initial attack by plowing lines across the 
head of the fire.” 
No. 10: Attempting 
frontal assault on fire. 
F: Fight fire aggressively 
but provide for safety 
first. 
“[He] noticed a space 50 to 100 feet [15–30 m] long 
on the line that was not tied together.” 
No. 11: Unburned fuel 
between you and the fire. 
O: Obtain current infor­
mation on fire status. 
“It [the wind] blew from the east, southeast, south, 
southwest, west, and then back again without warn­
ing.” 
No. 15: Wind increases 
and/or changes direction. 
R: Recognize current 
weather conditions and 
obtain forecasts. 
to the Survival Checklist, revealed 
the following trends: 
•T wenty-two were tied directly to 
Survival Checklist Situation No. 4 
(Unfamiliar with weather and 
local factors influencing fire 
behavior). 
• Thirteen were linked closely to 
Survival Checklist Situation No. 7 
(No communication link with 
crew member or supervisor). 
Scotoma—blindness to danger perceived as 
routine—had taken hold and blocked out sensitivity 
to hazardous events or conditions present in the 
fire environment. 
•T welve were connected directly to	  • Eleven were linked to Survival 
Survival Checklist Situation No.  Checklist Situation No. 16 
15 (Wind increases or changes  (Getting frequent spot fires 
direction).  across line). 
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deaths of nine firefighters estab­ fireline fatalities and a lack of awareness or 
lish? With 13 conditions or events  sensitivity to significant changes in fire behavior.  associated with communication, it 
is obvious that poor or nonexistent 
communication placed the fire­
fighters in a vulnerable position. No 
one can question the paramount 
necessity of maintaining close, 
effective communication with other 
personnel in the hostile fire envi­
ronment. 
But it is even more revealing to 
note that more than half of the 
hazardous conditions or events 
identified in the analysis relate to 
some aspect of fire behavior. 
Specifically, the relationship is 
clearly established between fireline 
fatalities and a lack of awareness or 
sensitivity to significant changes in 
fire behavior. 
Recommendations To 
Improve Safety 
What recommendations can be 
made on the basis of this trend 
analysis to reduce scotoma on the 
fireline and ensure firefighter safe­
ty? Listed below are some specific 
action items that NWCG agencies 
may wish to consider: 
• Besides the established national 
courses in fire behavior 
(Introduction to Fire Behavior; 
Intermediate Fire Behavior; and 
Advanced Fire Behavior), develop 
more localized fire behavior 
training focused on individual 
State or regional fuel types. 
•T each firefighters about fire sci­
ence—the relationship between 
fuels, weather, and topography 
and fire—and how to transfer fire 
behavior knowledge into the 
most prudent application of tac­
tics that will get the fire suppres­
sion job done without compro­
mising firefighter safety. Follow 
up classroom instruction in fire 
behavior training courses with 
simulated fire exercises in the 
field, where firefighters would be 
required to demonstrate safe, 
effective firefighting tactics in dif­
ferent fuel, weather, and topogra­
phy conditions. Evaluate critically 
to determine if participants had 
made the right tactical decisions. 
•D etermine a fuel condition 
threshold (possibly fuel moisture) 
for their local area in which 
going beyond a certain level 
would signal the mandatory 
establishment of a safe anchor 
point, posted lookout, and desig­
nated escape routes and safety 
zones to ensure safe tactical oper­
ations in the event of unexpected 
changes in weather and fire 
behavior. 
• Give high priority to fireline safe­
ty training, such as the NWCG 
Standards for Survival course. 
Agencies with few materials avail­
able for fireline safety training 
should obtain a copy of the recently 
prepared “Fireline Safety and 
Health Resources.” This publication 
was developed by the NWCG 
Fireline Safety Committee listing 
materials available for sharing by 
all NWCG agencies.  ■ 
Russo and Schoemaker (1989) Decision Trap 7—Group Failure: 
Assuming that with many smart people involved, good choices will 
follow automatically, and therefore failing to manage the group 
decisionmaking process.* 
* See page 9. 
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69 LCES—A KEY TO SAFETY IN THE
 
WILDLAND FIRE ENVIRONMENT*
 
Paul Gleason 
LCES—A System for
Operational Safety 
I

n the wildland fire environment,
 
where four basic safety hazards
 
confront the firefighter—light­
ning, fire-weakened timber, rolling 
rocks, and entrapment by running 
fires—LCES is key to safe proce­
dure for firefighters. LCES stands 
for “lookout(s),” “communica­
tion(s),” “escape routes,” and “safe­
ty zone(s)”—an interconnection 
each firefighter must know. 
Together, the elements of LCES 
form a safety system used by fire­
fighters to protect themselves. This 
safety procedure is put in place 
before fighting the fire: Select a 
lookout or lookouts, set up a com­
munication system, choose escape 
routes, and select safety zone or 
L—Lookout(s) 
C—Communication(s) 
E—Escape routes 
S—Safety zone(s) 
Key Guidelines 
LCES is built on two basic guide­
lines: 
•  Before safety is threatened, each 
firefighter must be informed how 
the LCES system will be used. 
• The LCES system must be con­
tinuously reevaluated as fire con­
ditions change. 
How To Make LCES 
Work 
•T rain lookouts to observe the 
wildland fire environment and to 
recognize and anticipate fire 
behavior changes. 
• Position lookout or lookouts 
where both the hazard and the 
firefighters can be seen. (Each 
situation—the terrain, cover, and 
The LCES system approach to fireline safety is an 
outgrowth of my analysis of fatalities and near-
misses for over 20 years of active fireline 
suppression duties. 
zones (fig. 1). 
In operation, LCES functions 
sequentially—it’s a self-triggering 
mechanism: Lookouts assess—and 
reassess—the fire environment and 
communicate to each firefighter 
threats to safety; firefighters use 
escape routes and move to safety 
zones. Actually, all firefighters 
should be alert to changes in the 
fire environment and have the 
authority to initiate communica­
tion. 
When this article was first published, Paul 
Gleason was the North Roosevelt fire man­
agement officer, USDA Forest Service, 
Arapaho and Roosevelt National Forests, 
Redfeather Ranger District, Fort Collins, 
CO. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 
52(4) [Fall 1991]: 9. 
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Figure 1—LCES components. fire size—determines the number  LCES simply refocuses on the essential elements 
of lookouts that are needed. As  of the standard Fire Orders. Its use should be 
stated before, every firefighter has  automatic in fireline operations. both the authority and responsi­
bility to warn others of threats to 
safety.) 
• Set up communication system— 
radio, voice, or both—by which 
the lookout or lookouts warn 
firefighters promptly and clearly 
of approaching threat. (Most 
often the lookout initiates a 
warning that is subsequently 
passed down to each firefighter 
by word of mouth. It is para­
mount that every firefighter 
receive the correct message in a 
timely manner.) 
• Establish the escape routes (at 
least two)—the paths the fire­
fighters take from threatened 
position to area free from dan­
ger—and make them known. (In 
the Battlement Creek 1976 fire, 
three firefighters lost their lives 
after retreat along their only 
escape route was cut off by the 
advancing fire.) 
• Reestablish escape routes as their 
effectiveness decreases. (As a fire­
fighter works along the fire 
perimeter, fatigue and distance 
increase the time required to 
reach a safety zone.) 
• Establish safety zones—locations 
where the threatened firefighter 
may find adequate refuge from 
the danger. (Fireline intensity, air 
flow, and topographic location 
determine a safety zone’s effec­
tiveness. Shelter deployment sites 
have sometimes been termed, 
improperly and unfortunately, 
“safety zones.” Safety zones 
should be conceptualized and 
planned as a location where no 
shelter will be needed. This does 
not imply that a shelter should 
not be deployed if needed, only 
that if there is a deployment, the 
safety zone location was not truly 
a safety zone.) 
A Final Word 
The LCES system approach to fire-
line safety is an outgrowth of my 
analysis of fatalities and near-miss­
es for over 20 years of active fire-
line suppression duties. LCES sim­
ply refocuses on the essential ele­
ments of the standard Fire Orders. 
Its use should be automatic in fire-
line operations. All firefighters 
should know LCES, the 
Lookout–Communication–Escape 
routes–Safety zone interconnec­
tion.  ■ 
The author’s personalized license plate. Paul Gleason developed the LCES concept while serving as superin­
tendent for the Zigzag Interagency Hotshot Crew. The photo was taken at the request of Gleason’s wife Karen 
after he passed away.* Photo: Mike Goodman, Lake Estes, CO, 2003. 
* For more on Gleason and LCES, see the Summer 2003 issue of Fire Management Today, a special issue dedicated to Paul Gleason. 
In particular, see Paul Keller, “‘Gleason Complex’ Puts Up Huge ‘Plume’: A Tribute to Paul Gleason” (Fire Management Today 63[3]: 
85–90); and Jim Cook and Angela Tom, “Inteview With Paul Gleason” (Fire Management Today 63[3]: 91–94). 
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HOW IC’S CAN GET MAXIMUM
 
USE OF WEATHER INFORMATION*
 
Christopher J. Cuoco and James K. Barnett 
D
uring initial and extended 
attack, up-to-date weather 
information is critical to suc­
cessful and safe wildland firefight­
ing. Unfortunately, obtaining and 
evaluating fire weather forecasts 
can be a challenge. With the few 
basic weather concepts plus the two 
user-friendly field aids provided 
here, Incident Commanders (IC’s) 
can get maximum use of weather 
information. 
The first of the reproducible field 
aids, the Supplemental Observation 
Sheet (see sample on page 73), can 
assist in using the “Mobile Fire-
Weather Observer’s Record” provid­
ed in every field belt weather kit. 
The Supplemental Observation 
Sheet can prompt a fire weather 
observer to take notice of impor­
tant weather phenomena that may 
affect fire behavior. This informa­
tion can be recorded in the 
“Characteristics and Comments” 
section of the observation form and 
passed on to the IC and the fire 
weather forecaster. 
The second field aid—the Weather 
Evaluation Sheet (see sample on 
page 73)—will lead an IC through a 
series of questions designed to 
increase understanding of current 
When this article was originally published, 
Chris Cuoco was a warning coordination 
meteorologist for the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, National Weather Service, 
Flagstaff, AZ; and Jim Barnett was the 
regional dispatcher for the USDA Forest 
Service, Rocky Mountain Area Interagency 
Fire Coordination Center; Broomfield, CO. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 
56(1) [Winter 1996]: 20–24. 
The two most critical factors in acquiring weather
 
forecasts during an incident are communications
 
and time.
 
weather conditions. With it, the IC 
will be able to evaluate the accura­
cy of a fire weather forecast and 
determine the effect of current and 
forecasted weather conditions on 
fire behavior and firefighting opera­
tions. 
Planning for Efficient
Communications 
The two most critical factors in 
acquiring weather forecasts during 
an incident are communications 
and time. Typically, dispatchers and 
IC’s communicate via radio. 
However, radio frequencies often 
become overloaded and subse­
quently slow down or eliminate 
requests for updated weather infor­
mation. In addition, taking a 
weather observation, relaying the 
data, and preparing and transmit­
ting a fire weather forecast all take 
valuable time. 
To make communications more 
efficient and effective, we suggest 
the designated individuals below 
assume the responsibilities follow­
ing their job titles: 
IC’s: 
•  Develop fire weather and fire 
behavior interpretation skills. 
•  Practice taking observations 
using techniques recommended 
in the Intermediate Wildland 
Fire Behavior course (S–290). 
•  Become familiar with Remote 
Automated Weather Stations 
(RAWS) and other real-time 
weather information sources in 
their area and become proficient 
in the means to obtain the data. 
They should seek out this infor­
mation when fighting fire out­
side their home territory.** 
Dispatchers: 
• Become sufficiently trained to 
understand and communicate 
** The local NWS Fire Weather Operating Plan 
(OPLAN) is a good resource for weather observations. 
The OPLAN will list RAWS sites, locations, elevations, 
and ID numbers. 
Original editor’s note:  Chris Cuoco was the National Weather Service 
(NWS) Colorado Fire Weather program manager throughout the severe 
fire season of 1994. The U.S. Department of Commerce recently pre­
sented him the Silver Medal Award for the fire weather forecasts and 
Red Flag Warnings he issued before, during, and after the tragic South 
Canyon Fire on July 6, 1994. He accepted the award in the names and 
memory of the 14 firefighters who died while fighting the South 
Canyon Fire. It is his hope that the information presented here will in 
some way help prevent such a tragedy from ever happening again. 
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Supplemental Observation Sheet 

In addition to the items specifically requested on the Spot Weather Observation Form found in the belt weather kit, 
the following should be observed. Circle or fill in appropriate items and communicate this information to the weather forecaster. 
Cloud Observations 
Cloud cover percentage  Cumulus development  Key cloud indicators  Possible consequences 
Clear (0-10% cover)  Small cumulus  Towering cumulus*  Erratic winds 
Scattered (11-50% cover)  Towering cumulus*  Cumulonimbus*  Erratic winds/thunderstorms 
Broken (51-90% cover)  Cumulonimbus (anvil)*  Horsetail cirrus  Frontal approach (24-72 h) 
Overcast (91-100% cover)  Direction(s)_________  Milky sky  Frontal approach (24-72 h) 
Fog  Distance__________  Lenticular clouds  Increasing winds 
Other Important Weather Observations  Local Terrain Factors 
Inversion break  Time__________  Fuel types_______________________ 
General wind shift  Time__________  New direction__________  Canyons (chimneys, chutes) 
Upslope/downslope wind shift  Time__________  New direction__________  Steep slopes 
Upvalley/downvalley wind shift  Time__________  New direction__________  Large body of water nearby or snowpack 
Smoke dispersal: Rapid* Moderate Slow  Direction______________ 
Dust devils* 
Additional comments 
*May indicate instability which may cause erratic fire behavior. 
Weather Evaluation Sheet 
1. Do you have the current Fire Weather Zone Forecast for your area? 
NO > Call dispatch. Request a forecast. 
YES > Evaluate forecast for your area and current weather conditions. 
Call for Spot Forecast > If information is incomplete or if the zone forecast is not representative of conditions on the incident. 
2. Evaluating the Spot Forecast:  Answer the questions in the first two columns. Use the third column to relate fire weather and fire behavior to 
firefighting strategy and tactics. Note that one weather parameter out of criteria may not require an updated forecast; it could be offset by other 
weather measurements or fuel conditions. 
Instability  Winds, temps, RH  Relating weather to fire behavior 
1.  Cumulus cloud development 
____ More development than forecasted 
(more unstable)? 
____ Less development than forecasted 
(more stable)? 
2.  Smoke column characteristics 
____ Higher column than expected (more 
unstable)? 
____  Lower column than expected? 
(more stable)? 
3.  Conditions appear more unstable than 
forecasted? 
____ NO 
____ YES > Consider new forecast. 
Cloud cover compared to forecast. 
____More ____Same  ____Less 
Wind speed within 5 mph of forecast? 
____ YES ____ NO > Consider new forecast. 
Does observed wind direction fit the terrain? 
____ YES ____ NO > Consider new forecast. 
Is the wind direction as forecast? 
____ YES ____ NO > Consider new forecast. 
Temp within 5 degrees of forecast? 
____ YES ____ NO > Consider new forecast. 
RH within 5% of forecast? 
____ YES ____ NO > Consider new forecast. 
1.  How will the observed and forecasted 
weather affect fire behavior? 
2.  Are current strategy and tactics 
appropriate for observed and predicted 
fire behavior? 
3.  Do we need to change strategy and 
tactics to fight this fire safely? 
Request a new Spot Forecast if you believe 
fire weather and fire behavior conditions 
require a change in tactics. 
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73 weather information as rapidly as  IC’s should try to obtain a copy of the entire fire 
possible.  weather zone forecast package or have the 
dispatcher read the applicable zone forecast over Fire Management Officers 
the radio. (FMO’s): 
• Develop coaching and prompting 
techniques to assist less experi­
enced field personnel. 
FMO’s and Dispatchers: 
• Establish primary and backup 
radio frequencies early each fire 
season. 
• Establish a rapid process for pass­
ing weather information between 
the field and the forecaster (e.g., 
with radio, phone, cellular 
phone,* fax, computer). 
• Develop guidelines for broadcast­
ing fire weather forecasts, Fire 
Weather Watches, Red Flag 
Warnings, pertinent special 
weather announcements, and key 
National Fire-Danger Rating 
System (NFDRS) data. 
• Develop a “confirmation of 
receipt” process for routine fire 
weather forecasts and for critical 
fire weather information. 
• Establish a fire-danger tracking 
system for each dominant fuel 
type in the area. (Such a system 
will aid in determining trends 
and danger levels.) 
Evaluating the Fire
Weather Zone 
Forecast 
NWS fire weather offices produce 
fire weather zone forecasts twice a 
day and update as needed. The zone 
forecast provides weather informa­
tion for relatively large areas. While 
the most important purpose of the 
zone forecast is to issue and explain 
Fire Weather Watches and Red Flag 
Warnings, it also: 
* Cellular phones can be especially useful because they 
allow direct communication from the field to the weath­
er forecaster. 
• Discusses the weather situation 
and general forecasts for geo­
graphic and topographic zones in 
the issuing office’s area. 
• Includes predictions of upper 
level winds and smoke dispersal, 
and provides extended weather 
outlooks. 
•P rovides an overall understand­
ing of forecasted weather and the 
meteorological features causing 
the weather. 
Note:  The zone forecast may be too 
general to apply to some initial and 
extended attack scenarios. 
Warning and Watch
Headlines 
Red Flag Warnings and Fire 
Weather Watches are “highlighted” 
with headlines preceding the fore­
cast discussion and each applicable 
zone forecast. (The conditions war­
ranting a Red Flag Warning or Fire 
Weather Watch are explained in 
detail within the weather discus­
sion.) These headlines: 
•  Announce critical fire weather 
conditions that need to be com­
municated to the field complete­
ly and accurately in all wildland 
firefighting situations. 
•  Highlight significant weather 
conditions that do not meet the 
warning or watch criteria but 
may require the IC’s heightened 
awareness. 
IC’s should try to obtain a copy of 
the entire fire weather zone fore­
cast package or have the dispatcher 
read the applicable zone forecast 
over the radio. If receiving the 
information by radio, IC’s should 
ask the dispatcher to read all head­
lines in their zone and in the dis­
cussion section of the forecast 
package. After reading or hearing 
the zone forecast, the IC should ask 
these questions: 
• Do I have a complete picture of 
the weather situation? 
• Do I feel comfortable with my 
knowledge about the general 
weather pattern (i.e., pressure 
systems, cold fronts, general wind 
patterns)? 
• Do I understand the predicted 
fire weather for my area? 
• Do the predicted conditions make 
sense for my incident? 
If the IC discovers that the infor­
mation is incomplete or if the zone 
forecast is not representative of 
conditions on the incident, the IC 
should consider requesting a Spot 
Forecast. 
Information To Provide 
the Forecaster 
During initial or extended attack, 
detailed site-specific weather obser­
vations can greatly improve weath­
er forecast accuracy. To enhance 
the information provided to the 
weather forecaster, we recommend 
observations be taken: 
• At the same times each day. 
(These will reveal trends of tem­
perature, humidity, and winds on 
the incident.) 
•A cross the range of elevations 
and aspects of the incident, if 
possible. 
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• At key (local) times of day: 
– 0600–0800 for lowest tempera­
ture and highest relative 
humidity (RH). 
– 1500–1700 for high tempera­
ture, low humidity, and 
strongest diurnal winds. 
The IC should also provide the fore­
caster with observations at various 
times of day to report such other 
data as: 
• The time the morning inversion 
broke. 
• Diurnal wind shifts and the time 
they occurred. 
• Cumulus cloud growth and thun­
derstorm development. 
•P recipitation. 
• Cloud cover. 
During an extended attack, appoint­
ing a dedicated weather lookout or 
field observer to take observations 
each hour is ideal. Observations 
from one well-trained individual 
will be consistent and will ensure 
that quality weather observations 
are provided to the IC and the 
weather forecaster throughout the 
course of the incident. 
What Should Be Done 
With Weather 
Observations? 
The IC should pass all fire weather 
observations to the fire weather 
forecaster. An observation from the 
fire site should be included with 
every Spot Forecast request. If the 
firefighting effort continues into a 
second or third burning period, we 
recommend all observations taken 
during the previous burning period 
be included with the next Spot 
Forecast request. 
A quality weather observation pro­
gram will also provide the IC with 
critical information for input into 
tactical firefighting decisions. With 
this onsite information, the IC can 
compare the observed weather to 
the weather forecast and then 
develop a fire behavior prediction. 
The key consideration for the IC: 
always make the connection 
between observed and forecasted 
weather and observed and forecast-
ed fire behavior. 
Optimizing the
Spot Forecast 
The requestor has plenty of input 
into the Spot Forecast provided by 
the fire weather forecaster. IC’s 
During an extended 
attack, appointing a 
dedicated weather 
lookout or field observer 
to take observations 
each hour is ideal. 
should attempt to anticipate the 
kinds of information they will need 
and request that information. The 
typical Spot Forecast includes: 
•A  weather discussion, 
• Forecasts of sky condition, 
• The chance of precipitation, 
• High and low temperature and 
RH, 
•W inds at eye level or 20 feet (6.1 
m) above ground, and 
• Smoke dispersal. 
IC’s can request more detailed 
information when needed such as: 
•A  forecast of temperature, humid­
ity, and wind at 2- to 3-hour 
intervals. 
•A  forecast for a single element, 
such as the 20-foot (6.1-m) wind, 
at 2- to 3-hour intervals. 
•A  prediction of the time of high­
est temperature and lowest RH. 
The forecaster will let the IC know 
if more information is being 
requested than the forecaster’s 
workload will allow or if the 
request is beyond the limits of the 
science of weather forecasting. 
Monitoring the
Weather and 
Evaluating a Forecast 
IC’s can evaluate a forecast and 
decide when a new forecast is need­
ed by monitoring—through meas­
urement and visual indicators—the 
atmospheric instability, winds, tem­
perature, and RH. 
Monitoring Instability.  A highly 
unstable atmosphere is a primary 
cause of radical fire behavior. 
Strong instability can create erratic 
winds and can greatly enhance fire 
growth. Cumulus cloud develop­
ment and smoke column character­
istics can be used as visual indica­
tors of atmospheric instability. The 
fire weather forecast should provide 
IC’s with the predicted cumulus 
development and instability condi­
tions from which smoke column 
behavior can be estimated. 
Atmospheric conditions are more 
unstable than predicted when: 
1. Cumulus clouds develop sooner 
and to greater heights than 
expected.* 
2. The smoke column rises faster 
and to greater heights than 
expected. 
Conditions are more stable than 
predicted when: 
1. Cumulus clouds develop later 
and/or to lesser heights than 
expected. 
* Cumulus clouds may be more developed or cover a 
larger area if there is more moisture available in the 
atmosphere, but the instability may not differ from the 
forecast. Fewer cumulus clouds or less vertical develop­
ment may mean drier conditions than expected. 
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as rapidly or as high as expected, 
or it does not develop at all. 
When evaluating atmospheric 
instability, the IC should ask these 
questions: 
• Does the atmosphere appear 
more unstable than expected? 
• If so, do we need to relay this 
information to the weather fore­
caster and ask for a new Spot 
Forecast? 
• How will greater instability affect 
fire behavior? 
When IC’s believe the observed 
instability conditions may signifi­
cantly increase fire behavior, they 
should strongly consider requesting 
a new Spot Forecast. 
Monitoring the Winds.  Wind 
observations taken every hour will 
yield important information about 
daily wind shifts and the strength 
of valley breezes at differing eleva­
tions. Accurate wind observations 
will record the true character of 
local slope and valley breezes. Many 
factors can influence the develop­
ment of local winds, but cloudiness 
is one of the most important and 
easiest to evaluate. Cloudiness over 
a site will affect surface heating and 
the shift in slope and valley breezes. 
When examining the cloudiness at 
the fire site, the IC should ask this 
question: Is there more or less 
cloud cover than forecasted? Based 
on the answer, the IC can draw 
some general conclusions: 
• More clouds than predicted will 
delay the shift to upslope and 
upvalley winds and often result in 
lower wind speeds. 
• Less cloud cover than predicted 
will cause an earlier shift to ups­
lope and upvalley winds, with 
stronger wind speeds and gustier 
conditions possible. 
The IC should consider requesting 
a new Spot Forecast if the shift to 
upslope and upvalley winds is 
delayed by more than 1 hour or if 
the wind speed varies from the 
forecast by 5 mph (8 km/h) or 
more. 
When considering the wind direc­
tion, the IC should always be suspi­
cious of any wind from a different 
The key consideration 
for the IC: always make 
the connection between 
observed and 
forecasted weather and 
observed and 
forecasted fire behavior. 
direction than the terrain would be 
expected to produce. The question 
to ask: Does the wind direction fit 
this terrain? If winds run counter 
to the normal slope and valley 
breezes and these winds were not 
predicted, there may have been a 
drastic change in weather condi­
tions. The IC should consider 
requesting a new Spot Forecast. 
Monitoring Temperature and RH. 
If an observer is available, we rec­
ommend monitoring the tempera­
ture and RH by plotting the fore­
cast temperatures and RH on graph 
paper every 2 to.3 hours, then com­
paring these plots to the observed 
data. (This procedure assumes the 
IC requested predictions of temper­
ature and RH every 2 to 3 hours.) 
An alternative would be to request 
a temperature and humidity fore­
cast for a key decisionmaking time, 
i.e., 1200 or 1300. The IC would 
determine how accurate the fore­
cast is by comparing the forecasted 
and observed data for that hour. 
Temperature and RH are strongly 
influenced by cloud cover. Often, 
small differences between observed 
and forecasted temperature and RH 
can be accounted for by observing 
cloudiness. A 30-percent difference 
in cloud cover may lead to a 1- to 
3-degree Fahrenheit (about 1 
degree Celsius) difference in tem­
perature and a 2- to 4-percent dif­
ference in RH. The questions to 
ask: 
•  Is the observed temperature 
within 5 degrees of the forecast-
ed temperature? 
•  Is the observed RH within 5 per­
cent of the forecasted RH? 
The IC should consider requesting 
a new Spot Forecast if the actual 
temperature differs from the fore­
cast by 5 degrees or more and/or 
the actual RH differs from the fore­
cast by more than 5 percent. 
Note:  When comparing observed 
and forecasted temperature and 
humidity, be certain to take into 
account the effect that aspect, 
cloud cover, sheltering, and eleva­
tion will have on the observed val­
ues. The ideal for comparative pur­
poses would be to take observations 
from the same location exactly 
throughout the course of the inci­
dent. 
Conclusion 
As we have stressed, throughout 
the incident, the IC should commu­
nicate as much information as pos­
sible to the fire weather forecaster. 
As time permits, the IC should give 
the forecaster quality feedback on 
forecast accuracy, observed weather 
conditions, and fire behavior. 
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We have summarized the recom- When IC’s believe the observed instability 
mendations presented here in the  conditions may significantly increase fire behavior, 
Supplemental Observation Sheet  they should strongly consider requesting a new and the Weather Evaluation Sheet.
 
We recommend these two field aids  Spot Forecast.
 
be reproduced and carried to the 
field to be used with the “Mobile 
Fire-Weather Observer’s Record.” 
When using the evaluation sheet, 
please keep in mind that a single 
weather element determined to be 
outside the criteria mentioned 
above may not require a request for 
a new Spot Forecast. A weather ele­
ment outside the stated criteria 
may be offset by fuel conditions or 
other weather measurements. The 
IC needs to consider what effect the 
overall weather conditions will have 
on fire behavior and firefighting 
tactics. 
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Fooling Yourself About Feedback:  Failing to interpret the evidence from
 
past outcomes for what it really says, either because you are protecting
 
your ego or because you are tricked by hindsight.*
 
* See page 9. 
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BEYOND THE SAFETY ZONE: 
CREATING A MARGIN OF SAFETY* 
Mark Beighley 
W 
ildland firefighting is 
fraught with hazards. When 
firefighters encounter those 
hazards, they are at risk—risk of 
injury, risk of death. To guarantee 
safety while wildfires are sup­
pressed, humans would have to 
stop being involved in firefighting. 
In most cases, this is not an option. 
We need firefighters to save lives, 
protect communities, and reduce 
damage to natural resources. Yet 
the question remains—how can 
firefighters suppress wildfires effi­
ciently without jeopardizing their 
own lives? 
Firefighters Have
Alternatives 
Firefighters must consider current 
and future weather and burning 
conditions and the effect they have 
on how, what, and where the fire is 
expected to burn before making 
decisions about the best suppres­
sion strategy to use. For any given 
suppression operation, firefighters 
can choose from a variety of strate­
gic and tactical alternatives. Some 
alternatives maximize the effective­
ness of the suppression effort, and 
some maximize firefighter safety. 
Sometimes the most effective sup­
pression action is also the safest, 
but generally there is a tradeoff 
between the two. Firefighters must 
always evaluate the risks before 
When this article was originally published, 
Mark Beighley was a team leader for 
Resource Operations, USDA Forest Service, 
Deschutes National Forest, Bend and Fort 
Rock Ranger Districts, Bend, OR. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 
55(4) [Fall 1995]: 21–24. 
selecting a course of action. They 
may have as little as a few minutes 
to conduct this risk analysis on 
fast-spreading fires. On fires that 
have not developed to their full, 
explosive fury, firefighters may have 
as much as several hours to analyze 
their risk and decide what to do to 
maximize suppression effectiveness. 
No matter what course of action 
firefighters choose, their decisions 
are not usually final because they 
must base their decisions on infor­
mation that is incomplete. In addi­
tion, information deteriorates 
quickly with time. 
Safety Zones 
A basic element of fire suppression 
safety is a safety zone, a place 
where firefighters are free from 
danger, risk, or injury. It is vital 
that firefighters know where and 
how to get to areas that provide a 
safe refuge when they analyze risk. 
In any given tactical operation, fire­
fighters must identify or create 
safety zones and “escape routes” 
that provide access to them. For 
operational assignments that 
require extensive and lengthy fire-
line construction, firefighters must 
develop a network of safety zones 
and escape routes. How is this net­
work designed? What factors should 
be considered? 
The safety zone and escape route network must 
be an integral part of tactical fireline operations, 
not added as an afterthought or after a fireline is 
constructed. 
The safety zone and escape route 
network must be an integral part of 
tactical fireline operations, not 
added as an afterthought or after a 
fireline is constructed. All fireline 
construction should start from a 
safe anchor point. As fireline con­
struction proceeds from that safe 
point, safety zones are identified or 
constructed along the way. Any 
time firefighters venture beyond 
the safety zones, they are at risk. As 
the distance between the firefighter 
and the safety zone increases, so 
does the risk of entrapment or 
burnover. 
Risk Threshold 
At some distance from the safety 
zone, firefighters begin to feel 
uncomfortable about their position. 
This discomfort may result from 
increased fire activity or the threat 
of increased fire activity. They real­
ize that there may be insufficient 
time to successfully retreat to the 
safety zone should the need arise. 
They have reached their risk 
threshold—that point at which the 
level of risk is too high. To reduce 
the level of risk, firefighters must 
then reduce the distance to a previ­
ous safety zone or locate or create a 
new safety zone. 
The risk threshold for all firefight­
ers is different. Every firefighter 
possesses a different combination of 
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which to evaluate the relative safety  thresholds, they always have a degree of
of the current situation. Fire- uncertainty because of inadequate or deteriorating  fighters may also have different 
information. information regarding local factors 
that might affect fire behavior. 
There is an assumption that veter­
an firefighters have well-defined, 
accurate risk thresholds. Also, it is 
assumed that these risk thresholds 
can be depended upon to provide a 
consistent and appropriate assess­
ment of safety for any given tactical 
fireline operation. But even if fire­
fighters have developed accurate 
risk thresholds, they always have a 
degree of uncertainty because of 
inadequate or deteriorating infor­
mation. Because conditions on a 
fire seldom stay constant for more 
than a few hours and can change 
quite rapidly, a constant supply of 
information is an important facet of 
the risk assessment process. 
When Safe Becomes 
Unsafe 
Risk threshold applications are, for­
tunately, rarely tested. Even when 
firefighters are uncomfortable with 
their position, the fire does not 
always test the situation. Feedback 
on risk threshold is infrequent; 
therefore the accuracy of a fire­
fighter’s risk threshold is often 
unknown. Even under the best of 
circumstances, the most experi­
enced and knowledgeable firefight­
ers are plagued with imperfections 
inherent in the human condition. 
Inattention, distraction, fatigue, 
attitude, boredom, information 
overload, mind set, and carbon 
monoxide poisoning can all work to 
erode the judgment of the most 
vigilant of firefighters. 
Safe becomes unsafe when the fire 
has the potential to get to the fire­
fighter before the firefighter can 
get to a safety zone. That philo­
sophical break-even point is the 
line between safe and unsafe fire-
line operations. The firefighter 
must constantly evaluate where 
that line is and how close he or she 
is to it, given the current situation. 
Uncertainty is always present. Risk 
threshold is not measurable, there­
fore not quantifiable. Firefighters 
cannot measure how close they are 
to an unsafe situation. Only the fire 
can provide feedback to the accura­
cy of their risk threshold. 
Quantifying Fireline
Safety 
Without the ability to measure the 
safety of their position, firefighters 
will not consistently know when a 
safe situation becomes unsafe. 
What is safe in the morning could 
become unsafe in the afternoon. 
What is safe about their current 
position could become unsafe as 
they continue to build fireline. 
In order to assure safe fireline oper­
ations, firefighters need processes 
to evaluate fireline safety that are 
measurable, consistent, and trans­
ferable. When they can measure 
how safe they are, firefighters can 
repeat that safety measurement and 
communicate it to others. They will 
be able to describe what is safe and 
unsafe and evaluate the safety of 
their current and planned actions. 
Two distance and time relationships 
must be evaluated by firefighters 
before they can determine how safe 
they are. The first is the distance 
between the fire and the safety zone 
and the time (T1) it would take the 
fire to spread to the safety zone. 
The second is the distance between 
the firefighter and the closest safety 
zone and the time (T2) it would 
take for the firefighter to retreat to 
it. Knowing these two times will 
allow the firefighter to determine 
where the line between a safe and 
unsafe operation exists. For exam­
ple, in figure 1, the firefighters esti­
mate that it will take 18 minutes 
(T1) for the fire to reach the safety 
zone and 12 minutes (T2) for them 
to reach the zone. 
Creating a Margin of
Safety 
A margin of safety can be described 
as a cushion of time in excess of 
the time needed by the firefighters 
to get to the safety zone before the 
fire gets to them. It is the positive 
difference of T1 – T2. In figure 1, 
the difference is 6 minutes (18 
minutes – 12 minutes), so the fire­
fighters are in a safe position. If T1 
= T2 as in figure 2, the difference is 
0 and the fire and firefighters arrive 
at the safety zone at approximately 
the same time. Obviously, this situ­
ation would not benefit the fire­
fighters; the fire may block their 
planned escape route. At best, they 
would experience a very close call, 
so they need to evaluate their mar­
gin of safety for escape or build a 
new safety zone. 
If the difference is less than 0 as in 
figure 3 (T1 is 12 minutes and T2 is 
15 minutes equaling –3 minutes), 
then it is likely that the fire will 
reach the firefighters before they 
get to the safety zone. While we 
would hope that firefighters would 
deploy fire shelters and survive the 
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Figure 1—T1 is estimated at 18 minutes—the time it would take a fire to reach safety 
zone 3 (SZ3). T2—the time it would take a firefighter to reach SZ3—is tested at 12 min­
utes. A 6-minute margin of safety exists, and firefighters are in a safe position. 
Figure 2—It is estimated that the fire will reach safety zone 4 (SZ4) 20 minutes after it 
begins to run—T1 on the map. The time it would take a firefighter to reach SZ4 is the 
same (T2 = 20 minutes). There is no margin of safety. 
fireline operations, 
firefighters need 
processes to evaluate 
fireline safety that are 
measurable, consistent, 
and transferable. 
fire, for a margin of safety, firefight­
ers must arrive at the safety zone 
before the fire. T2 must be less 
than T1. In this example, the fire­
fighters need to locate or construct 
a closer safety zone, abandon their 
suppression effort, or the fire 
behavior characteristics need to 
change. In short, the greater the 
positive difference between T1 and 
T2, the greater the margin of safety. 
Firefighters should increase their 
margin of safety when there is an 
increase in uncertainty. Uncertainty 
can come from many situations. 
Firefighters can be uncertain about 
future weather conditions, a specif­
ic fire location, expected fire behav­
ior in local fuel types, their own 
and others’ physical ability, and the 
effectiveness of control actions on 
adjacent divisions or other fires in 
the immediate area. Firefighters 
must consider these variables when 
managing a margin of safety. There 
should never be any uncertainty 
about the location of safety zones 
and escape routes, the adequacy of 
communications, or the posting of 
lookouts. 
Knowing When “Safe”
Becomes “Unsafe” 
Firefighters can use the T1 and T2 
concept to provide a measurable, 
consistent, and transferable process 
to assess their margin of safety. 
This will enhance the value of 
L.C.E.S. applications—Lookouts, 
Communications, Escape Routes, 
and Safety Zones. Firefighters will 
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Fire Management Today Figure 3—T1—the time for the fire to reach safety zone 5 (SZ5)—is estimated at 12 min­
utes after the fire run begins. T2—the time it would take a firefighter to reach SZ5—is 
tested at 15 minutes, an unsafe situation. 
There should never be 
any uncertainty about 
the location of safety 
zones and escape 
routes, the adequacy of 
communications, or the 
posting of lookouts. 
be able to identify when “safe” will 
become “unsafe” and communicate 
that to all affected personnel. They 
will know when to look for new 
safety zones and when escape route 
travel times are too long. 
For large fire operational planning, 
this assessment can be conducted 
prior to committing firefighters to 
a fireline assignment. Safety zone 
and escape route requirements can 
be identified in the Incident Action 
Plan. A network of safety zones and 
escape routes can then be devel­
oped in conjunction with fireline 
construction. Firefighters will be 
able to create and maintain a mar­
gin of safety when they are beyond 
the safety zone.  ■ 
Russo and Schoemaker (1989) Decision Trap 9—Not Keeping Track: 
Assuming that experience will make its lessons available automatically, 
and therefore failing to keep systematic records to track the results of 
your decisions and failing to analyze these results in ways that reveal 
their key lessons.* 
* See page 9. 
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FIREFIGHTER SAFETY ZONES: 

HOW BIG IS BIG ENOUGH?*
 
Bret W. Butler and Jack D. Cohen 
A
ll wildland firefighters working 
on or near the fireline must be 
able to identify a safety zone. 
Furthermore, they need to know 
how “big” is “big enough.” 
Beighley (1995) defined a safety 
zone as “an area distinguished by 
characteristics that provide free­
dom from danger, risk, or injury.” 
The National Wildfire Coordinating 
Group proposed that a safety zone 
be defined as “a preplanned area of 
sufficient size and suitable location 
that is expected to prevent injury to 
fire personnel from known hazards 
without using fire shelters” 
(USDA/USDI 1995). 
In our study of wildland firefighter 
safety zones, we focused on radiant 
heating only. In “real” wildland 
fires, convective energy transport in 
the form of gusts, fire whirls, or 
turbulence could contribute signifi­
cantly to the total energy received 
by a firefighter. However, convec­
tion is subject to buoyant forces 
and turbulent mixing, both of 
which suggest that convective heat­
ing is important only when a fire­
fighter is relatively close to the fire. 
One reason that firefighters in 
potential entrapment situations are 
told to lie face down on the ground 
is to minimize their exposure to 
convective heating. We hope to 
When this article was originally published, 
Bret Butler and Jack Cohen were research 
scientists for the USDA Forest Service, Fire 
Behavior Research Unit, Rocky Mountain 
Research Station, Intermountain Fire 
Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 
58(1) [Winter 1998]: 13–16. 
How much heat can 
humans endure before 
injury occurs? 
define more clearly the relationship 
between convective heating and 
safety zone size in future work. 
What Do We Know? 
Two questions are important when 
specifying safety zone size: 
1. What is the radiant energy distri­
bution in front of a flame? and 
2. How much heat can humans 
endure before injury occurs? 
Concerning the first question, 
Fogarty (1996) and Tassios and 
Packham (1984) related the energy 
received by a firefighter to fireline 
intensity and distance from the 
flame front. Green and Schimke 
(1971) presented very specific infor­
mation about fuel break construc­
tion on slopes and ridges in the 
Sierra Nevada mixed-conifer forest 
type. Others have discussed the per­
formance of fire shelters under dif­
ferent heating regimes (for exam­
ple, King and Walker 1964; Jukkala 
and Putnam 1986; Knight 1988). As 
one would expect, there is not 
much information related to the 
second question. The available 
information suggests that 0.2 
Btu/ft
2/s (2.3 kW/m
2) is the upper 
limit that can be sustained without 
injury for a short time (Stoll and 
Greene 1959; Behnke 1982). 
Studies by Braun and others (1980) 
suggest that when a single layer of 
6.3 oz/yd
2 (210 g/m
2) Nomex cloth 
is worn, second degree burns will 
occur after 90 seconds when a fire­
fighter is subjected to radiant fluxes 
greater than 0.6 Btu/ft
2/s (7 kW/m
2). 
The Nomex shirts and trousers cur­
rently used by wildland firefighters 
have fabric weights of 5.7 and 8.5 
oz/yd
2 (190 and 280 g/m
2), respec­
tively. Few studies, however, have 
explored relationships between 
flame height and the safety zone 
size necessary to prevent burn 
injury. 
Theory Versus Reality 
We formulated a theoretical model 
to predict the net radiant energy 
arriving at the firefighter wearing 
Nomex clothing as a function of 
flame height and distance from the 
flame (Butler and Cohen 1998). 
Figure 1 displays the results. 
The amount of radiant energy 
arriving at the firefighter depends 
both on the distance between the 
firefighter and the flame and on the 
flame height. The information 
shown suggests that in most cases 
safety zones must be relatively 
large to prevent burn injury. 
We compared safety zone sizes pre­
dicted by our model against those 
reported on four wildfires: the 
Mann Gulch Fire, the Battlement 
Creek Fire, the Butte Fire, and the 
South Canyon Fire. 
The Mann Gulch Fire overran 16 
firefighters on August 5, 1949. Wag 
Dodge, one of only three survivors, 
lit a fire and then lay face down in 
the burned-out area as the main 
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Gulch Fire occurred in an open  firefighter depends both on the distance between
stand of scattered, mature pon­ the firefighter and the flame and on the flame derosa pine (60 to 100+ years old)
 
with a grass understory. Flame  height.
 
heights of 10 to 40 feet (3–12 m) 
were estimated to have occurred at 
the time of entrapment. Rothermel 
(1993) indicates that Dodge’s fire 
burned about 300 feet (92 m) 
before the main fire overran it. 
Assuming an elliptical shape for the 
burned area, with its width approxi­
mately half the length, the safety 
zone created by Dodge’s escaped 
fire would have been about 150 feet 
(46 m) wide. Figure 1 indicates that 
the safety zone needed to be large 
enough to separate the firefighters 
and flames by 90 to 150 feet (27 to 
46 m) or approximately the same 
width as the area created by 
Dodge’s fire. 
The Battlement Creek Fire oc­
curred in western Colorado during 
July of 1976 (USDI 1976). The fire 
burned on steep slopes covered 
with 6- to 12-foot- (2- to 4-m-) 
high Gambel oak. Flames were esti­
mated at 20 to 30 feet (6–9 m) 
above the canopy. Four firefighters 
were cut off from their designated 
safety zone. When the fire overran 
them, they were lying face down on 
the ground without fire shelters in 
a 25-foot- (8-m-) wide clearing near 
the top of a ridge. Tragically, only 
one of the four survived, and he 
suffered severe burns over most of 
Figure 1—Lines represent predicted radiant energy arriving at the firefighter as a func­
tion of flame height and distance from the flame. It is assumed that the firefighter is 
wearing fire-retardant clothing and protective head and neck equipment. The heavy shad­
ed line represents the burn injury threshold of 0.6 Btu/ft
2/s (7 kW/m
2). The heavy solid 
black line indicates the rule of thumb for the size of the safety zone. 
his body. Figure 1 suggests that for 
this fire, the safety zone should 
have been large enough to separate 
firefighters from flames by 150 feet 
(46 m). Clearly, the 25-foot- (8-m-) 
wide clearing did not qualify as a 
safety zone. 
Flame heights were reported to be 
200 to 300 feet (62 to 92 m) high 
on the Butte Fire that burned on 
steep slopes covered with mature 
lodgepole pine and Douglas-fir dur­
ing August of 1985 (Mutch and 
Rothermel 1986). Figure 1 indi­
cates that a cleared area greater 
than 1,200 feet (370 m) across 
would have been needed to prevent 
injury to the firefighters standing 
in its center. In fact, safety zones 
300 to 400 feet (92 to 123 m) in 
diameter were prepared (Mutch and 
Rothermel 1986). This diameter 
was not sufficiently large enough to 
meet the definition of a safety zone, 
as indicated by the fact that 73 fire­
fighters had to deploy in fire shel­
ters to escape the radiant heat. As 
the fire burned around the edges of 
the deployment zone, the intense 
heat forced the firefighters to crawl 
while inside their shelters to the 
opposite side of the clearing. 
On July 2, 1994, the South Canyon 
Fire was ignited by a lightning 
strike to a ridgetop in western 
Colorado. During the afternoon of 
July 6, the South Canyon Fire 
“blew up,” burning across the pre­
dominately Gambel-oak-covered 
slopes with 50- to 90-foot- (15- to 
28-m-) tall flames (South Canyon 
Fire Accident Investigation Team 
1994). Tragically, 14 firefighters 
were overrun by the fire and died 
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while attempting to deploy their 
fire shelters. Twelve of the firefight­
ers died along a 10- to 12-foot- (3­
to 4-m-) wide fireline on a 55-per­
cent slope, the other two in a steep 
narrow gully. Eight other firefight­
ers deployed their fire shelters in a 
burned out area approximately 150 
feet (46 m) wide. They remained in 
their shelters during three separate 
crown fire runs that occurred 450 
feet (138 m) away from them; none 
of these eight firefighters was 
injured (Petrilli 1996). One fire­
fighter estimates that air tempera­
tures inside the shelters reached 
115 °F (46 °C) and remembers 
smoke and glowing embers enter­
ing the fire shelters during the 
crown fire runs. Survivors felt they 
were far enough from the flames 
that survival with minor injuries 
would have been possible without 
the protection of a fire shelter 
(Petrilli 1996). A firefighter who did 
not deploy in a shelter but 
remained on a narrow ridge below 
the eight firefighters during the 
“blowup” experienced no injuries 
(South Canyon Fire Accident 
Investigation Team 1994). Figure 1 
suggests that in this situation, the 
safety zone must be large enough 
to separate the firefighters and 
flames by 250 to 350 feet (77–115 
m). 
A general rule of thumb can be 
derived from figure 1 by approxi­
mating the injury limit with a 
straight line. After doing so, it 
appears that a safety zone should be 
large enough that the distance 
between the firefighters and flames 
is at least four times the maximum 
flame height. In some instances 
such as the Mann Gulch, Battle­
ment Creek, and Butte Fires, the 
fire may burn completely around 
the safety zone. In such fires, the 
separation distance suggested in 
figure 1 is the radius of the safety 
A safety zone should be 
large enough that the 
distance between the 
firefighters and flames 
is at least four times 
the maximum flame 
height. 
zone, meaning the safety zone 
diameter should be twice the value 
indicated. 
What About Fire 
Shelters? 
We calculated the net radiant ener­
gy transferred through a fire shel­
ter like those used by firefighters in 
the USDA Forest Service. The fire 
shelter is based on the concept that 
the surface will reflect the majority 
of the incoming radiant energy. An 
average emissivity for the alu­
minum-foil exterior of a fire shelter 
is 0.07, indicating that approxi­
mately 93 percent of the energy 
incident on a fire shelter is reflect­
ed away (Putnam 1991). Model pre­
dictions shown in figure 2 suggest 
that heat levels remain below the 
injury limits for deployment zones 
wider than 50 feet (15 m), even 
with 300-foot- (92-m-) tall flames. 
However, this model does not. 
account for convective heating that 
could significantly increase the 
total energy transfer to shelters 
deployed within a few flame lengths 
of the fire. 
Conclusions 
Radiant energy travels in the same 
form as visible light, that is, in the 
line of sight. Therefore, locating 
safety zones in areas that minimize 
firefighters’ exposure to flames will 
reduce the required safety zone 
size. For example, topographical 
features that act as radiative shields 
are the lee side of rocky outcrop­
pings, ridges and the tops of ridges, 
or peaks containing little or no 
flammable vegetation. Safety zone 
size is proportional to flame height. 
Therefore, any feature or action 
that reduces flame height will have 
a corresponding effect on the 
required safety zone size. Some 
Figure 2—Predicted radiant energy on a fire shelter as a function of distance between the 
fire shelter and flames, and flame height. The heavy shaded line represents the burn 
injury threshold for a firefighter inside a deployed fire shelter. 
84 
Fire Management Today  
examples are burnout operations 
that leave large “black” areas, thin­
ning operations that reduce fuel 
load, and retardant drops that 
decrease flame temperatures. 
We emphasize that while this study 
addresses the effects of radiant 
energy transfer, convection is not 
addressed. Convective energy trans­
fer from gusts, fire whirls, or tur­
bulence could significantly increase 
the total heat transfer to the fire­
fighter and thus the required safety 
zone size. Further work in this area 
is needed. 
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SAFETY ALERT: WATCH OUT
 
FOR AIRCRAFT TURBULENCE!*
 
Billy Bennett 
A
ircraft play a vital role in 
today’s fire control operations, 
carrying out such crucial mis­
sions as water and fire retardant 
drops. Yet turbulence from aircraft 
can sometimes contribute to erratic 
fire behavior, potentially endanger­
ing firefighters. As the National 
Wildfire Coordinating Group notes 
in a training publication for fire­
fighters, “The blasts of air from low 
flying helicopters and air tankers 
have been known to cause flare­
ups” (NWCG 1992). Those on the 
fireline should keep this potential 
hazard in mind, mentally adding it 
to their list of 18 Watch Out 
Situations. 
Incident Within an 
Incident 
A case in point occurred on July 11, 
1996, on the Broad Canyon Fire in 
central Utah. At about 3 p.m., a 
wind shift caused the fire to jump 
containment lines during a burn­
out operation. A Cat D–7 dozer and 
dozer boss began constructing line 
around the slopover, which was 
burning in brush and 15-foot (4.6­
m) juniper. 
A type 2 helicopter using a bucket 
with a 35-foot (10.7-m) line began 
making drops along the fire edge. 
When this article was first published, Billy 
Bennett was a law enforcement officer and 
fire management officer for the South 
Carolina Forestry Commission, Piedmont 
Region, Spartanburg, SC. In July 1996, he 
was the Staging/Initial Attack Safety 
Officer for the USDA Forest Service and 
USDI Bureau of Land Management in cen­
tral Utah. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 
58(4) [Fall 1998]: 20–21. 
When the helicopter approached 
the area near the dozer, the rotor 
downwash caused the fire to behave 
erratically, encircling the immedi­
ate area around the dozer and 
dozer boss with fire. The only 
escape was to push through the 
active fire into the safety zone of 
the black. As the dozer operator 
bladed through the fire, the dozer 
boss followed close behind, using 
the dozer as a heat shield. They 
managed to escape unharmed. 
Contributing Factors 
Several factors contributed to this 
near-tragic incident, including cir­
cumstances clearly identifiable as 
Watch Out Situations: 
•A vailable fuels were very dry and 
extremely volatile. 
Aircraft turbulence should be one of the unwritten
 
Watch Out Situations for firefighters to keep in
 
mind on the fireline.
 
•A  sudden wind shift had already 
caused the fire to jump contain­
ment lines. 
Watch Out Situations: 
#15  Wind increases and/or 
changes direction. 
#16  Getting frequent spot fires 
across line. 
• The incident occurred in a some­
what narrow part of the canyon, 
where topography might have 
influenced fire behavior. 
• When the helicopter pilot ap­
proached the slopover, he could 
not make radio contact with fire­
fighters on the ground. This 
caused a delay, because the pilot 
did not know specifically where 
to make the drop. 
Watch Out Situations: 
#5  Uninformed on strategy, 
tactics, and hazards. 
Resources assembling for the initial attack on the Broad Canyon Fire in central Utah, 
July 1996. Photo: Billy Bennett, South Carolina Forestry Commission, Spartanburg, SC, 
1996. 
86 
Fire Management Today #6  Instructions and assign­
ments not clear. 
#7  No communication link 
with crew members/super­
visor. 
• The airspeed of the helicopter as 
it approached the scene was 
about 46 miles per hour (74 
km/h), and altitude was less than 
200 feet (61 m) above ground 
level. Firefighters on the ground 
believe that this was too low 
under the conditions, and the 
pilot now concurs. 
• The helicopter was large enough 
to cause substantial rotor down-
wash (the larger the helicopter, 
the more rotor downwash to 
expect). 
If any of these contributing factors 
had been removed, the incident 
likely would not have occurred. 
However, rotor downwash was 
probably the final contributing fac­
tor to the erratic fire behavior and 
resulting entrapment. The firefight­
ers were operating within accept­
able risk limits before the helicop­
ter arrived, having to some extent 
compromised only a minimum 
number of Watch Out Situations. 
Not until the helicopter arrived did 
acceptable risk escalate into unac­
ceptable risk within just a matter of 
seconds. 
Unwritten Watch Out 
Situation 
One of the most important func­
tions of fire managers on the fire-
line is to recognize when Watch 
Out Situations and Standard Fire 
Orders are excessively compro­
mised, and to take immediate cor­
rective action to ensure firefighter 
safety. Pilots will most likely not 
know how close firefighters on the 
ground are to this point of unac­
ceptable risk. When air operations 
are in progress, pilots and firefight­
ers alike must remember that no 
Watch Out Situation or Standard 
Fire Order specifically addresses 
how aircraft turbulence affects fire 
behavior. Pilots and firefighters 
should keep in mind that low or 
moderate hazards, under certain 
conditions, can quickly become 
high or extreme hazards due to 
unexpected aircraft turbulence. 
This incident in no way suggests 
that turbulence from aircraft will 
Fire behavior in brush–juniper fuels on the Broad Canyon Fire in central Utah, July 11, 
1996. Fuels were extremely dry and volatile. Photo: Billy Bennett, South Carolina 
Forestry Commission, Spartanburg, SC, 1996. 
always cause erratic fire behavior. 
However, it does suggest that air­
craft turbulence should be one of 
the unwritten Watch Out 
Situations for firefighters to keep in 
mind on the fireline. 
Literature Cited: 
NWCG (National Wildfire Coordinating 
Group). 1992. Common denominators of 
fire behavior on tragedy and near-miss 
forest fires. NFES 2225. Boise, ID: 
National Interagency Fire Center.  ■ 
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INCREASING SAFETY DURING MOPUP* 
Tom Leuschen and Ken Frederick 
F
or many years, the wildland fire 
community has known that 
mopping up a fire can be just as 
dangerous as containing and con­
trolling it. Unfortunately, we have 
not always done the best job in mit­
igating the hazards that firefighters 
are exposed to during this impor­
tant phase of fire suppression. 
A new approach is now available for 
assessing the need for, and accom­
plishing, mopup on wildland fires. 
Known as the consumption strate­
gy, the new approach departs from 
traditional thinking by using the 
natural tendency of a fire to burn 
itself out by consuming its fuel. 
The consumption strategy realisti­
cally compares the risks and conse­
quences associated with an escaped 
fire to the risks and consequences 
associated with the hazards fire­
fighters typically face during mop-
up, which tend to be related to 
gravity (falling snags, rolling mate­
rials, and tripping and falling). The 
strategy is designed to improve fire­
fighter safety while still suppressing 
a fire. 
The consumption strategy is 
planned during containment and 
implemented during control or 
mopup. It includes these steps (fig. 
1): 
When this article was first published, Tom 
Leuschen was a fire and fuels specialist for 
the USDA Forest Service, Okanogan 
National Forest, Okanogan, WA; and Ken 
Frederick was an information assistant for 
the Forest Service, Wenatchee National 
Forest, Chelan Ranger District, Chelan, 
WA. 
* The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 
59(4) [Fall 1999]: 30–34. 
1. Mopup strategy and standards 
flow from a determination made 
about the fire’s potential to 
escape across firelines after it is 
declared contained. 
2. Sections of the fire that show a 
high potential for escape receive 
the normal mopup treatment. 
3. Sections of the fire that do not 
show a high potential for escape 
and that contain significant grav­
ity-related hazards are not con-
The consumption strategy for mopup exploits a
 
fire’s natural tendency to consume its fuels and
 
burn itself out.
 
sidered for lengthy operational 
assignments that could place 
crews in harm’s way. 
4. Sections of the fire avoided due 
to gravity-related hazards are 
still patrolled or otherwise moni­
tored. “Patrolling” means that 
crews or scouts hike along fire-
lines in the avoided areas (stay­
ing alert for falling or rolling 
material) to check for escapes of 
the fire across firelines but not 
Figure 1—Consumption strategy decision tree, for application separately to each 
section of the fire. 
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to extinguish flames or embers 
within the firelines. 
5. Operational assignments in 
avoided areas can include, in 
addition to patrolling, tasks such 
as blacklining (burning fuels 
adjacent to firelines), flush-cut­
ting stobs, trimming tree 
branches immediately inside the 
lines, and gridding (searching 
systematically along gridlines) 
for spot fires well outside of the 
lines. Firelines can be strength­
ened, as long as crews maintain 
good lookouts and do not linger 
in dangerous spots. 
Origins of the
Consumption Strategy 
The consumption strategy originat­
ed in response to a near tragedy 
during the 1997 fire season. The 
season was relatively quiet in east­
ern Washington. In fact, the only 
project fire on the Wenatchee 
National Forest was the Gold Creek 
Fire on the Naches Ranger District 
in August 1997, which burned 
about 480 acres (190 ha) of pon­
derosa pine and Douglas-fir near 
Cliffdell, WA. During mopup on the 
incident, a Washington Department 
of Natural Resources crewmember 
was struck and seriously injured by 
a snag being felled by a sawyer. 
Ironically, the accident occurred 
when areas inside the fireline were 
being “snagged” for firefighter safe­
ty. 
Tom Leuschen, the fire and fuels 
specialist for Washington’s 
Okanogan National Forest, was on 
the Gold Creek Fire as a fire behav­
ior analyst. “It occurred to me,” 
Leuschen recalled, “that we were 
asking the firefighters to work in 
hazardous areas to do mopup when 
there was minimal risk of the fire 
escaping.” By the third day of the 
Gold Creek Fire, Leuschen had 
hiked the perimeter of the fire and 
determined that the blaze posed lit­
tle threat of escaping. However, the 
operations and plans sections of the 
type 2 team managing the fire were 
still trying to control the fire 
according to standards agreed to by 
the local line officer and the inci­
dent management team—and that 
included risky mopup work inside 
the black. 
After the accident, Leuschen and 
the district ranger walked out to 
the lines with the incident com­
mander, safety officer, and opera­
tions section chief to take a sober 
look at the work. Although discus­
sion continued to focus on how 
firefighters could work safely inside 
the lines, Leuschen questioned 
whether firefighters needed to work 
inside the black at all. Areas where 
firefighters had completed several 
shifts of mopup showed little differ­
ence in the kinds and amounts of 
smoldering debris from similar 
areas where no mopup had oc­
curred. Residual interior smokes 
were not a threat to the lines. 
Furthermore, a large percentage of 
the fire perimeter consisted of sec­
tions where the fire had backed 
downhill; in order to escape in 
these areas, the fire would have to 
jump the lines and aggressively 
spread downhill, a highly unlikely 
eventuality. “As a result of our 
observations,” Leuschen said, “we 
recommended a change in mopup 
standards to the line officer.” The 
group had learned a lesson: Per­
forming mopup where it wasn’t 
really needed had nearly cost a life. 
The Gold Creek incident made it 
increasingly obvious that we need a 
strategy for assessing risk to reduce 
firefighters’ exposure to hazards 
during mopup. Since the South 
Canyon tragedy in 1994, risk 
assessment has focused primarily 
on avoiding fire entrapments. In 
recent years, the wildland fire com­
munity has paid more attention to 
mitigating risk during containment 
and control (constructing and 
securing firelines) than during 
mopup. We need to rethink what 
mopup is. Are we out there trying 
to physically put out every flame 
and ember, or are we trying to pre­
vent the fire from escaping control 
lines while those flames and 
embers burn out? Depending on 
the situation, we currently do both; 
but we should remember to distin­
guish between the two and to 
choose the approach that best pro­
tects our crews. 
Managers’ perceptions of the risks 
to firefighters must change with 
changes in a given fire. At a certain 
point in a fire, the primary danger 
facing firefighters is no longer the 
fire itself, but rather  falling or 
rolling objects (fig. 2). As the fire 
nears containment, entrapment 
risk decreases but gravity-related 
risk increases. Trees, both live and 
dead, with fire in their bases 
become increasingly unstable; 
stumps roll as they lose the old, dry 
roots that have held them on the 
slope; and firefighter fatigue accu­
mulates, reducing energy and alert­
ness and causing more tripping and 
falling on steep terrain. 
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ously remains a serious risk that 
overhead and crews must never for­
get. However, we must elevate our 
awareness of the risks to firefight­
ers from gravity-related hazards 
during mopup. 
Operational Success 
In August 1998, the 8,500-acre 
(3,400-ha) North 25 Fire on the 
Wenatchee National Forest’s Chelan 
Ranger District in Washington pro­
vided the first opportunity to 
implement the consumption strate­
gy. A number of factors coincided 
to make testing possible under 
actual field conditions. First, Tom 
Leuschen was detailed to the dis­
trict as the fire management officer 
for the summer. Second, the 
Central Washington Area Incident 
Command Team, the same team 
that had handled the Gold Creek 
Fire, was assigned to manage the 
North 25 Fire when it escaped ini­
tial attack. With the Gold Creek 
experience still fresh in their 
minds, the team’s leaders were will­
ing to consider a new approach. 
Third, District Ranger Al Murphy 
and Forest Supervisor Sonny 
O’Neal were both willing to accept 
the possibility of a longer lasting or 
larger fire if the consumption strat­
egy were implemented. Finally, the 
North 25 Fire had the topographi­
cal and fuel conditions necessary 
for applying the new approach (fig. 
3). 
Implementing the consumption 
strategy on the North 25 Fire 
offered several immediate benefits: 
1. Reduced risk of firefighter injury 
due to falling and rolling materi­
als on steep, rocky slopes. 
2. Reduced need for resources and 
labor. Because much of the 
North 25 Fire’s perimeter was 
inaccessible by road, convention- 3. Reduced cost. Assisted by the 
al mopup was likely to involve  consumption of available fuels, 
lots of crews, long hoselays, and  mopup would cost less than tra­
significant helicopter use.  ditional, labor-intensive mopup. 
Figure 2—Consumption strategy risk assessment on a fire in coniferous forest that is 
contained after 3 days. As the fire nears containment, gravity-related risks (such as falling 
trees, slippery slopes, and rolling rocks and stumps) exceed risks from an escaped fire. In 
sections of the fire where gravity-related risks exceed the risk of fire escape (the no-work 
zone), mopup should be avoided. 
Figure 3—An Erickson S–64 helicopter drops water on an inaccessible spot fire, part of 
the North 25 Fire, Chelan Ranger District, Wenatchee National Forest, WA, in August 
1998. The steep terrain and poor accessibility of the site called for applying the consump­
tion strategy, which succeeded in controlling the fire while minimizing the risks to fire­
fighters from gravity-related hazards such as falling snags and rolling logs. Photo: Paige 
Houston, USDA Forest Service, Okanogan National Forest, Tonasket Ranger District, 
Tonasket, WA, 1998. 
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4. Reduced spread of noxious 
weeds, particularly the diffuse 
knapweed (Centaurea diffusa). 
Ranger Murphy saw that tilling 
less soil would reduce the 
amount of prepared seedbed for 
weed propagation. “The North 25 
Fire burned on both sides of one 
of the busiest roads on this dis­
trict,” he said. “The less ground 
we dig up, the more we prevent 
weeds from spreading outside of 
the road corridor.” 
The incident management team 
carefully briefed all operational per­
sonnel on why and how the new 
mopup standards were to be imple­
mented on the fire. Even after sev­
eral briefings, however, some crews 
still had trouble accepting the idea 
of merely patrolling firelines for 3 
to 5 days while allowing the fire to 
consume fuels just inside the lines. 
“This approach is a cultural shift in 
how we manage fires,” said Incident 
Commander Jim Furlong. “We are 
used to being aggressive in extin­
guishing fires, so being patient like 
this feels a little unnatural.” Some 
crews modified their line patrol 
assignments by scavenging a 20­
foot (6.2-meter) strip of ground just 
inside the lines for fuel and then 
constructing and burning numer­
ous small handpiles. The result was 
a cleanly burned and very secure 
blackline. 
According to Furlong, many crews 
understood that the incident man­
agement team was looking out for 
firefighter safety in using the con­
sumption strategy. “The crews that 
picked up on what we were doing 
were the hotshot crews,” Furlong 
noted. “I had a number of superin­
tendents come up to me and thank 
us for using this approach.” 
Twenty-two interagency hotshot 
crews from the Pacific Northwest 
and California were on the North 
25 Fire. 
The consumption strategy succeed­
ed. About a quarter of the fire 
perimeter was never considered for 
direct attack, let alone mopup, 
because it was on an extremely 
steep, rock-strewn slope overlook­
ing Lake Chelan (fig. 4). Around 
the remainder of the fire, the oper­
ations section chiefs opted for 
intensive mopup on only 22 per­
cent of the firelines, based on the 
prevalence of unburned fuels next 
to the lines. For 3 to 5 days, more 
than 7 miles (11.2 km) of the 9.5 
miles (15.2 km) of accessible 
perimeter were allowed to smolder 
under the watchful eyes of daily 
patrols. There were no accidents 
during mopup and no significant 
escapes. Because almost no hose 
was laid and operations were much 
less labor intensive than under the 
conventional mopup approach, 
seven crews could be freed right 
away for fire assignments else­
where. 
Lessons Learned 
Several lessons can be learned from 
our experience with the consump­
tion strategy on the North 25 Fire: 
•F irefighters should mop up in 
areas of high gravity-related haz­
ard only when necessary. Too 
often we approach mopup based 
on tradition and habit. Especially 
in an age of increasingly large 
fires across the West, the same 
Figure 4—The North 25 Fire burns deep in Box Canyon on the south shore of Lake 
Chelan, Chelan Ranger District, Wenatchee National Forest, WA, in August 1998. About a 
quarter of the fire perimeter was never considered for direct attack, let alone mopup, 
because it was on an extremely steep, rock-strewn slope overlooking the lake. The con­
sumption strategy is well suited for consideration on such sites. Photo: Paige Houston, 
USDA Forest Service, Okanogan National Forest, Tonasket Ranger District, Tonasket, WA, 
1998. 
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mopup as for line construction. 
Sometimes it might be safer and 
more sensible to be vigilantly 
patient for a few days while a fire 
consumes its fuels than to 
aggressively put it out. 
• Line officers and fire managers 
on project fires should reflect 
upon what might be a false sense 
of insecurity regarding how thor­
oughly a fire should be extin­
guished before the local adminis­
trative unit reassumes responsi­
bility for the fire. Line officers 
should consider accepting more 
risk of fire escape in exchange for 
less risk to firefighter safety. The 
risk of escape is often only mar­
ginally higher under the con­
sumption strategy. 
•F ire behavior analysts should 
measure the potential for escape 
on each section of line as it is 
completed. Each section must 
also be evaluated for gravity-
related hazards. These data must 
then be presented to the line offi­
cer for determining mopup stan­
dards. 
• Although perceiving mopup as 
putting out the fire is often 
appropriate, sometimes a more 
reasonable interpretation of 
mopup is making sure the fire 
does not cross control lines. 
Making this subtle distinction 
will help fire managers and fire­
fighters avoid the potentially high 
costs of doing what the fire will 
likely do by itself—given just a 
little time. 
Safety must always be our first pri­
ority in suppressing wildland fires. 
Applied correctly, the consumption 
strategy offers a safer, more cost-
effective means of achieving the 
same objective—wildland fire sup­
pression.  ■ 
Wildland Fire Research’s Raison D’etre
* 
One basic presupposition seems  just one justification for existence,  measure necessary for the suc­
to be essential, and to demand  just one function, just one objec­ cessful practice of forestry is pro-
full agreement and understand­ tive. That is: To aid the present and  tection from forest fires.” Fire 
ing…. This is the premise that  future administrators of fire con- research is therefore intended to 
all of our experiment station  trol, Federal, State, and private. We  serve as directly as possible the 
divisions of fire research have  are not doing research for  fire-control men who must first 
research’s sake. We have a definite,  be successful before any of the 
* From H.T. Gisborne “Review of Problems and  decidedly practical goal, and it is  other arts or artists of forestry 
Accomplishments in Fire Control and Fire 
Research (Fire Control Notes 6[2] [April 1942]: 
47–63). 
still the basic, over-all goal that 
Graves stated in 1910: “The first 
can function with safety. 
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PHOTO CONTEST ANNOUNCEMENT
 
Fire Management Today invites 
you to submit your best fire-related 
photos to be judged in our annual 
competition. Judging begins after 
the first Friday in March of each 
year. 
Awards 
All contestants will receive a 
CD–ROM with all photos not elimi­
nated from competition. Winning 
photos will appear in a future issue 
of Fire Management Today.I n 
addition, winners in each category 
will receive: 
• 1st place—Camera equipment 
worth $300 and a 16- by 20-inch 
framed copy of your photo. 
• 2nd place—An 11- by 14-inch 
framed copy of your photo. 
•3 rd place—An 8- by 10-inch 
framed copy of your photo. 
Categories 
•W ildland fire 
•P rescribed fire 
•W ildland/urban interface fire 
• Aerial resources 
•G round resources 
•M iscellaneous (fire effects; fire 
weather; fire-dependent commu­
nities or species; etc.) 
Rules 
• The contest is open to everyone. 
You may submit an unlimited 
number of entries from any place 
or time; but for each photo, you 
must indicate only one competi­
tion category. To ensure fair eval­
uation, we reserve the right to 
change the competition category 
for your photo. 
• An original color slide is pre­
ferred; however, we will accept 
high-quality color prints, as long 
as they are accompanied by nega­
tives. Digitally shot slides (pre­
ferred) or prints will be accepted 
if they are scanned at 300 lines 
per inch or equivalent. Digital 
images will be accepted if you 
used a camera with at least 2.5 
megapixels and the image is shot 
at the highest resolution or in a 
TIFF format. 
•Y ou must have the right to grant 
the Forest Service unlimited use 
of the image, and you must agree 
that the image will become pub­
lic domain. Moreover, the image 
must not have been previously 
published. 
• For every photo you submit, you 
must give a detailed caption 
(including, for example, name, 
location, and date of the fire; 
names of any people and/or their 
job descriptions; and descriptions 
of any vegetation and/or wildlife). 
•Y ou must complete and sign a 
statement granting rights to use 
your photo(s) to the USDA Forest 
Service (see sample statement 
below). Include your full name, 
agency or institutional affiliation 
(if any), address, and telephone 
number. 
• Photos are eliminated from com­
petition if they have date stamps; 
show unsafe firefighting practices 
(unless that is their express pur­
pose); or are of low technical 
quality (for example, have soft 
focus or show camera move­
ment). (Duplicates—including 
most overlays and other compos­
ites—have soft focus and will be 
eliminated.) 
• Photos are judged by a photogra­
phy professional whose decision 
is final. 
Postmark Deadline 
First Friday in March 
Send submissions to: 
Madelyn Dillon 
CAT Publishing Arts 
2150 Centre Avenue 
Building A, Suite 361 
Fort Collins, CO 80526 
Sample Photo Release Statement 
Enclosed is/are  (number) slide(s) for publication by the USDA Forest Service. For each slide 
submitted, the contest category is indicated and a detailed caption is enclosed. I have the right to grant 
the Forest Service unlimited use of the image, and I agree that the image will become public domain. 
Moreover, the image has not been previously published. 
Signature  Date 
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First of Its Kind: A Historical Perspective on
Wildland Fire Behavior Training 
M.E. Alexander and D.A. Thomas 
In 1957, the Chief of the USDA 
Forest Service appointed a task 
force to study ways of preventing 
firefighter fatalities in the future. 
A review of 16 fatality fires found 
that the associated fire behavior 
in all but one case was unexpect­
ed by those entrapped or over­
run. One of the task force’s 
major recommendations was an 
intensified program of fire 
behavior training.* 
The recommendation led to the 
first National Fire Behavior 
Training School. Trainees assem­
bled at the Smokejumper Center 
in Missoula, MT, for a course that 
lasted from March 31 to May 1, 
1958. Bacon (1958) has written a 
good account of the 5-week 
course. 
The 28 trainees came from all 
regions of the Forest Service, 
various forestry schools, the U.S. 
Department of the Interior, and 
the National Association of State 
Foresters. The instructors came 
from the Forest Service, the U.S. 
Weather Bureau, Yale University, 
Marty Alexander is a senior fire behav­
ior research officer with the Canadian 
Forest Service at the Northern Forestry 
Centre, Edmonton, Alberta; and Dave 
Thomas is regional fuels specialist for 
the USDA Forest Service, Intermountain 
Region, Ogden, UT. 
* The task force’s full report is on the World Wide 
Web at <http://wildfirelessons.net/Libr_History.html>. 
Students and instructors at the first National Fire Behavior Training School, held in 
spring 1958.  Front row (left to right): A. Brackebusch (INT), E. DeSilvia (R-1), J. 
Philbrick (R-6), E. Marshall (R-6), M. Lowden (WO), E. Williams (R-8), J. Coleman (R­
9), E. Bacon (WO), and W. Moore (R-1).  Middle row (left to right):  F.  Brauer (R-1), K. 
Knutson (R-2), K. Wilson (R-2), J. Koen (R-8), J. Kilodragovich (R-1), C. Phillips (CDF), 
D. Pomerening (R-8), B. Emerson (R-9), H. Reinecker (CDF), and J. Dieterich (INT). 
Back row (left to right):  L. Biddson (R-5), C. Fox (R-4), S. Moore (R-6), K. Scholz (R­
2), J. Davis (RMF), K. Thompson (R-2), B. Rasmussen (R-4), J. Keetch (R-7), T. 
Schlapfer (R-5), L. Kelley (R-7), T. Koskella (R-4), W. Murray (R-4), K. Weiesenbam (R­
3), F. Mass (R-1), J. Franks (BLM), C. Hardy (INT), W. Krumm (WB), and J. Barrows 
(INT). Abbreviations: BLM = U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land 
Management; CDF = California Division of Forestry; INT = USDA Forest Service, 
Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station; R-1 = Forest Service, Northern 
Region; R-2 = Forest Service, Rocky Moutain Region; R-3 = Forest Service, 
Southwestern Region; R-4 = Forest Service, Intermountain Region; R-5 = Forest 
Service, Pacific Southwest Region; R-6 = Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region; R-8 
= Forest Service, Southern Region; R-9 = Forest Service, Eastern Region; RMF = 
Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station; WB = U.S. 
Weather Bureau; and WO = Forest Service, Washington Office. 
and the Munitalp Foundation.  help with naming the individuals 
Trainees and some instructors are  shown in the photo. 
shown in the group photo below 
(from Bacon 1958).  Reference 
Bacon, E.M. 1958. Training in forest fire 
Acknowledgment  behavior. American Forests. 64(7): 
24-25, 47-49.
The authors wish to thank Mike 
Hardy and Colin Hardy for their 